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ABSTRACT
Current recommendations in the UK identify the audit committee as a key
component of effective corporate governance. These recommendations
emphasise the importance of structure and processes in an effective audit
committee. It is therefore important to consider if these structures and
processes are effective in promoting corporate accountability and control.
This thesis therefore considers the extent to which the composition and
structure of the audit committee is associated with the ability of the audit
committee to fulfil its roles and objectives effectively in UK listed companies.
It is reasonable to assume that an audit committee may be considered effective
where it achieves its stated roles. The audit committee is not required to report
to the shareholders within the financial statements on the extent to which they
have achieved their roles. Thus, actual audit committee effectiveness cannot be
externally observed.
It is possible to measure audit committee effectiveness indirectly if it is
considered that the absence of financial reporting problems indicates an audit
committee has been effective in achieving their financial reporting oversight
role. I.e. the extent to which the audit committees discharge their functional
roles could be used as a surrogate for an external indication of audit committee
effectiveness.
This thesis therefore considers if the key governance mechanisms thought to
impinge on audit committee effectiveness are present in companies in which the
audit committee is considered to have failed in their financial reporting oversight
role.
The key governance mechanisms examined were:
• The presence of the joint role of the CEO and the chairman;
• Board Balance;
• Existence of an audit committee;
• Independence of the audit committee;
• No. of audit committee members;
• Existence of charter/terms of reference;
• No. of meetings held by the audit committee per year;
• Evidence of Interaction with / existence of Internal audit;
• Financial literacy of members;
• Technical competency of members;
• Additional directorships of members.
The results, based on comparing the above governance mechanisms in
companies with no financial reporting problems ("CNFRP") to companies that
have financial reporting problems (CFRP), indicate that "CNFRP's" have audit
committees with significantly higher percentages of financially literate and
technically competent members.
This thesis provides insight into the effectiveness of governance mechanisms in
UK audit committees during the period 1995-1999. This thesis contributes by
updating our understanding of the factors that influence the effectiveness of the
audit committee. It highlights that current recommendations in the United
Kingdom, with their focus on audit committee composition and structure, should
also consider the competency of audit committee members and determine a
benchmark by which competency may be measured.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
I INTRODUCTION
1.1 WHAT IS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
"Corporate governance is concerned with the process by which corporate
entities, particularly limited liability companies, are governed: that is with the
exercise of power over the direction of the company, supervision of executive
duties, accountability..." Tricker 1984 p.482-3
A country's economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its companies.
Thus the effectiveness with which the their boards discharge their
responsibilities determines competitive position. The board must be free to drive
the company forward but must exercise that freedom within a framework of
accountability. A good system of governance must therefore: -
• fulfil of the long term strategic goals of the owners;
• consider and care for the interest of employees;
• take account of the needs of the local community and the environment;
• maintain good relations with customers and suppliers; and
• ensure compliance with legislation and regulations.
The interactions of the various parties result in several conflicts. An analysis of
the underlying issues provides a useful starting point in the analysis of
corporate governance and the specific issues arising therein.
"The shareholders provide the capital the corporation needs and thus own the
property of the corporation and have certain legal rights to see that this property
is used to further their interests." Bucholz (1986 p.235) 
This traditional model as defined by Bucholz (1986) of the company sees
directors acting in the interests of the company as agents of the shareholders
and management being selected by the board to carry out the day to day tasks
involved in serving the shareholders' interests. The duties of the Board, e.g.
governance, and management are distinct. The focus of governance is
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concerned with the overall direction of the company and its interaction with the
company stakeholders. The focus of management is the attainment of specific
goals over a definite time frame.
(Dayton, 1984 p.34) summarises the distinction as:
"By corporate governance, I mean the process, structure and relationships
through which the board of directors oversees what its executives do. By
management, I mean what the executives do to define and achieve the
objectives of the company".
The critical issue is whether directors who are also members of top
management can be relied upon to monitor and control their own managerial
performance.
Donaldson (1990) argues a view of managerial motivations contrary to agency
theory that can be defined as stewardship theory. This theory argues that non-
financial motivators-McCelland (1961) i.e. the need for intrinsic job satisfaction
result in managers being able to carry out actions which may not necessarily be
in their own personal interests- Etzioni (1957).
Exponents of stewardship theory argue that the classical concept of the
corporation, enshrined in company law, has been that power lies with the
shareholders. These powers enable the shareholders to choose the structure of
their company's board and members of it, with independent external auditors
appointed to report on the truth and fairness of the reports that the directors are
required to regularly present.
However, many commentators e.g. Berle and Means (1932) have pointed out
that large public companies have many shareholders who are geographically
dispersed, hold diverse expectations from their investment, and are separate
and remote from management. The classical approach under stewardship
theory for shareholders to oversee directors is therefore considered
inappropriate.
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Agency theory argues that in the modern corporation, in which share ownership
is widely held, managerial actions depart from those required to maximise
shareholder returns (Berle and Means, 1932).
If agency theory is applied to corporate governance, it is posited that managers
will not act to maximise returns to shareholders unless appropriate governance
structures are in place.
Eisenhardt (1989) specifies certain mechanisms to reduce the cost of agency.
These mechanisms include the need for boards to have: -
• non-executive directors who are genuinely independent of management;
• committees of the board comprising of non-executive directors to be concerned with
audit, nomination of new directors, and remuneration of top management; and
• the roles of the chief executive officer and chairman as separate positions.
The current recommendations on corporate governance appear to embody
agency theory and this is reflected in the various mechanisms included in
current corporate governance recommendations.
1.2 DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance issues became prominent in the early 1980's in the
United States during the period of aggressive corporate take-over activity.
During this period, many boards instituted measures that were aimed to prevent
undesirable take-over bids. Whilst these measures may have proved effective,
some shareholders felt that the boards were not acting in the best interests of
the shareholders. The difference in the 1980s was that institutional
shareholders were much more likely to address these issues and debate
possible solutions.
The problems associated with the divergence of interests between shareholders
and the board are not new. Berle and Means (1932) defined the agency
problem as:
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The inherent tension created when the directors running the companies were
not the major shareholders". Berle and Means (1932) 
In contrast, in the UK, the corporate governance debate came into the spotlight
due to several high-profile corporate failures - such as Polly Peck, Coloroll and
BCCI. In these cases, directors were not only seen as acting against the
shareholders' interests, they were also in breach of their duties to the company.
In the aftermath of these cases, a committee, chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury,
was formed in 1991 to examine the financial aspects of corporate governance in
publicly quoted UK companies. The subsequent Cadbury Report, which was
published in December 1992, focused the corporate governance debate in four
main areas:
• The responsibilities of executive and non-executive directors for reviewing and reporting
on performance to shareholders;
• The case for establishing audit committees;
• The principal responsibilities of auditors;
• The links between shareholders, boards of directors and auditors.
Following a series of highly publicised large pay awards, amidst poor corporate
performance, to certain directors primarily in the privatised utilities, public
awareness of the divergence between the interests of directors and
shareholders was raised. The Greenbury Committee was set up, chaired by Sir
Richard Greenbury.
The Greenbury Code (1995) made a series of recommendations on the role of
remuneration committees, disclosure of directors' remuneration and provisions
for approval of long-term incentive schemes, corporate remuneration policy, the
length of directors' service contracts and the compensation paid to directors
when these contracts come to an end.
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The Committee on Corporate Governance (known as the Hampel Committee)
was issued in 1998 and reviewed the previous codes and made proposals for
updating them.
The Combined Code (1998) was a consolidation of the work of the three prior
governance inquiries. The Combined Code has been incorporated into the
Stock Exchange Listing Rules as part of the Yellow Book's 'Continuing
Obligations'. While companies are under no formal obligation to comply with the
Combined Code, they are obligated to report on their compliance with
guidelines set out in the first section of the Code and to identify and explain
areas of non-compliance as a stock exchange listing condition.
The importance of corporate governance lies in its contribution both to business
prosperity and to accountability. As a result of the events in the early 1980's, the
corporate governance debate in the United States has focused on shareholder
rights. However, the emphasis in the UK has predominantly focused on
accountability and the structure and processes to ensure accountability.
The Institute of Directors' report, stated that:
"The key purpose of the board is to ensure the company's prosperity by
collectively directing its affairs and meeting the legitimate interests of the
shareholders and other interested parties. To achieve this, Standards for the
Board highlights four key tasks for the board:
• Establishing vision, mission and values
• Setting strategy and structure
• Delegation to management
• Exercising responsibility to shareholders and other interested parties". Standards for
the Board (1995)
National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) suggested that:
"The debate should concentrate on two issues:
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Board integrity - ensuring that accounting and other statutory concerns are
addressed
Enterprise - encouraging boards to drive businesses forward in the long-term
interests of the shareholders." Good Corporate Governance (1996)
Both reports (Institute of Directors and NAPF) were clear that the promotion of
business enterprise was a key issue in corporate governance. They served to
highlight the fact that the recommendations on corporate governance published
to date (Cadbury and Greenbury) had not emphasised this issue.
Criticisms of the current recommendations on corporate governance before the
publication of the Turnbull report were mainly as a result of the focus on the
issues concerning accountability as opposed to those concerned with promoting
corporate enterprise.
The Turnbull Report (1999) which has also been incorporated into the
Combined Code completes the current recommendations on corporate
governance for UK listed companies. The key features of the guidance are:
• It aims to reflect good practice whereby internal controls are 'embedded' in the business.
• it adopts a risk-based approach to sound internal control.
• Clarification is provided of the respective roles of the board, its committees and
management.
• It covers all internal controls, not just the financial ones.
• it requires that companies should undertake an annual review of its internal audit
department or, if it does not have one, they should review the need for such a function.
• It provides a series of questions covering risk assessment, control, information and
communication and monitoring to assist companies in reviewing internal control.
The Turnbull Report was therefore not focused solely on disclosure. With the
guidance provided on risk control and assessment, the management of the
significant business risks representing a threat to the achievement of a
company's objectives was considered. It was clear that this report had taken
PAGE 12
steps to ensure that the corporate governance debate was now focused on the
promotion of business enterprise as well as accountability.
The emphasis on structure and process in the current recommendations on
corporate governance still remains. It is therefore important to consider if these
structures and processes are effective in promoting corporate accountability
and control.
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Given the highly publicised business failures in many countries, attention has
been increasingly focused on audit committees as one of the primary means of
improving corporate governance.
There is no specific definition of an audit committee in private sector
organisations but they are generally described as: -
• a sub-committee of the board;
• composed exclusively or predominantly of non-executive directors; and
• having the responsibility for reviewing the financial statements and the accounting
principles and practices underlying them, liasing with the internal and external auditors,
and reviewing the effectiveness of internal controls.
Pincus et al (1988) note that audit committees enhance the board's capacity to
act as a management control by providing a more detailed knowledge and
understanding of the financial statements and other financial information issued
by the organisation.
Accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders is achieved primarily
through financial reports that have been subject to a statutory external audit.
The external audit process has been much criticised due to the apparent failure
of auditors to discover fraud and error and to foresee corporate failure and the
apparent non-independence of auditors caused by their provision of non-audit
services.
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Whilst the problems regarding user perception may be to some extent
addressed by better disclosure and an expansion in the nature and scope of
external audit assignments to reflect these concerns, the problems associated
with the credibility of external auditors and the perceived lack of independence
still remains.
A great deal of research has been undertaken to date about audit committees.
However, most of this research has been concerned with structure and
existence of audit committees. Fried (1976) noted that the pre-occupation with
the form of audit committees was not conducive to evaluating the effectiveness
of audit committees. Prior to the mandatory listing requirements of the Stock
Exchanges in the UK and USA, the establishment of audit committees provided
some indication of their usefulness. Existence is now no longer a criteria in
evaluating audit committee effectiveness.
Studies regarding the effectiveness of audit committees in meeting their
objectives have been limited. McMullen (1996) and Wild (1996) found positive
associations between the presence of audit committees and improved financial
reporting. These studies provide limited evidence of audit committee
effectiveness given that Stock Exchange requirements in the UK and USA have
resulted in large quoted companies being required to have audit committees.
The study provides useful evidence on the consequences of not having an audit
committee.
Beasley (1996) highlights the significance of board composition as opposed to
the existence of an audit committee in relation to the likelihood of financial
statement fraud. Given that the monitoring of financial reporting is one of the
main roles of the audit committee, if board composition is the more significant
factor, the role of the audit committee in financial reporting is questionable.
Beasley (2000) considered the key structural elements of audit committees in
fraud as compared to no-fraud firms. It was found that whilst both types of firm
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had audit committees, the structure of the fraud firms audit committee was
unsatisfactory.
This highlights that the mere presence of an audit committee is not an important
governance mechanism. It is rather the structure and composition of the audit
1.
committee that influences the effectiveness of the audit committee.
This thesis therefore considers the extent to which the composition and
structure of the audit committee is associated with the ability of the audit
committee to fulfil its roles and objectives effectively in UK listed companies.
1.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The overall purpose of this thesis therefore considers if the key factors thought
to impinge on audit committee effectiveness are present in companies in which
the audit committee is considered to have failed in their financial reporting
oversight role. It was considered that the extent to which the audit committees
discharge their functional roles could be used as a surrogate for an external
indication of audit committee effectiveness.
For the purpose of this thesis, it was decided to focus on the audit committee's
oversight role in respect of the financial statements. Audit committees were
considered ineffective where disclosures within the financial statements did not
reflect the true state of affairs in the company. The overall null hypothesis of this
thesis considers that companies with financial reporting problems have
ineffective audit committees.
The balance of the board i.e. the proportion of executive to non-executive
directors may result in a board in which non-executive directors are ineffective
and may therefore result in an ineffective audit committee.
Hypothesis 1 states that companies with financial reporting problems
are more likely to have ineffectively composed boards
PAGE 15
The separation of the role and chief executive officer is considered important to
the effectiveness of the overall board and by implication the audit committee.
Hypothesis 2 states that companies with financial reporting problems
are more likely to have boards where the same person holds the
positions of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.
The literature specific to audit committee was also considered. The factors
considered influencing the ability of the audit committee to be effective were the
structure of the audit committee, the independence of audit committee members
and the quality of non-executive directors.
It was important to consider if companies with financial reporting problems were
more likely to have audit committees.
Hypothesis 3 therefore states that companies with financial reporting
problems are less likely to have audit committees
The membership of the audit committee was considered to impinge on the
effectiveness of the audit committee in respect of the number of members on
the audit committee. A minimum of three non-executive directors was
considered necessary for the audit committee to be effective.
Hypothesis 4 therefore states that companies with financial reporting
problems are more likely to have audit committees that have less than
three members
The governance procedures considered to impinge on the effectiveness of the
audit committee in respect of the structure of the audit committee were:
• The existence of an audit committee charter or terms of reference.
• The number of audit committee meetings in a given period.
• The existence of an internal audit function.
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Hypothesis 5 therefore states that companies with financial reporting
problems are more likely to have audit committees with poor
governance procedures
• The independence of audit committee members. All members of the audit committee
were to be independent for the audit committee to be considered effective.
Hypothesis 6 therefore states that companies with financial reporting
problems are more likely to have audit committees composed of non-
independent members
The quality of non-executive directors was considered to impinge on the
effectiveness of the audit committee. Audit committee members were assessed
in terms of:
• The extent to which the audit committee members are financially literate.
Hypothesis 7 therefore states that companies with financial reporting
problems are more likely to have audit committees with non-financially
literate members
• The extent to which the audit committee is considered technically competent.
Hypothesis 8 therefore states that companies with financial reporting
problems are more likely to have audit committees with no technically
competent members
Research evidence highlighted that as the number of additional directorships
held by non-executive directors' increases, their ability to fulfil their monitoring
responsibility decreases.
It was considered that as the number of additional directorships held by non-
executive directors' influenced their ability to fulfil their monitoring
responsibilities.
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Hypothesis 9 therefore states that companies with financial reporting
problems were more likely to have audit committees with directors who
hold additional directorships.
The above hypotheses therefore consider if the key factors thought to impinge
on audit committee effectiveness are present in companies in which the audit
committee is considered to have failed in their financial reporting oversight role.
1.5 UNTATIONS OF THE STUDY
Several limitations were evidenced during the study. These included:
• A focus on limited listed companies only.
• Company selection.
• Board member data.
• Audit committee data.
• Audit committee members.
• The use of secondary data sources.
1.5.1 Limited Company Focus
The focus on listed companies resulted in the fact those large private limited
companies whom, by choice, have not converted to PLC status were ignored by
the study. Whilst this may have resulted in some significantly large companies
with financial reporting problems being excluded from the population, this
problem is not considered to have invalidated the results of the study.
1.5.2 Company Selection
Four main data sources were used to identify companies with financial reporting
problems (FRP Companies). These were:
• Dialogue database.
• Press notices issued by the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) in the period
from 1.1.93 to date.
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• Hemmington Scott Quarterly Publications 1993-1997 and Hemmington Scott Quarterly
Database 1988 to date.
• Macmillan's Stock Exchange Yeart3ook 1999.
• Companies house Statutory Returns.
The populations of companies with financial reporting problems were drawn
from these sources. The FRRP primarily focuses on large PLC's — i.e. the TOP
350 UK companies. The Dialogue Database does not distinguish companies in
terms of size. The criterion for inclusion in this database is PLC status. The
Hemmington Scott Quarterly Publications / Hemmington Scott Quarterly
Database details all listed companies that have been removed due to
liquidation, administration, or receivership. The selection of companies from
these three sources therefore results in a population which may be considered
representative, in terms of size, of the overall population of UK listed
companies. The amalgamation of the companies identified from these three
sources limits this study but is not considered to invalidate this study.
The identification of companies with no financial reporting problems is however
biased due to the assumption that the absence of an audit report qualification
indicates the lack of a financial reporting problem.
The literature review highlights the reasons for which audit reports may not be
qualified in situations where a qualification was justified. The FRRP is however
there to prevent this situation from occurring. The problem however lies with the
manner in which cases are brought to the attention of the FRRP. The financial
statements of all listed companies are not routinely examined. The FRRP relies
on any inconsistencies to be brought to their attention. The lack of a pro-active
approach limits the extent to which the FRRP may be considered effective.
There is currently no other alternative source of information on the company
that would guarantee that a company selected would have no financial reporting
problems.
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1.5.3 Board Member Data
Certain weaknesses were evidenced in the collection of data on board
members. Reliance was placed on the disclosures within the financial
statements that stated if the role of the chief executive officer and the chairman
were combined or separated. In reality, there may be cases where the
separation of these roles may be more due to job title as opposed to a clear
separation of the role.
This may limit this study but is not considered to invalidate this study as there is
currently no other alternative external source of information on the company
that discloses the role and duties of the chief executive officer and the
chairman. Without this information, reliance must be placed on disclosures
within the financial statements.
1.5.4 Audit Committee Member Data
Certain weaknesses were evidenced in the collection of data on audit
committee members. The assessment of independence to some extent relied
on the disclosure of family and other significant director relationships. There is
no requirement to disclose family relationships and unless an obvious pattern is
evidenced, this evidence is unobtainable. This clearly limits the extent to which
this criteria may be evaluated.
The criteria used to assess independence this study were based on the
provisions of the Code (1998). Other bodies e.g. The ABI have other formal
measures to assess independence.
This study was limited to financial reporting problems within the financial
statements. It was therefore considered that the focus of the criteria used to
assess the adequacy of governance mechanisms should be based on
provisions that these companies were required to comply with.
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Section 4.1.2 of the Cadbury Report (1992) acknowledged that ".. non-executive
directors should be independent of management and free from any business or
other relationship that could materially interfere with their judgement."
This statement highlights that there may be other issues e.g. friendship and
personality that might compromise the independence of the directors. Whilst the
possible existence of these impediments to independence may be present and
may limit the true assessment of independence in this study, there is a lack of
available data to test these issues.
Director loans and other significant relationships are required to be disclosed by
the Companies Act 1985 and FRS 8 respectively. However, FRS 8 was only
introduced in 1995 and is effective only for companies with accounting periods
commencing after 23rd December 1995. Many companies included in the
qualifying period may not have been required to make the relevant disclosures.
This clearly limits the extent to which this criteria may be evaluated in some
companies.
1.5.5 Member Backgrounds
The categorisation of the backgrounds in terms of the technical competency
and financial literacy of audit committee members introduced a certain amount
of bias as audit committee members were classified into categories based on
published biographical information and prior employment history.
Problems therefore arose where no biographical information was available on
the director. It was therefore only possible to assume certain competencies
based on the directorships disclosed in the statutory returns by the director.
1.5.6 Secondary Data
The use of secondary data sources only is a potential weakness. The decision
to rely on secondary data sources was taken for the following reasons:
• Data availability. Given that a number of the companies to be reviewed were dissolved,
the use of primary data sources was not considered feasible.
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• Audit committees should be perceived as effective. The perception of effectiveness is
influenced by the composition of the audit committee. The availability of data within the
public domain to evaluate audit committees is thus required.
However, in order to ensure that the results gained using secondary data were
valid, a sample of audit committee members were interviewed to ensure that
their opinions validated the results obtained.
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter 2 first considers a governance model showing the main functions of the
board and main board committees to which these functions are delegated. The
model shows that the board is influenced by extrinsic influences i.e. the ability of
external parties to influence the board and intrinsic factors i.e. those attributes
of composition and structure that influence the ability of the board to perform.
The available literature on intrinsic and extrinsic influences on board and where
applicable the audit committee is then reviewed.
This chapter also examines the literature to date on the relationship between
the structure of the board and its effectiveness and highlights the factors that
might also influence audit committee effectiveness. Throughout this chapter,
the issues, which the author intends to utilise as bases for future hypotheses,
are highlighted as research questions
The main activities of the audit committee are examined in detail in chapter two
as it is considered that the extent to which the audit committees discharge their
functional roles can be used as a measure of audit committee effectiveness.
Chapter 2, given the roles delegated to the audit committee, also reviews the
composition and structure of the audit committee. The key governance
mechanisms particular to the audit committee are examined.
The literature to date on the relationship between the composition and structure
of the audit committee and its effectiveness and highlights the factors that might
also influence audit committee effectiveness is also reviewed. Throughout this
PAGE 22
chapter the issues, which the author intends to utilise as bases for future
hypotheses, are highlighted as research questions.
Chapter 3 contains the research hypotheses, the methodology to be used in
testing the stated hypotheses, and justification for the choice of methodology.
This chapter sets out the criteria used in: -
• Determining the nature of the study;
• Collecting and collating the data;
• Evaluating the data;
• Defining the nature of the testing to be undertaken; and
• Considering the limitations and strengths of the data collected.
Chapter 4 contains detailed descriptive results of the testing. Chapter 5 shows
the detailed statistical results of the testing. Chapter 6 contains the research
conclusions and highlights areas where additional studies are suggested.
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CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE
REVIEW
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 INTRODUCTION
A system of corporate governance is concerned with the checks and balances
on the exercise of power and with, if necessary, it's peaceful transfer - I.e. a
framework for effective accountability. Corporate governance varies between
countries as a result of differing ideologies, histories, political beliefs, social
and economic factors. It is therefore not possible to impose one uniform
system of governance across the board.
Governance systems mature and evolve over time. There are essentially three
models of governance namely: -
• the European Model as practised in Germany and most continental European
countries;
• The Japanese model;
• The Anglo-Saxon system (as practised in the UK, USA and Canada);
The two-tier model (the European model) has no common membership
between the supervisory board and the management team. The Japanese
model tends to have boards composed solely of executive management.
In the Anglo-Saxon model, boards are comprised of a combination of non-
executive directors and management. In the UK there tends to be
management dominated boards whilst in the USA and Canada non-executive
directors tend to form the majority of the board.
The governance model shown in section 2.3 reflects the Anglo-Saxon Model of
governance. The differences in the models of governance result in the fact that
only comparisons of the differences in corporate governance systems of
countries within the same model of governance are made.
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2.1.1 UK Governance
The UK system of corporate governance relies mainly on the board of
directors and, to some extent, the shareholders to achieve good governance.
The traditional model of the company sees the directors as acting in the
interests of the company as the agents of the shareholders, and management
being selected by the board to carry out the day to day tasks involved in
serving the shareholders' interests. Shareholders delegate the power to run
the company to managers. In theory, management (headed by the chief
executive officer) is accountable to boards who are elected by the
shareholders. Accountability can therefore be considered in terms of: -
• the accountability of management to the Board; and
• the accountability of the Board to shareholder.
The board therefore should play a pivotal role in ensuring that management is
accountable for their actions and that these actions are in the best interests of
the shareholder.
There is an enormous body of law that pertains to the legal duties of the board.
These laws however do not give specific definitions of the roles and functions
of the board. Publications in the USA and the UK I however have tended to
describe the roles and functions of the board as: -
• the selection, evaluation and if necessary dismissal of the chief executive officer,
• The review of corporate strategy and financial objectives;
• Review of internal control systems; and
• The selection and recommendation to shareholders of appropriate directors for
election.
The existence of boards is therefore based on the premise that they oversee
management, and select or dismiss managers who are able or unable,
respectively, to fulfil corporate objectives.
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This thesis is primarily concerned with the effectiveness of the key
mechanisms of the corporate governance framework. It considers if these
mechanisms and structures, in respect of UK companies and in particular their
audit committees constitute an adequate framework for effective
accountability.
2.2 CHAPTER STRUCTURE
Section 2.3 first considers a governance model showing the main functions of
the board and main board committees to which these functions are delegated.
The model shows that the board is influenced by extrinsic influences i.e. the
ability of external parties to influence the board and intrinsic factors i.e. those
attributes of composition and structure that influence the ability of the board to
perform.
The available literature on intrinsic and extrinsic influences on board and
where applicable the audit committee is then reviewed. The factors considered
in detail include: -
• Board size;
• Age/experience;
• Director remuneration;
• The separation of the role of the Chief executive officer and Chairman;
• Director independence; and
• The balance of the board - given the importance of the non-executive director's role
within the framework, the literature to date on the effectiveness of non-executive
directors in achieving their roles is reviewed.
This section also examines the literature to date on the relationship between
the structure of the board and its effectiveness and highlights the factors that
might also influence audit committee effectiveness. Throughout section 2.3,
the issues, which the author intends to utilise as bases for future hypotheses,
are highlighted as research questions.
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Section 2.4 reviews the role and structure of the audit committee, given the
roles delegated to the committee and the overall purpose of this thesis as
discussed in chapter 1. The key governance mechanisms particular to the
audit committee are examined. These include: -
• Audit committee composition;
• Audit committee structure; and
• Audit committee member backgrounds and skills.
The literature to date on the relationship between the composition and
structure of the audit committee and its effectiveness and highlights the factors
that might also influence audit committee effectiveness is also reviewed.
Throughout section 2.4, the issues, which the author intends to utilise as
bases for future hypotheses, are highlighted as research questions.
Section 2.5 considers the main findings of the literature review.
2.2.1 Corporate Governance Theories
2.2.1.1 Agency Theory
Agency theory with reference to the modern corporation in which share
ownership is widely held, may be defined in terms of the manner in which the
agents (the directors) will exercise their roles. This theory argues that the
actions of the agents depart from those required to maximise shareholder
returns (Berle and Means, 1932). I.e. agents will act in their own self-interest
as opposed to that of the principals (the shareholders)
If agency theory is applied to corporate governance, it is posited that
managers will not act to maximise returns to shareholders unless appropriate
governance structures are in place.
Based on an economic theory of monitoring by Jensen and Meckling (1976), it
is argued that managerial agents have economic incentives to adopt optimal
controls to reduce agency costs that arise because of the separation of
ownership and control.
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Eisenhardt (1989) specifies certain mechanisms to reduce the cost of agency.
These include incentive schemes for managers that reward them financially for
maximising shareholder interests and the use of the board of directors to
monitor and control management.
Fama and Jensen (1983) theorise that the board of directors is the highest
internal control mechanism responsible for monitoring the actions of top
management and thus should curtail any actions of management that are not
in the shareholder interest.
The critical issue is whether board directors who are also members of top
management can be relied upon to monitor and control their own managerial
performance.
Agency theory therefore supports the arguments for boards to have non-
executive directors who are genuinely independent of management and for the
separation of the roles of the chief executive officer and chairman.
The effectiveness of the board must therefore be influenced by the ability of
management to manipulate the board. Crucial to this debate must therefore be
the selection process of the board2, the extent to which executive
management can influence the selection process, and the implementation of
structures3 that result in a board that is balanced enough to ensure that
executive management is unable to dominate.
Agency theory therefore supports the arguments for committees of the board
comprising of non-executive directors to be concerned with audit, nomination
of new directors, and remuneration of top management.
Shareholder interests, as argued in agency theory, must be protected by
governance structures that do not rely on the individual motivations of
management.
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2.2.1.2 Stewardship Theory
Stewardship theory with reference to the modern corporation, in which share
ownership is widely held, may also be defined in terms of the manner in which
the agents (the directors) will exercise their roles. This theory argues that the
actions of the agents will be in the best interest of the principals in order to
maximise shareholder returns.
Exponents of stewardship theory argue that the classical concept of the
corporation, enshrined in company law, has been that power lies with the
shareholders. I.e. the shareholders have the power to choose the structure of
their company's board and members of it and to appoint independent external
auditors to report on the truth and fairness of the reports that the directors are
required to regularly present.
However, many commentators e.g. Berle and Means (1932) have pointed out
that large public companies have many shareholders who are geographically
dispersed, hold diverse expectations from their investment, and are separate
and remote from management. The classical approach under stewardship for
shareholders to oversee directors is therefore inappropriate.
Donaldson (1990) argues a view of managerial motivations contrary to agency
theory that can be defined as stewardship theory. This theory argues that non-
financial motivators-McCelland (1961) i.e. the need for intrinsic job satisfaction
may result in managers being able to carry out actions which may not
necessarily be in their own personal interests- Etzioni (1957).
Agency theory, on the other hand, points to many examples of the abuse4 of
power stemming from the domination of the board by incumbent management
who have acted in their own interests rather than those of the owners. Given
that a breakdown in controls and a lack of managerial accountability appears
to have characterised most of the financial scandals of the in the USA and the
UK, the notion of reliance on positive managerial motivation is not acceptable.
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I 
Review of
internal control
systems
The current recommendations on corporate governance consider agency
theory as justification for the various mechanisms to strengthen the board, the
use of board committees, and the promotion of the roles of both internal and
external auditors as a means of improving accountability and control.
2.3 GOVERNANCE MODEL
The model was developed in order to reflect the UK system of corporate
governance. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Keasey and Wright (1993) both
consider that the board is central to good governance. The UK system of
governance largely relies on that fact and thus the importance of the board is
reflected in the model below.
Intrinsic
Influences
Extrinsic
Influences
Boa d of
Directors
Functions
I
I I I I
Select Compensation Selection of Review of Review of corporate
CEO of directors other directors financial
objectives
strategy
Remuneration Nomination Audit Audit
Committee Committee committee committee
FIGURE 1 GOVERNANCE MODEL
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The model (see Figure 1) therefore shows the use of three board committees
namely nomination, remuneration and audit. The model also reflects the
functions of the board and the various board committees to which these
functions may be delegated.
The model also reflects the functions of the board and highlights the generally
accepted board5
 functions- see Mace (1971), Chitayat (1984), and the
committees to which these functions may be delegated. This serves to
emphasise the significance of the board's role and the extent to which poor
performance on the part of the board can materially affect the future viability of
the company.
The performance of the board may be affected by: -
• The pressures from external parties who hold the board accountable for the
company's performance i.e. extrinsic influences6 ; and
• The structure of the board - I.e. intrinsic influences 7 - the extent to which the
composition of the board in terms of its structure and the attributes of the individual
board members will influence the ability of the board to be effective.
2.3.1 Intrinsic influences
Fama and Jensen (1983) contend that the composition of individuals who
serve on the board is an important factor in creating a board that is an effective
monitor of management actions.
The corporate governance framework developed by Keasey and Wright (1993)
also considers that one of the key mechanisms of the corporate governance
framework to be directors and board structure. John and Seibert (1998) also
support this premise as they argue that size, independence and composition
determine the effectiveness of board monitoring.
Given that the regulatory authorities in the UK and USA appear to have
embodied these concepts in their corporate governance codes, it is therefore
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In line with the agency theory of governance, this thesis considers the role of
the non-executive director and the extent to which the intrinsic factors affect
their ability to fulfil their financial reporting roles with respect to the audit
committee. Only the definition of experience in respect of non-executive
directors8 is therefore examined in section 2.4.3.10.
Based on the above argument, the following research question therefore
arises.
IS THERE A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR EXPERIENCE
AND AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS?
2.3.1.2 Remuneration of Directors
The compensation of executive directors is considered to be an important
factor on board effectiveness. The remuneration committee, composed of non-
executive directors, has the responsibility to determine, on behalf of the board
and the shareholders, the company's policy on remuneration and the
remuneration packages of each of the executive directors.
The Cadbury Code (1992: para. 3.3) stated that "...executive directors pay
should be subject to the recommendations of a remuneration committee made
up of wholly or mainly non-executive directors".
The reasoning behind this recommendation being that if executive directors
rewards are to be linked to performance, those directors benefiting, should not
decide on their own remuneration, due to a conflict of interest.
The Greenbury Report (1995) was the result of the Study Group on Directors
Remuneration. The recommendations of this Code, which have since been
included in the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (1998) required
that:
• Boards of directors should set up remuneration committees of independent non-
executive directors to determine, on behalf of the board and the shareholders, within
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agreed terms of reference, the company's policy on executive remuneration and the
specific remuneration packages for each of the executive directors. (Pam. Al)
• The Code stated that non-executive directors be independent. It also however
highlighted the fact that these directors must have no cross-directorships with the
executive directors due to the possibility of mutual agreements to increase each
other's remuneration.
• The remuneration committee should report to shareholders as part of or annexed to
the annual financial statements.
The remuneration committee should result in: -
• Accountability - I.e. the delegation and determination of executive management pay to
non-executive directors who should have no conflicts of interest.
• Transparency - I.e. the provision of explanations to shareholders as to the manner in
which remuneration is decided, the disclosure of all elements of individual directors
remuneration packages, and the availability of information with which the shareholders
can assess if the non-executive members of the nomination committee are
independent.
The Greenbury Report (1995) noted that the key to enhancing directors
performance lay in remuneration packages which: -
• Link rewards to performance; and
• Align the interests of directors and shareholders in promoting the company's progress.
The levels of executive management pay have been criticised in recent years
due to apparent lack of correlation between performance and directors
remuneration. Major criticisms were directed at the large increases in the
remuneration packages of the executive directors of the then newly privatised
utility industries in spite of poor financial performance and declining customer
service.
Figure 2 shows the increases in UK Board Pay between 1983 and 1999 as
compared to other economic indicators.
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Comparison of Board pay with Other Indicators
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FIGURE 2- COMPARISON OF BOARD PAY WITH OTHER INDICATORS9
These figures emphasise that levels of board remuneration have increased
over and above levels of pre-tax profits. Whilst pre-tax profits may not be the
best indicator of firm performance, they can be assumed to be an indication of
short-term corporate performance. These figures appear to justify the general
perception that board remuneration is not linked to performance. A recent
example in the case of the final entitlements and new salary paid to the CEO
of RaiItrack appears to further support this perception. Empirical evidence from
both UK and US research e.g. Conyon (1995) suggests the actual link
between pay and performance is very weak. Core et al (1997) report that CEO
compensation correlated positively with the proportion of non-executive
directors on a company's board but negatively with the firm's future
performance. Lambert et al (1993) noted that CEO compensation was higher
in firms with a larger proportion of non-executive directors. This study did not
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however consider if higher pay was correlated to improvements in
performance.
Research evidence overall does not seem to support the link between
increased pay and performance. Notwithstanding research evidence to date,
the linking of compensation to performance is increasingly reflected in the use
of long term incentive schemes and board shareholdings.
Given the emphasis placed on the award of shares as part of directors'
remuneration, the influence of directors' ownership on governance is
considered relevant in the Greenbury Report. This emphasis is clearly
warranted as Keasey and Short (1999) reported that directors' average equity
shareholding in a random sample of UK quoted companies was 11.5%.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) noted that board shareholdings act as an
incentive to directors to act like owners in terms of how rigorously they monitor
management. Kren and Kerr (1997) also found empirical evidence to support
the proposition that increased board shareholdings were positively associated
with the corporate performance -compensation link. This positive association
was however dependent on the extent of the board shareholding. Other
research e.g. Kole (1995), McConnell and Servaes (1990 and 1995) differ in
their analysis of the size of shareholding that creates a positive association.
All research does tend to suggest a link between performance and board
shareholdings at low levels of board shareholding. Keasey et al (1999) found
similar relationship exists for UK companies.
Weisbach (1988) noted that boards in which executive management has large
shareholdings tend to have a lower proportion of non-executive directors. I.e.
as the interests of directors become more closely aligned to those of the
shareholders, the agency costs of monitoring and mechanism (the proportion
of non-executive directors) are reduced.
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It is important that the number of non-executive directors is not reduced to a
point where they are considered ineffective as Loebbecke (1989) noted that
the extent of shareholdings by executive management was a key fraud
motivational factor. Dechow et al (1996) also noted that at higher percentage
of shareholdings was held by executive directors in firms experiencing
financial statement fraud.
Increasing board shareholdings may align the interests of directors to
shareholders and provide directors with incentives to improve their
performance. Care must be taken to ensure that these shareholdings are not
granted in a fashion that may result in executive management decisions that
are designed to artificially boost the value of their shareholdings.
Given that the audit committee is composed of non-executive directors who
should not be financially dependent on the company, executive management
compensation is not considered to be a factor that influences audit committee
effectiveness.
The manner in which non-executive directors are remunerated is of concern.
There are increasing calls for non-executive directors to be partly or wholly
remunerated in shares as a result of the view that board shareholdings
increase the incentive of the directors to monitor managerial outcomes.
Shivdasani (1993) and Jensen (1989) suggest that non-executive directors
who hold a larger equity stake in the firm are likely to have a greater incentive
to monitor executive directors.
Whilst this may positively align the interests of non-executive directors with
shareholders, the existing tax regime in the United Kingdom may result in
punitive tax liabilities for non-executive directors. At present, non-executive
directors can only be included in unapproved" share option schemes. Under
an unapproved scheme, the non-executive director faces two potential tax
liabilities.
• An income tax liability on exercise of the option.
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• A capital Gains tax liability on disposal of the shares.
These schemes are however not popular with companies as the set-up costs
associated with the scheme are not allowable for tax purposes. Companies
tend to prefer approved share option schemes. Under an approved scheme",
executive directors are subject only to capital gains tax on the disposal of the
shares.
It is unlikely that non-executive directors are going to be prepared to accept
tax liability that exceed that incurred by executive directors for share options
exercised and disposed of at the same price.
Overall evidence from US research studies suggests that directors'
shareholdings play a significant role in governance and provides support for
the recommendations contained within the Combined Code (1998) with
respect to long-term board shareholdings.
2.3.1.3 Director Independence
Non-executive directors can be classified as independent or "grey" directors. It
is important for non-executive directors to be independent so that there exists
no conflicts of interests that might affect their judgement. An independent
director is a director with no affiliation to the firm aside from being a member of
the board of directors. Grey non-executive directors are those who have some
non-board affiliation with the organisation. Gilson (1990) and Shivdasani
(1993) found being relatives of management, consultants, suppliers, lawyers,
bankers or retired management of the firm could impair independence of grey
directors. Vicknair (1993) found that at least 74% of the companies on the
NYSE had at least one 'grey' director. Peasnell et al (1998) found that
approximately one-third of all non-executive directors in the U.K. could be
classified as "grey".
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The Hampel Report (1998: para.3.9) concurred with the recommendations of
the Cadbury code in that it required that "... a majority of non-executive
directors be independent".
The audit, remuneration, and nomination committees all require independent
non-executive directors. The Independence" of judgement required: -
• establishes the integrity of the financial statements in the case of the audit committee;
• the legitimacy of the awards given to top management in the case of the remuneration
committee; and
• the integrity and transparency of the selection process in the case of the nomination
committee.
The independence of the non-executive director may also be threatened in
cases where the ex-chief executive officer is invited to sit on the board as a
non-executive director.
Cosh and Hughes (1997) found that even though there appeared to be an
increase in the percentage of non-executive directors on the boards of UK
companies, a significant number of these non-executive directors were past or
present CEO's or executive managers 12 . This suggests difficulties in the ability
of non-executives to be impartial in key monitoring roles.
The potential of an existing chief executive officer to dominate the board is
well-documented e.g. Menon and Williams (1994). However, the retired chief
executive officer may also continue to dominate board decisions. Executive
directors may feel a sense of loyalty to the retired CEO as this CEO may have
appointed them.
Non-executive directors may also feel a need to be loyal to an individual who
may have been instrumental in their appointment. This sense of loyalty may
compromise the independence of the non-executive director if this sense of
loyalty results in their inability or fear to oppose the decisions of the retired
chief executive officer.
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The director nomination process appears to be a key mechanism through
which the independence of non-executive directors may be achieved. Latham
(1999) noted that CEO's involvement in the process of nominating prospective
non-executive directors for board approval might still be an undue influence of
process,
However, Vafeas (1999) noted that the existence of a nominations committee,
which was composed of independent directors, had a significant positive
impact on board quality.
The importance of non-executive director independence is also highlighted in
consideration of top manager remuneration. The Combined Code (1998)
stated that the remuneration committee should consist of only independent
non-executive directors.
Main and Johnston (1993) found, in their study of UK remuneration
committees, that the level of pay was unaffected regardless of whether there
was a remuneration committee. This study also highlighted that most
remuneration committees were not composed solely of independent non-
executive directors. It should be noted that this study was undertaken prior to
the recommendations of the Cadbury code (1992) and the Green bury Code
(1995).
Notwithstanding the period of the study, this study suggests that the ability of
non-executive director to fulfil this monitoring role was compromised and
highlights the need for independent non-executive directors.
Research evidence therefore suggests that the independence of the non-
executive director on board committees and in particular the audit committee is
a crucial factor in determining board effectiveness. Accordingly, the following
research question arises: -
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IS THERE A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE AUDIT
COMMITTEE AND AUDIT COMMIITTEE EFFECTIVENESS?
2.3.1.4 Size of the Board of Directors
Many researchers have examined board size. Koontz (1967) and Pfeiffer
(1972) found that larger companies had larger boards. This correlation is
explained by the fact that the complexity of larger organisations results in:
• More bureaucratic administration;
• The representation of certain stakeholder groups on the board;
• The use of board sub-committees to ensure those important areas is effectively
monitored.
Jones (1986) argues that large boards are able to contribute more expertise
and experience. Chaganti (1985) reviewed the relationship between the size of
the board and business failures. Chaganti (1985) found that the smaller size of
board was significantly correlated to the incidence of business failure.
Jensen (1993) however argues that a smaller board of directors is more likely
to play a more controlling function. Beasley (1996) also found evidence to
support the argument for a smaller board. He noted that as board size
increases the likelihood of financial statement fraud increases. Yermack
(1996) and Conyon et al (1998) found a negative relationship between board
size and performance.
Small boards may be able to play a more controlling function. However, it is
important that the size of the board does not fall to a level that results in there
not being enough members to fulfil their roles effectively.
The Hampel Report (1998: para. 3.14) states that "...we believe that it is
difficult for them (the non-executive directors) to be effective if they make up
less than one third of the board. Thus board size to some extent must be
considered to influence board effectiveness. Furthermore, if the size of the
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board influences the effectiveness of the non-executive directors, audit
committee effectiveness may also be compromised.
The Cadbury Report (1992) stipulated a minimum of three non-executive
directors. The Hampel Report (1998) went further as it also stated that boards
with less than three non-executive directors could not be considered effective.
Many of the smaller listed 13 companies felt that this recommendation in view of
their size and nature was punitive.
The Quoted Companies Alliance14 — (QCA) was established in 1992 in order
to recommend amendments more suitable to the "smaller company".
The QCA recommended that it was acceptable for "smaller" companies to
have two non-executive directors. While the recommendations of the QCA
have garnered significant support, they have not been formally adopted into
the Combined Code (1998).
As such this thesis still considers that companies with less than three non-
executive directors and, by implication, audit committees with less than three
non-executive directors to be ineffective. Accordingly, the following research
question arises: -
IS THERE A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SIZE OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE AND
AUDIT COMMIITTEE EFFECTIVENESS?
2.3.1.5 Board structure
The proportion of non-executive directors to executive directors is an important
feature of board structure. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that it is natural for
the most influential members of the board to be executive management
because of their privilege of information. Williamson (1984) however notes that
because executive management does have informational advantage due to
their full-time status and insider knowledge, the board of directors may
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become an instrument of executive management. Fama (1980) contends that
domination of the board by top management may lead to collusion and a
transfer of shareholder wealth to management.
The domination of the board by executive management is clearly an issue in
the UK context. Kesner and Dalton (1986) contend that the 'ability of the board
to perform effectively is related to the lack of independence from the
management it is meant to control. The separation of the role of Chief
Executive Officer and Chairman and competent, independent non-executive
directors is often advanced as a means to prevent domination of the board by
a powerful chief executive and top management.
Non-executive directors are considered to be in a better position to play a
monitoring and controlling function as opposed to executive management due
to their independent nature. Research on the ability of non-executive directors
to determine compensation Core et al (1997) may suggest otherwise.
Vance (1983) contends also that non-executive directors are more likely to be
obligated to the Chief Executive Officer for their position and are therefore less
likely to aggressively challenge and oversee executive management.
Research on chief executive turnover disputes this argument to some extent
as Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) shows that boards can and do remove
top managers as a result of poor performance. Weisbach (1988) also noted
that boards dominated by non-executive directors were more likely to dismiss
top management as a result of poor corporate performance.
Scott and Kleidon (1994) find that firms with a majority of non-executive
directors that replace Chief executive officers tend to have worse pre-
replacement share prices than firms with executive dominated boards. This
appears to suggest that non-executive directors are able to replace Chief
executive officers where externally observable indicators suggest poor
performance. However, the extent to which non-executive directors may
replace a poor CEO when external indicators remain constant is not known.
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Klein (1998) considers if the existence of a board committee affects firm
performance and finds no evidence to suggest that performance is improved
where a greater number of non-executive directors are on the board. Bhagat
and Black (1997) dispute this argument as they find that a direct albeit weak
relationship exists between board composition and firm performance.
The AICPA's paper - Strengthening the Professionalism of the Independent
Auditor (1994) - included recommendations on changes in board composition
to enhance the board's independence for the purposes of minimising the
occurrence of financial statement fraud. This appears to be justified as
Beasley (1996) noted that boards of no-fraud firms" were significantly more
likely to have a higher proportion of non-executive directors than fraud firms.
Dechow et al (1996) supported this premise and also concluded that firms with
a higher percentage of executive directors and no audit committee were more
likely to commit financial statement fraud.
Most of the evidence to date, with the exception of Chaganti (1995)16
considers that board structure is an important determinant of board
effectiveness and by implication audit committee effectiveness. The balance of
the board i.e. the proportion of non-executive directors to executive directors is
therefore considered to be a factor that might influence the ability of the non-
executive directors to be effective, and by implication, the ability of the audit
committee to be effective. The following research question arises: -
DOES A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP EXIST BETWEEN AUDIT COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS
AND THE BALANCE OF THE BOARD?
2.3.1.6 Chief Executive Officer and Chairman Duality of Role
Russell Reynolds Associates Survey Board Practices (1998) highlight that
85% of S&P 500 Companies in the USA do not have separate individuals as
Chief Executive Officer and Chairman. However, if the evaluation and
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compensation of the chief executive officer is delegated to the remuneration
committee, which consists of solely independent non-executive directors, the
combined role may not affect the monitoring function of the board in that
respect. In this case, clearly the independence of the non-executive directors
and their ability to influence decisions is important. Non-Oxecutive directors
generally dominate boards in the USA and evidence —Weisbach (1997) exists
to show that non-executive directors in the USA are more likely to dismiss the
chief executive officer for poor corporate performance.
Daily and Dalton (1997) identified a variety of arguments for and against
combining the role of CEO and chairman. The main arguments for being to
strengthen the leadership of the company through the superior knowledge of
the business as a result of the joint position. Donaldson et al (1990) and
Barney (1990) contend that it is essential for the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer to exercise complete authority over the corporation and that
their role be unambiguous and unchallenged. Donaldson and Davis (1990)
results indicate that having an independent chairman does not lead to
shareholder wealth and that shareholder wealth increases when the chief
executive officer and chairman role is combined.
Daily et al (1997) found conflicting evidence on the empirical link between
CEO role duality and firm performance. Baliga et al (1996) were also unable to
detect a significant relationship between role duality and firm performance.
The main arguments against being to achieve greater board independence.
The main argument for the separation of the role was that board independence
would be improved. Jensen (1983) argues that the role of the chairman
includes the evaluation and compensation of the Chief Executive Officer and
thus separation of the role must occur if the board is to be effective in its
monitoring function.
Mil!stein et al (1998) noted that even where the role was split the chairman in
many instances was not independent. Furthermore, Daily et al (1997)
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considered the independence of the chairman under both the dual and
separate role structures. No statistically significant relationship was found to
show that the independence of the chairman was any less when the role was
joint as compared to when the role was split. Rechner and Dalton (1986) noted
that shareholder returns were inferior when Chief Exedutive Officer and
chairman role was combined.
Differences in the governance structures of the USA and The UK show that: -
• In the USA, re. Kom/ Ferry (1993, 1999) survey, the roles of chairman and thief
executive officer are combined, the boards are dominated by non-executive directors;
and
• In The UK, re. Peasnell et al (1998), the roles of chairman and thief executive officer
are usually separated and the boards tend to be dominated by executive directors.
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (1998) in the UK however
considers that the separation of the roles to be important to board
effectiveness and by implication, audit committee effectiveness.
Many of the smaller listed 17
 companies felt that this recommendation in view of
their size and nature was punitive. The QCA recommended that the presence
of two independent non-executive directors offset the need for the separation
of the role of chairman and CEO.
Given that these recommendations have not been formally adopted into the
Combined Code (1998), this thesis still considers that the separation of the
role of CEO and Chairman as an important determinant of board and audit
committee effectiveness. Research to date has not examined if the separation
of these roles is positively associated with audit committee effectiveness. In
view of the above argument, the following research question arises: -
IS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE POSITIVELY ASSOCIATED WITH CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHAIRMAN ROLE SEPARATION?
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2.3.2 Extrinsic influences
Extrinsic influences consider the role of shareholders and other regulators in
corporate governance. Their roles are considered from the perspective of their
ability to exert pressure on the board and to what extent they consider the
structure of the board a factor in board effectiveness. Figure 71 (see
appendices page 245) shows the groups that may influence the board.
2.3.2.1 The Role Of Shareholders
Under the current legal and regulatory framework, UK shareholders have no
responsibilities, other than a requirement to disclose any equity shareholdings
greater than equal to 3% and to abide by the provisions of the Take-over code.
This framework however provides shareholders with certain rights, which
include: -
• the right to receive a dividend;
• the right to transfer ownership;
• The right to appoint and remove directors;
• The right to appoint and remove auditors;
• The right to submit resolutions;
• The right to be consulted over changes to the memorandum and articles of
association; and
• The right to be consulted over any changes to the share capital of the companyn
Historically, private individuals owned shares. The ownership of shares
conferred the above rights. The right to receive dividends and transfer
ownership is not under threat. However, the rights to elect directors and
external auditors' i.e. the parties who are meant to protect the shareholders
interest do not appear, in practice, to permit private shareholders to either veto
the election of directors or the choice of auditors and thus apply pressure to
the board. This is partly due to the diversity of private ownership as this results
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in them being unable to form an effective group and thus influence the board.
However the manner in which private shareholders vote, i.e. their voting rights
are partly responsible for their inability to influence the board. Section 2.3.2.4
considers the voting rights of shareholders and the options available to them to
influence the board.
2.3.2.2 Institutional Investors
The pattern of share ownership has since evolved. Figure 3 shows that in the
UK institutional investors 18 are now the single largest group of shareholders.
UK (%)
Individuals 18
Banks 1
Institutions 60
Companies 2
Governments 3
Foreign 16
FIGURE 3 OWNERSHIP OF SHARES 19
Given the extent of the shareholdings held by institutions, the ability of the
private shareholder to exercise stewardship is further limited. It is for this
reason that only the role of the institutional investor is examined in detail. It is
clear that since the institutional investors are the only group of shareholders
that have enough voting power to bring pressure on the board and
management, the extent to which they utilise this power is important.
Effective exercise by shareholders of their powers of intervention and control is
a very important component of the governance system. In order to understand
the issues concerning the role of institutional investors, it is important to
determine the definition of a shareholder.
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A shareholder under section 22(2) of the Companies Act 1985 is defined as a
person who has agreed to become a member and whose name is entered in
the register of members. This definition establishes who the legal owner is and
therefore who can transfer good title. The legal owner differs from the
beneficial owner i.e. the person with the economic interest in the share and
entitled to some or all the benefits of ownership. This may come about in a
variety of ways, but two are of particular significance:
• A private individual who owns the rights to a share may elect that it should be held
through a nominee, such as a broker, or a professional nominee who may be selected
and dealt with by the broker on the individual's behalf.
• A fund manager or pension funds trustee may employ a specialist custodian for similar
administrative convenience, or security reasons. The custodian is the legal owner, and
the rights of the legal owner and the beneficial owner are set out in a contract between
them.
The financial aspects of share ownership are not a matter of concern. It is
more the "control rights" attached to a share that influence the extent to which
the shareholder may exercise their rights. These control rights include the right
to:
• receive the report and accounts and notices of general meetings;
• to attend and vote at general meetings;
• to combine with other shareholders to propose a shareholder resolution;
• to requisition an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM).
These rights rest with the legal owner and there are no statutory or other rules
requiring them to be passed back to the beneficial owner. The separation of
legal and beneficial ownership of shares may well inhibit the corporate
governance role of both individual and institutional shareholders.
According to a NAPE survey20, the average proportion of votes cast on
resolutions at AGMs remains at less than 50 per cent, despite some recent
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increase. It is now widely accepted that the right to vote a share has an
economic value and that those who hold voting rights on behalf of others have
a fiduciary responsibility to consider whether (and if so how) to vote.
The recent report of the National" Association of Pension Funds Committee
of Inquiry into Vote Execution found that a significant proportion of instructions
given to custodians were not carried out, and that procedures for verifying that
votes had been cast were inadequate.
Black and Coffee (1994) reviewed UK institutional shareholder activism in the
early 1990s. They noted21 that the specific areas of shareholder activism
focused upon included:
• Protecting shareholders' rights, especially against the adoption of take-over defences;
• CEO replacement (where there is limited evidence of institutional pressure leading to
CEO turnover - and usually this pressure is only effectively applied when institutions
have greatest leverage, e.g. when companies need new equity capital and need
investors to agree to an offering);
• Changes to board structure and membership (where greater proportions of executive
directors exist);
• Voting behaviour,
• Management and director compensation;
• Proxy fights.
Russell Reynolds Associates (1998) survey noted that the governance
practices considered important by institutional investors included:
• Separation of the role of chairman and chief executive officer22.
• The evaluation of Chief Executive Officer compensation by the board and the
importance that the Chief Executive Officer and other executive management
remuneration be linked to performance.
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• The need for the board to play a more active role in succession planning. The
investors surveyed further noted that the existing Chief Executive Officer participate
but not chair the committee in place to search for the successor.
• The survey highlighted board composition issues such as interlocking directorships,
family relationships, and directors who serve on too many other listed companies
boards as important to investors.
Russell Reynolds Associates (1998) survey also noted that the weight given to
corporate governance by the fact that non-financial factors including
governance structure were of increasing importance to institutional investors
when making a decision as to whether to invest in a company.
However, the above survey noted that investors still indicated that good
governance practices might be sacrificed for a higher return on investment.
However, a significant number of institutional investors had made the decision
not to invest in a company due to poor corporate governance practices.
Solomon, Solomon, Joseph and Norton (2000) in a questionnaire survey of UK
institutional investors' attitudes to corporate governance reform noted that
institutional investors have generally welcomed the recent reforms and attach
more relevance to initiatives aimed at monitoring the principal/agent problem.
According to a McKinsey & Co (2000) survey of 200 institutional investors from
the US, Europe, Latin America and Asia, three-quarters of institutional
investors were of the opinion that board practices were just as important to
them as financial performance when evaluating companies for investment.
These investors stated that they would be prepared to I pay an average
premium of 18% 23 for well-governed24 companies in the UK and US, and a
higher premium in other countries.
Recent cases e.g. The Royal Bank of Scotland highlight that institutional
investors may no longer all be willing to accept the trade off between good
governance and return on investment.
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2.3.2.3 Shareholder Resolutions
It is important to therefore consider the options open to shareholders should
they wish to exercise their rights by putting forward resolutions at the AGM.
Sections 376 and 377 of the Companies Act provide the corresponding
regulation of the process of submitting shareholder resolutions in the UK.
Section 376 provides that 'members representing not less than one-twentieth
of the total voting rights or 100 members holding shares on which there has
been paid up an average sum per member of not less than £100 may require
the company to give notice of their resolutions which can then be considered
at the next AGM.'
The notice must be deposited with the company at least six weeks before the
AGM and the proposers must meet the company's costs of distributing the
notice. This provides management with ample forewarning of opposition and,
given that the company is not required to disclose details of its timetable six
weeks ahead of time, is also a logistically impossible.
Members are allowed to circulate statements of up to 1000 words in support of
their own resolutions or in opposition to specific proposals of the board through
the company's communication 'machinery', the expenses involved make this
option not very much more attractive than acting independently in contacting
shareholders directly.
Davies (1997) notes that, in large public companies with dispersed
membership, 'victory normally goes to those who first state their case and first
solicit proxies.'
While the AGM does provide a forum for both the board and the opposition to
state their cases again, in reality, the result of any disputed resolution is
determined in advance through the system of proxy votes.
This suggests that small shareholders do not generally have any hope of
tabling a resolution for discussion at the AGM due to the associated costs and
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logistics of such an action. Furthermore, the system of proxy votes does not
tend to allow the smaller shareholder the right to influence the board.
23.2.4 Proxy Voting
In the UK, section 372 of the Companies Act governs proxy voting. Even
though post-1948 regulatory reform relating to proxy voting has seen to it that
the board must now send out a `two-way' proxy form, allowing members to
direct the proxy vote either for or against management proposals, directors are
still afforded 'tactical advantages'.
Their position enables them to get their materials out first, stating their case
without immediate opposition. By the time opposition to any of the resolutions
may have been organised and circulated to the members, a substantial
number of shareholders who intended to vote might already have done so.
In the UK the evidence on shareholder voting pertains mainly to institutional
shareholder voting. Stapledon (1996) overviews evidence on UK institutional
investor voting up to 1994. He notes that the evidence for pre-1994 shows that
the overall level of proxy voting by UK investors, including fund managers, was
quite low.
The most recent evidence cited was for the lodgement of proxies between
November 1993 and September 1994 for a sample of 101 of the largest 250
UK listed companies. This sample reflected that only 35% of ordinary shares
were voted.
Stapledon (1996) suggested that the practical difficulties associated with
passing votes through from nominees to fund managers to trustees in the
short amount of time between the issue of the notice and the 48 hour cut-off
before the AGM or EGM were responsible for these low levels.
The recent rise in voting levels, and the increase in routine voting, is attributed
to
• increased awareness of corporate governance issues among investors;
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• pressures on institutional investors to exercise their votes; and
. the emergence of voting information services institutions, such as that provided by
PIRC (Pensions Investment Research Consultants).
Short and Keasey (1997) note that in the recent past there have been calls for
mandatory voting of shares, along with the publication of detailed voting policy
statements by institutions. Many institutional investors have not been willing to
disclose their voting policies to date.
2.3.2.5 AGM
Another form of shareholder activism is addressing questions to directors at
the AGM. Shareholders' questions are required to relate to the subject matter
under debate but many companies allow for an open `question-and-answer
session.
Discussion of the reform of the AGM centres on the failure of shareholders to
use this forum to any significant degree as a corporate control mechanism.
Institutional shareholders, who have privileged access to company directors
and management through private meetings, tend not to attend AGM's25.
Davies (1997) argues that the AGM, particularly the opportunity to ask
questions, is the only forum for effective individual shareholder activism as the
outcome of voting on resolutions is de facto determined beforehand by the
proxy voting system, mainly by institutional shareholder votes.
The fact that voting outcomes are determined by proxy votes that are held on
behalf of institutional investors further highlights the importance of the role of
the institutional investor. It also highlights the need for institutional investors to
vote in a responsible fashion.
There have been increasing calls for changes to be made to the way AGM's
are conducted in order to allow more shareholders to exercise their fights. The
use of the Internet has been debated for: -
• Notices calling meetings;
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• Circulation of annual reports to members;
• Electronic voting;
• Communications between nominee and beneficial shareholders;
• Registering proxy votes;
• Real time video broadcasts of General Meetings to desktops of 'subscribed' members;
and
• 'Virtual meetings' with real time broadcasting and interactive features.
It is hoped that these advances will improve shareholder activism and voting.
The need for the institutional investor to influence the board and governance
practices is paramount, as they are the only shareholder group large enough
to effect any changes.
The ability of institutional investors to influence governance practices lies in
their willingness to monitor the board and ensure that poor governance
practices are not acceptable. In so far as a trade-off between financial return
and good governance exists, the potential influences are reduced.
2.3.3 Regulators
The regulators are considered to be groups who are able to exert pressure on
companies (in particular the board) to effect governance changes. The three
main groups therefore considered are:
• The Financial Services Authority — FSA. Listed companies are required to meet the
rules set out in the Yellow Book — Continuing Obligations in order to maintain their
listing on the London Stock exchange. The FSA, with its responsibility for the
supervision of this exchange, is therefore examined.
• The Financial Reporting Council- FRC. Listed companies are required to publish
annual audited financial statements. The FRC and its sub-committees are therefore
examined.
• Government.
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2.3.3.1 The FSA
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) 26 is an independent non-governmental
body, which exercises statutory powers under the Financial Services Act 1986
and the Banking Act 1987 (and certain other legislation) : It is a company
limited by guarantee, financed by levies on the industry.
Under the Financial Services Act, the FSA also has responsibility for
overseeing the integrity of UK investment markets. In practice, the FSA does
this by:
• Recognising and supervising a number of specialist organisations with responsibility
• for particular markets and services;
• Listing and supervising institutions involved in certain inter-professional markets; and
• Maintaining the London Code of Conduct with which market participants are expected
to comply.
The FSA supervises the six UK Recognised Investment Exchanges (RIEs).
The exchanges are: -
• The London Stock Exchange;
• Tradepoint;
• The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE);
• The OM London Exchange;
• The London Metal Exchange (LME); and
• The International Petroleum Exchange (IPE).
2.3.3.2 The London Stock Exchange
In the UK a number of corporate governance codes were conceived to
address perceived corporate governance weaknesses. These codes were self-
regulatory controls and enforceable only through shareholder pressure and the
Stock Exchange Listing Rules.
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The first, the Cadbury Code, was issued in 1992 following the deliberations of
the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. The
second, the Greenbury Code, was issued in 1995 following the deliberations of
the Committee on Executive Pay.
The Cadbury Committee was set up by the Financial Reporting Council, the
Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession following financial
mismanagement scandals and made recommendations on accounting and
auditing issues, on the proper structure of boards and on the appropriate
standards of conduct for directors.
The Greenbury Committee was set up on the initiative of the Confederation of
British Industry in reaction to controversies surrounding increases in
managerial remuneration, especially in privatised utilities.
The Committee on Corporate Governance (known as the Hampel Committee)
was set up in 1996. Its report, published in August 1998, reviews the previous
codes and makes proposals for updating them.
The Combined Code (1998) was a consolidation of the work of the previous
three governance codes. The Combined Code has been incorporated into the
Stock Exchange Listing Rules as part of the 'Continuing Obligations' of the
Yellow Book.
While companies are under no formal obligation to comply with the Combined
Code, they are obligated to report on their compliance with guidelines set out
in the first section of the Code and to identify and explain areas of non-
compliance as a Stock Exchange listing condition.
The Combined Code is organised according to 14 principles (general guidance
statements) and 45 provisions (specific requirements) in five separate
categories. The first section of the Code covers the first four categories and
applies to company boards. The categories of provisions include:
• directors' duties and responsibilities and the composition of the board;
• directors' remuneration;
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• communications with institutional and private investors; and
• accountability and audit.
The second section of the code covers the fifth set of provisions and applies to
institutional investors. It sets out a new set of responsibilities for institutional
investors to become more proactive in corporate governance.
The Stock Exchange Listing Rules enforce the Combined Code on Corporate
governance indirectly by requiring disclosure of non-compliance. The extent to
which this can be seen as a truly effective means of enforcement is where
investors, who consider corporate governance to be important, takes steps to
ensure that these matters are redressed.
2.3.3.3 The FRC
The Financial Reporting Council and its subcommittees - the Accounting
Standards Board and the Financial Reporting Review Panel - were established
in 1988.
Although the FRC and its companion bodies have the strong support of
Government they are not government-controlled, but rather part of the private
sector process of self-regulation.
The remit of the Council is to provide support to the operational bodies—the
Accounting Standards Board and the Financial Reporting Review Panel—and
to encourage good financial reporting generally. At its first meeting, in May
1990, the Council codified this role as being to: -
• promote good financial reporting, and in that context from time to time make public
reports on reporting standards; and
• provide guidance to the Accounting Standards Board on work programmes and on
broad policy issues.
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2.3.3.4 The Accounting Standards Board
The Accounting Standards Board Limited (ASB) is formally a subsidiary of the
ERG that acts as its sole director. The role of the ASB is to make, amend and
withdraw accounting standards.
Unlike the former Accounting Standards Committee, the Accounting Standards
Board is autonomous; it needs neither outside approval for its actions, nor
approval from the company's director. It is however the practice of the Board
to consult widely on all its proposals.
2.3.3.5 The Financial Reporting Review Panel
The Financial Reporting Review Panel Limited (FRRP) is a subsidiary of the
FRC, which acts as its sole director. The company contains a Review Panel,
which is autonomous in carrying out its functions; it needs neither outside
approval for its actions nor approval from the company's director. By
agreement with the Department of Trade and Industry, the normal ambit of the
Panel is public and large private companies.
The role of the Review Panel is to examine departures from the accounting
requirements of the Companies Act 1985, including applicable accounting
standards, and if necessary to seek an order from the court to remedy them.
A chief concern of the Panel is with an examination of material departures
from accounting standards with a view to considering whether the accounts in
question nevertheless meet the statutory requirement to give a true and fair
view.
The Panel does not scrutinise on a routine basis all company accounts falling
within its ambit. Instead it acts on matters drawn to its attention, either directly
or indirectly.
Groups normally aim to discharge their tasks by seeking voluntary agreement
with the directors of a company on any necessary revisions to the accounts in
PAGE 61
question. The Companies Act 1985 makes possible the voluntary revision of
accounts as well as their revision by court order.
If this approach fails and the Panel believes that revisions to the accounts are
necessary, it will seek a declaration from the court that the annual accounts of
the company concerned do not comply with the requirements of the
Companies Act 1985, and for an order requiring the directors of the company
to prepare revised accounts.
Where accounts are revised at the instance of the Panel, either voluntarily or
by order of the court, but the company's auditor had not qualified the audit
report on the defective accounts the Panel will draw this fact to the attention of
the auditor's professional body.
2.3.3.6 Government
Governments are elected to represent the public interest and provide
conditions within which economic progress can be made. The UK government
has so far been reluctant to intervene27 in the corporate governance arena and
thus move away from the self-regulatory framework in existence. The role of
government in promoting corporate governance is limited to the introduction of
legislation in support recommendations from private sector initiatives. This
support is evident in the: -
• Extent of funding given to private sector regulators e.g. the FRC;
• The role of the DTI in promoting and facilitating consultative reviews of the main issues
in UK corporate governance;
• The introduction of changes to the accounting provisions of the Companies Act 1989;
• The provision for the compulsory revision of accounts where the court is satisfied that
the original accounts do not show a true and fair view or do not otherwise comply with
the requirements of the Companies Act 1985. The legislation also made possible the
voluntary revision of defective accounts, and it is this procedure that in practice has so
far been followed when correction has been needed; and
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• The introduction of a legal definition of Accounting standards and the requirement that
large companies must disclose whether or not they have complied with them.
2.4 AUDIT COMIVITTEES
The role played by independent non-executive directors on the board
continues to be a prominent feature of corporate governance. In recent years,
increasing attention has been paid to audit committees by both regulatory
authorities and academics. SEC, the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting (1987) and the Kirk Panel (1994) state that the audit
committee is an important element in corporate governance and instrumental
in ensuring the quality of financial reporting.
Academic research examines the relation between audit committee
characteristics and aggressive reporting (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991;
Dechow et al. 1996), the incidence of fraud (Beasley 1996; McMullen 1996)
and other firm characteristics. Most studies consider that a positive
relationship exists between the existence of an audit committee and the quality
of financial reporting.
This section therefore considers: -
• the development of audit committees;
• the roles of the audit committee; and
• the structure and composition of the audit committee.
The development of the audit committee is considered using the experiences
of companies28 in the UK, USA and Canada. Overall, the main reasons for
audit committee development regardless of country remain the same i.e. the
need to improve the credibility of financial reporting.
The roles of the audit committee are then considered. For the purpose of this
thesis, the main focus is the audit committee role in financial reporting within
the financial statements.
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Bearing in mind the nature of the audit committee, the structure and
composition of the audit committee is examined. Available literature on the
relationship between structure and the audit committee effectiveness where
relevant is examined.
2.4.1 Development of Audit Committees
The concept of the audit committee is not new. A report of the audit committee
of the Great western Railway CO. Dated 1872 highlights this fact. Venables
and Impey (1991) noted that audit committees in the USA and Canada were
developed in order to: -
• increase confidence in the credibility and objectivity of the financial statements;
• assist directors in discharging their financial reporting responsibilities; and
• to strengthen the independence of the external auditors.
A historical review of the development of audit committees in the USA,
Canada and the UK highlights the importance of financial reporting and thus
by implication the need for an effective audit committee.
2.4.1.1 Development of Audit Committees in the USA
The development of the modern audit committee can be traced back to 1940
when both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) recommended the establishment of audit
committees following the McKesson and Robbins fraud case in the 1930's.
The 1967, the AICPA recommended that all publicly owned companies should
have audit committees composed of non-executive directors. Mautz and
Neumann (1970) noted in their study of audit committees highlighted that only
38% of quoted organisations had audit committees.
The Bar Chris case in 1968 and the post-Watergate findings in the early 70's
once again resulted in the audit committees being promoted to increase
confidence in financial reporting. In response, SEC issued Accounting Series
Release (ASR) no. 12329
 which stated "...SEC endorses the establishment by
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all publicly held companies of audit committees composed of non-executive
directors ...to assist in affording the greatest possible protection in investors
who rely on such financial statements". The NYSE issued a white paper in
1973 that contained a similar recommendation.
In the 1970s, massive financial disclosure problems at companies such as
Lockheed and Penn Central created a furore as some blamed financial
accounting irregularities on too-familiar relationships between corporate
boards and outside auditors. To mitigate the problem, Congress passed the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and securities exchanges adopted
rules requiring a corporate board to have an independent audit committed. The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) also imposed a statutory liability on
directors of quoted companies to maintain adequate internal control systems.
By 1979, with the exception of AMEX- the American Stock Exchange - all
regional exchanges had included this recommendation as a mandatory listing
rule.
So far, most groups had made recommendations on the establishment and
general composition of the audit committee. It was not until the publication of
the report by the Treadway Commission (1987) that specific guidelines for
audit committees were recommended. The Report contained specific
guidelines on the roles and structure of audit committees and further
recommended that all public companies be required by SEC to establish audit
committees composed solely of non-executive directors. SEC has not changed
its stance from that of a recommendation to a requirement.
During the 1990s, as some companies increasingly began to "manage" their
financial disclosures, the practice prompted some to question the integrity of
company financial statements.
The matter reached a head with a now well-known speech, 'The Numbers
Game," by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt at New York University in September
1998. Levitt called for a committee to examine the financial reporting system.
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The result was the creation of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audits to study management's role in financial
disclosures.
The committee issued a report in February 1999, recommending that the
various securities exchanges and SEC implement rules that would provide
audit committees with a self-regulatory framework emphasising disclosure,
transparency and accountability. SEC has since implemented the
recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Report of which the most important are:
• Financial literacy. NYSE and NASD rules (SEC release no. 34-41982) provide that
companies with a stated market capitalisation must have audit committees consisting
of at least three directors who are financially literate or who become financially literate
within a reasonable time after their appointment. The audit committees also must have
at least one member with accounting or related financial management expertise.
• Committee charters. The new SEC rules provide that a company proxy statement
must indicate whether the audit committee has a charter, if so, the company should
attach the charter to the proxy statement once every three years (SEC release no. 34-
42266).
• Independent committee members. The SEC rules require companies to disclose
whether audit committee members are independent and the relationship that makes a
specified member not independent.
• Audit committee statements. SEC rules require that proxy statements include a
representation by the audit committee that its members have reviewed and discussed
the financial statements with management and the external auditors and that they
have received the required information from the external auditors verifying the auditors'
independence.
Boards, audit committees, companies and auditors all have been given new
responsibilities. The full impact of these changes remains to be seen as
companies will apply the rules and make the required disclosures in the year
commencing 2001.
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2.4.1.2 Development of Audit Committees in Canada
Following the collapse of the Atlantic Acceptance Corporation in 1965, a
Canadian Royal Commission Report (1965) recommended that audit
committees be formed in all public corporations. In 1967 the Lawrence
Commission recommended that the establishment of an audit committee be
mandatory for all companies issuing shares.
The Ontario Business Committees Corporation Act (1970) introduced
legislation which made audit committees mandatory in the province. Central
government followed suit with the Canadian Business Corporation Act (1971).
This Act was amended in 1975 to require all public companies to have an audit
committee whose duty is to approve the financial statements prior to
submission to the main board of directors for approval. The Adams Report
(1978) made further recommendations with respect to the responsibilities of
the audit committees.
The Macdonald Report (1988) issued by the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants made recommendations which included: -
• all public companies to have audit committees composed primarily of non-executive
directors;
• audit committees to report annually to shareholders; and
• audit committees to review both the interim and annual financial statements prior to
publication.
The Bank Act, the Trust and Loan Companies Act, and the Insurance
Companies Act were all amended with effect from June 1992 to ensure that
the audit committee be composed of at least three non-executive directors of
whom none should be officers or employees of the company or its
subsidiaries. These Acts also set out specific audit committee duties that
included: -
• Reviewing annual financial statements prior to board approval;
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• Ensuring that appropriate internal controls were in place;
• Meeting with external auditors to discuss the financial statements or any matters
affecting the company; and
• Meeting with chief internal auditor and management to discuss the effectiveness of
control procedures.
The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) established a Committee on Corporate
Governance in 1993. The Committee issued a report 30
 in December 1994.
The Dey Report proposed fourteen guidelines for corporate governance. For
fiscal years ending on or after June 30, 1995, the TSE implemented a
requirement that TSE-listed firms report on their corporate governance system
and on whether their system was in accordance with the fourteen guidelines.
The TSE guidelines suggest that a firm's board of directors should assume
responsibility for stewardship, including strategic planning, risk management
and internal control. The guidelines also suggest that the board of directors
should be constituted with a majority of independent directors and that the firm
should disclose whether the majority of board members are independent. The
guidelines also discuss orientation and training for new board members,
compensation committees, the composition and responsibilities of audit
committees, and related matters. Implementation of the fourteen corporate
governance guidelines was however voluntary.
As a follow-up to the Dey Report, the TSE and the Institute of Corporate
Directors surveyed senior executives of TSE-listed firms in November 1998 to
assess how much progress had been made in improving the quality of
corporate governance since the release of the Dey Report. In June 1999, the
results of this survey were released in the "Report on Corporate Governance,
1999: Five Years to the Dey."
In October 1999, responding to one of the recommendations arising out of
"Five Years to the Dey," the TSE amended its corporate governance
disclosure requirements. For years ending on or after December 31, 1999,
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TSE-listed firms are required not only to describe their approach to corporate
governance on an annual basis, but also to specifically address each of the
fourteen corporate governance guidelines.
The impact of this change can be seen most readily in the expanded corporate
governance disclosure sections in the 1999 annual reports of many TSE-listed
corporations.
The extent of compliance with the TSE corporate governance guidelines was
also evaluated by the authors by reviewing the fiscal 1997 corporate
governance disclosures of all TSE 300 firms. Results indicated that 94% of
TSE 300 firms made corporate governance disclosures as required by the
TSE, but the quantity and quality of the disclosures made varied widely.
2.4.1.3 Development of Audit Committees in the UK
The support for audit committees has gained momentum in the last two
decades primarily as a result of company failures due to poor corporate
controls and diminishing confidence in the credibility of financial statements,
independence, and effectiveness of the external audit function. In view of
these problems, attention was focused on the establishment of audit
committees and their role in promoting the financial aspects of corporate
governance.
The Companies Bill (1977) tried to advocate for legislation on the
establishment of audit committees but without success and there is still no
statutory requirement to have an audit committee in the UK. However, public
sector initiatives are in evidence from as early as 1973. The Civil service31
noted the advantages of having an audit committee that included the
discussion of audit plans and results as one of its roles. Private sector
initiatives have been most active in the last two decades.
In 1982, PRO-NED, an organisation for the PROMOTION OF NON-
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS, was set up by the Bank of England, CBI, and other
financial institutions. In 1987, the Code of Recommended Best Practice was
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published and it included the recommendation that "...the appointment of non-
executive directors ...to facilitate the establishment of audit committees in large
quoted companies".
In 1986, an ICAEW working party recommended that audit committees be
responsible for both the appointment and remuneration of auditors, the
approval of audit plans, and the review of management reports issued by
auditors.
In 1987, The Bank of England issued a paper entitled-the Role of Audit
Committees in Banks- that recommended that all banks have audit
committees. In 1987 The Stock Exchange also recommended that all listed
companies have audit committees composed of non-executive directors.
The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance was set up
in May 1991 by the Financial Reporting Council, The London Stock Exchange,
and the Accountancy Profession to address the financial aspects of corporate
governance. The committee published in its recommendations in a Code of
Best Practice - The Cadbury Report.
The Cadbury Report (1992) required that all companies listed on the Stock
Exchange should issue, as a continuing listing obligation, a statement of
compliance with the Code of Best Practice. It further recommended that this
statement of compliance be reviewed by the external auditors who were also
required to state if the company had complied with the Code of Best Practice.
Paragraph 4.3 of the Code recommended that "...the Board should establish
an audit committee of at least 3 non-executive directors with written terms of
reference, which deal clearly with its authority and duties".
The Hampel Report (1998) restated the recommendations with respect to the
establishment, structure, role and duties of audit committees in the UK. The
recommendations of both codes have now been included in The Combined
Code on Corporate Governance (1999).
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The Turnbull Report (1999) considered the role of the audit committee and
highlighted that that the annual review of the effectiveness of internal control
could be delegated to the audit committee. The definition of internal control
was however widened by this report to include all controls rather than just
financial controls.
The delegation of this review to the audit committee therefore inferred that the
audit committee roles could be extended 32
 to include an assessment of the
overall risks to the organisation.
2.4.2 Roles of Audit Commitbees
Audit committees provide a focus and a means for a fuller review and analysis
of the matters relating to internal controls, auditing, and financial reporting.
Wolnizer (1995) summarised the functional audit committee recommendations
of corporate governance commissions and committees in the US, UK,
Canada, and Australia. He demonstrated that the audit committee is expected
to perform almost exclusively in the technical areas of financial reporting,
auditing, and internal control.
These expectations are also cited in the literature of public accounting firms
(e.g. Arthur Andersen, 1994; Coopers & Lybrand, 1995:) and professional
bodies responsible for setting standards (e.g. AICPA, 1988; ICAEW, 1994:).
Verschoor (1993) study of the functions of the audit committees disclosed by
some of the largest US companies reported that they operated in the
aforementioned areas.
The detailed functions, common in all recommendations, which audit
committees, should undertake include but are not limited to:
• Internal control Assessment i.e. review the adequacy of the system of internal control;
and review the scope and results of internal auditing activities.
• Financial reporting.
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• External Auditing; i.e. recommendations on the appointment or removal of the external
auditors; review the plan and results of the audit with the external auditors; approve
the provision of consultancy services by the external auditors; Review the
independence of the external auditors.
• Investigations within its terms of reference.
2.4.2.1 Internal Control Assessment
The control environment represents the collective effect of many factors.
These include the management's philosophy and operating style, the
company's organisational structure, the functioning of the board and the audit
committee, the methods of communicating and implementing the assignment
of authority and responsibility, and practices of monitoring and following-up on
performance. The control environment includes activities of top management
and the board of directors.
The objective of the Treadway Commission Report (1987) was to identify
causes and make recommendations to reduce fraudulent financial reporting.
One of the recommendations was the integration of the various concepts and
definitions of internal control to develop a common frame of reference for
assessing all types of controls. As a result, Internal control - Integrated
Framework also known as the COSO Report was published in September
1992.
The primary responsibility for an effective system of internal control lies with
the board of directors. The Cadbury Code considered it good practice for
companies to set up an internal audit department to help discharge this
responsibility. The audit committee's involvement with the internal controls of
the organisation is primarily a review of the report on the effectiveness of
internal control on behalf of the board of directors.
An effective internal audit department is a valuable resource to an audit
committee. According to the IA's Standards for the Professional Practice of
Internal Auditing, ". The scope of internal auditing should encompass the
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examination and evaluation of the organisations system of internal control and
the quality of performance in carrying out assigned responsibilities".
The internal audit department is in a key position to review and assess the
adequacy of internal controls. Furthermore, it may ideally provide the audit
committee with the support for the public statements required by the directors
on internal control.
It follows that the audit committee can therefore look to an internal audit
department functioning within the IIA's standards to be an effective monitor of
the controls within an organisation.
A key characteristic of an effective internal audit department is the
independence with which it operates. Independence is crucial to the nature of
internal audit as it allows the auditor to render impartial and unbiased
judgement. It is best achieved through organisational status and objectivity.
The essence of the internal auditor - audit committee relationship is to provide
"reporting independence". I.e. the internal auditors have an avenue to report all
deficiencies to an authority without fear of reprisal by management. The chief
internal auditor should have direct communication with the audit committee.
Price Waterhouse (1993) survey highlighted that in 62% of all cases surveyed,
the internal auditor had exclusive communication with the audit committee.
The audit committee can also protect the independence of the Internal audit
department by ensuring that the chief internal auditor is not dismissed as a
result of reports which reflect unfavourably on management. The Treadway
Commission stressed this fact as it noted that "... given the importance of
internal audit to the audit committee ...the audit committee should review the
appointment and dismissal of the chief internal auditor. A survey by Price
Waterhouse (1993) highlighted that the audit committee reviewed and
concurred with the decision to hire or fire the chief internal auditor in only 40%
of all cases.
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The Cadbury Code (1992) highlighted these recommendations in their
guidance on audit committee relationships with internal audit. However,
surveys e.g. (Price Waterhouse 1993, KPMG 2000) undertaken highlight that
in practice, organisational status is still under threat.
Scarborough (1998) examined the relationship between the audit committee
and internal audit. He found that audit committee composition did influence the
extent of interaction between the audit committee and internal audit. Whilst
limited to the examination of the audit committee role in internal control
assessment, this study provides evidence that audit committee composition
influences the effectiveness of the audit committee in relation to internal
controls. Raghunandan et al (2001) examined the association between audit
committee composition and the committee's interaction with internal auditing.
They found that audit committee composition33 influenced the extent of
committee interaction with internal auditing.
These studies provide empirical support for the recommendations of the
Combined Code (1998) on audit committee composition.
2.4.2.2 Outsourcing
The value of internal audit in an organisation is not under scrutiny. It is more a
question of how this service is best delivered. It is argued that an external
provider cannot efficiently acquire the knowledge possessed by internal
auditors employed within the organisation.
Outsourcing occurs when a business entity takes work traditionally performed
internally and gives it to an external provider. Outsourcing as defined by the
IIA34 refers to" the processes whereby an organisation reviews headquarters
functions and invites outside contractors to bid against internal departments for
the work". The IIA states that "a competent internal audit department that is
properly organised with trained staff can perform the internal audit function
more efficiently and effectively than a contracted service".
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Petravick (1997) compares organisations in the USA that have outsourced
their internal audit departments to those who have staffed it in-house The
study finds that the number of institutions using outsourcing nearly equals the
number with in-house functions. The study notes that the decision to outsource
was usually based on access to expertise and management of internal audit
costs. . Selim et al (2000) however note that companies in the UK are not as
likely to outsource the internal audit department and prefer to keep this
function in-house.
The choice to maintain an in-house function was also highly correlated with the
management of external audit costs. A survey undertaken by Kusel and Scull
(1998) provides data on the scope and depth of outsourcing in the USA and
Canada. Survey data35 shows that management decisions to outsource are
strongly influenced by cost-saving factors. It is clear that management must
perceive that the value-added to the organisation by an in-house function
supersedes the financial gains to be made if the function is outsourced.
There is empirical evidence — Scarborough (1998) and Raghunandan et al
(2001) to suggest that the existence and composition of an audit committee
greatly improves the level of interaction and reporting access of internal audit.
The data available does not highlight if the audit committee plays a role in the
decision to partially or wholly outsource the internal audit department. Given
the potential reliance of the audit committee on the reports and
recommendations of the internal audit department, the audit committee should
at least review and concur with management's decision to outsource the
internal audit department.
2.4.2.3 Financial Reporting
The audit committee is responsible for reviewing the financial statements and
considering whether they are complete and consistent with the information
known to management. Audit committees, in order to undertake this review,
require background knowledge of the business that includes: -
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• a detailed knowledge of the company's operations;
• awareness of political, economic, and technological risks and information on economic
trends, competitive forces that may impact on the business;
• an awareness of the actual performance of the company as compared to the expected
performance; and
• an awareness of the accounting policy choices in the industry in which the company
operates.
A review of the financial statements should involve consideration of the
following issues:
• The choice of accounting practices and policies or changes in accounting principles
which may have a significant impact on the results of the company; The audit
committee should understand and be adequately briefed by management and the
external auditor on the impact of these policies or changes to the policies.
• The compliance of the chosen practices and policies with legislation, SSAP's, FRS's,
and SORPs issued by the industry bodies.
• Significant changes in company performance and the judgmental areas that impact on
the company's results. Accruals, reserves, and estimates are often matters that
require significant judgement and they can significantly alter the results of the
company. 85% of the audit committees surveyed by Price Waterhouse (1993)
discussed significant accruals and reserves strongly influenced by estimates.
Given that the financial reporting oversight role is often delegated to the audit
committee, Beasley (1996 and 2000) considered if the existence of an audit
committee was associated with a reduced likelihood of financial statement
fraud. The study found that it was board composition as opposed to the
existence of an audit committee that was "...significantly more likely to reduce
the likelihood of financial statement fraud".
Other studies, also undertaken in the USA, have found positive associations
between the existence of the audit committee and various proxies for the
quality of financial reporting. Defend and Jiambalvo (1991) found that
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companies overstating their earnings were less likely to have an audit
committee. McMullen (1996) found a positive association between audit
committee existence and the quality of financial reporting. Wild (1996) found a
positive association between audit committee formation and the quality of
accounting earnings.
The review of interim financial statements is also part of the financial oversight
role of the audit committee. The publication of half-year financial reports has
been mandatory for companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and the
USM since 1964. Interim reports have become increasingly important to
investors and security analysts. The price of a company's shares may change
dramatically in response to interim reports that show earnings that are
materially different to forecasted projections.
The Treadway Commission Report (1987) recommended that the Audit
committee oversee the interim reporting process. This recommendation has
been adopted in the USA, as SEC rules require that the audit committee
review the interim reports. It is not mandatory for the audit committee to
undertake this review in Canada and the UK respectively as:
• The Macdonald Commission only recommended that the audit committee review
interim financial information before publication.
• The Cadbury Report in the UK only recommended that the audit committee review the
half-year reports before submission to the Board for approval.
The survey undertaken by Price Waterhouse (1993) notes that, on average,
only 29% of UK audit committees were involved in the interim reporting
process.
Recommendations in the UK have resulted in audit committees being a
mandatory requirement for listed companies. Support for audit committees
cannot therefore be justified if it is based on research that considers the
associations between various financial reporting proxies and the existence or
formation of an audit committee. Support may only be justifiable in instances
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where improvements to the quality of financial reporting are evidenced post
formation of the audit committee.
There is limited evidence to show company earnings and financial reporting
improve post audit committee formation — Wild (1996) and McMullen (1996)
respectively. Research evidence to date does not however consider if the
composition and structure of the audit committee is related to the quality of
financial reporting.
Furthermore, most of the research evidence is based on the experiences of
US companies as opposed to UK companies. Given the differences noted in
Section 2.3.1.5 between USA and UK Board structures, research conclusions
may therefore be inappropriate in the UK context.
Research to date on audit committees is limited and in some cases
inconclusive. This thesis therefore considers the associations between various
financial reporting proxies and the composition and structure of audit
committees in UK companies.
The extent to which the quality of financial reporting can be directly attributable
to the audit committee is debatable. However, it can be inferred that if there is
an effective audit committee, financial reporting irregularities should at least be
disclosed within the financial statements.
2.4.2.4 Reporting on Internal Controls
The Cadbury Code recommended that directors report in financial statements
on the effectiveness of their system of internal control. Following the
publication of the Cadbury code, companies and their external auditors,
alarmed at the requirements for reporting on the effectiveness of internal
controls suggested by the commission, required that the Code be clarified.
As a result, a committee chaired by Paul Rutteman, set up to provide guidance
to the directors of the affected companies, published a paper in 1994 - Internal
Control And Financial Reporting: Guidance For Directors Of Listed
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Companies- also known as the Rutteman Report (1994). This report provided
further guidance in complying with the requirements of the Cadbury code to
directors of listed companies. The report allowed directors to limit the scope of
their report to internal financial controls. The report defined internal financial
controls as the internal controls established to provide reasonable assurance
of: -
• The safeguarding of assets against unauthorised use or disposition;
• The maintenance of proper accounting records; and
• The reliability of financial information used within business or for publication.
The Rutteman Report (1994) maintained that directors reporting that a review
of the internal financial controls had been undertaken in the year under review
would achieve effective compliance with the code. A shortcoming was that the
Rutteman report did not lobby for directors to express an opinion on the
effectiveness of their internal financial control systems.
Whilst the Rutteman report (1994) sought to limit the scope of review to
financial as opposed to operational, the need for a review of all areas must still
be undertaken. Failures of operational controls will lead to failures to
safeguard the assets and ultimately a financial loss. The Hampel Report
(1998) revisited the subject of internal control reporting. It noted 36 that internal
controls... cover not only financial controls but operational and compliance
controls, and risk management, since there are potential threats to the
shareholders investment in each of these areas.
It is important to note the audit committee conducts the annual review of the
effectiveness of internal control on behalf of the board. The report on the
internal controls within the financial statement is issued collectively by the
board. The extent to which the quality of internal control reporting can be
directly attributable to the audit committee is debatable.
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However, it can be inferred that if there is an effective audit committee
irregularities in internal controls, which have resulted in a material loss to the
company, should be highlighted within the financial statements.
24.2.5 External Audit
One of the main reasons put forward by the Cadbury Committee on the
benefits of audit committees was that they "...offer added assurance to the
shareholders that the auditors, who act on their behalf, are in a position to
safeguard their interests"
The Cadbury report (1992) noted that "...the annual audit is one of the
cornerstones of corporate governance. The audit provides an external and
objective check on the way the financial statements have been prepared and
presented and it is an essential part of the checks and balances required37."
One of the key functions of the audit committee is to act as an interface
between the external auditors and the board of directors. Furthermore, the
external auditors can provide an objective report on internal financial controls
to the audit committee.
The other roles of the audit committee with respect to the external auditors
include:
• Consideration of the selection, reappointment, and dismissal of the external auditor,
The audit committee should share the selection responsibility with management. The
results of the survey by Price Waterhouse (1993) showed that on average 60% of the
audit committees surveyed were involved in the selection of the external auditor. The
audit committee should also be involved in the annual re-appointment process. In
considering the appointment of the external auditors, the committee should consider
the quality of services received.
• Reviewing the independence of the external auditor, it is important that the audit
committee protect and enhance the independence of the external auditor. The
committee should therefore consider if there are any factors that might impair the
independence of the external auditors.
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The ultimate objective of the audit process is to arrive at an opinion on the
truth and fairness of the financial statements and therefore convey to the users
of the financial statements an independent opinion as to whether the financial
statements as a whole represent a true and fair view of the company's profits
or losses and its state of affairs at balance sheet date. The external audit has
been criticised due to perceived problems with auditor independence.
An auditor can be said to be independent when free from the authority, control
or influence of others. Objectivity, which is implied by independence, is the
state of mind, which has regard to all considerations relevant to the task. It
implies integrity. Independence is central to the concept of auditing.
Shareholders, it is held, would not employ them if their ability to form
judgements independent of management were questionable. United States v
Arthur Young38 described the independent audit as "...the public watchdog
function" and noted that' ...if investors were to view the auditor as advocate
for the corporate client, the value of the audit might well be lost'. This view was
corroborated by the fact that a review undertaken by the Public Oversight
Board [POB] into alleged audit failures which showed that '...in too many
cases, preference of client management... prevailed over the preference of the
audit or consulting partner."
The extent of auditor independence from management is open to criticism.
The major areas of controversy are:
• Audit fees are paid to the auditors; thus financial independence is therefore
questionable. Critics would also maintain that as audit fees are in reality set by the
directors regardless of the statute giving shareholders the right to ratify these fees at
an Annual General Meeting. Financial independence may be further compromised the
practices of 'opinion shopping' and 'low balling'.
• Low Balling describes the practice whereby firms competing for tendered audit
engagements deliberately under-price their bids. This may result in auditors reducing
the scope of their work in order to ensure that break-even on costs is achieved. It is
however thought that this practice usually occurs where audit firms consider that
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lucrative consultancy assignments will be gained once they are appointed as external
auditors.
• UK auditors are pemiitted to provide non-audit services. It is argued that
independence may be eroded due to the fact that auditors may be under pressure to
capitulate in situations where financial reporting disputes arise if larger, more lucrative
consultancy fees may be lost as a result of managerial dissatisfaction. The
'quarantining' of audit services as an option has been considered on several
occasions. The Dearing Report39 in 1986 advocated that audit firms should not
provide 'related' services to audit clients as independence was compromised. This
suggestion was rejected then and once again during the considerations of the
Cadbury Committee. The Cadbury Report49 advocated full disclosure of fees paid to
external auditors for non-audit work.
The sale of the consultancy businesses of large accounting firms to third parties has
been a recent new development. However, this is voluntary and does not debar them
from retaining certain elements of the consultancy business within the practice41.
The provision of consultancy services is a contentious issue and it appears that
accountancy firms in the UK have responded by distancing their audit from their
consultancy practices. The manner in which this has been achieved suggests these
changes are primarily cosmetic.
Recent SEC42 pronouncements on external auditor independence highlight nine non-
audit areas where external auditor independence is compromised. Due to the
provision of related services. This includes specific limits° on  the provision of internal
audit services by the external audit provider.
The provision of 'related' services is not subject to such stringent requirements in the
UK. However, in a study conducted by Brand Finance PLC in June 2000, 96% of the
analysts surveyed were of the opinion that significant non-audit fees were likely to
compromise audit independence.
• Opinion shopping" describes the practice whereby the client seeks a second opinion
from another audit firm. Both firms in this scenario may be compromised: The existing
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auditors giving way on an audit issue to retain the engagement or the advisory firm
providing an agreeable opinion in anticipation of gaining a new client. In this situation,
the objectivity of the existing auditor is clearly threatened.
It is therefore important that the audit committee review the criteria required for
external auditor independence. Following up on recommendations of the Blue
Ribbon Committee on the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, in
December 1999, the SEC adopted rule amendments" requiring reporting
companies to include in their annual meeting proxy statement a report
disclosing whether the audit committee has taken certain actions. Specifically,
the audit committee report will have to disclose: -
• whether the audit committee has reviewed and discussed certain matter with the
independent auditors; whether the audit committee has reviewed and discussed the
audited financial statements with management;
• whether the audit committee has discussed with the independent auditors certain
matters required under SAS 61 auditing standards and whether they have received
and discussed the information required by Independent Standards Board Standard
No. 1 regarding the auditors' independence; and
• whether, based on any such reviews, the audit committee recommended to the board
of directors that the audited financial statements be included in the company's Annual
Report to SEC.
The disclosure requirements on external auditor independence in the USA
highlight the extent to which the role of the external auditors and their
relationship with the audit committee is considered to be a key mechanism in
corporate governance.
2.4.2.6 Going Concern Reporting
Given the functions of most audit committees, the review of the going concern
status of the company may be delegated to the audit committee.
The Companies Act 198546 states " the company shall be presumed to be
carrying on business as a going concern." SAS 130 defines a going concern
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as" an enterprise that will continue in operational existence for the foreseeable
future47". This means that in particular that the balance sheet and profit and
loss account assumes no intention or necessity to liquidate or significantly
curtail the scale of operations.
The Stock Exchange Listing rules require that directors make an assessment
of the going concern status of the company and set out a statement on going
concern in the operating financial review. Auditing Guidelines state that "...
where there is a significant uncertainty about the enterprise's ability to
continue in business, this fact should be stated in the financial statements."
I.e. the auditor is required to alert shareholders as to the significant possibility
that the company will enter bankruptcy by giving a "going concern"
qualification in the audit report. The external auditor is required to consider if
the disclosures given by the directors are adequate. They are required to set
out the reasons for disagreement with any of the disclosures in the corporate
governance report. They are required to qualify their opinion on the Cadbury
statement of compliance and going concern report if they do not agree with the
actual statement.
A responsibility for directors to consider the appropriateness of the going
concern basis is not new. The effect of the Cadbury Code (1992) and the
accompanying guidance for directors on "Going Concern and Financial
asReporting" is to make this recommendation more explicit.
The audit committee will generally consult with the external auditors and
management during the review. The audit committee should be confident that
the external auditor's opinion on the going concern status of the company is
reliable.
During the early 1980's and 1990's there were a number of well-publicised
cases in which auditors were criticised following corporate failure leading to
concerns that auditors were failing to give investors adequate warnings about
bankruptcy.
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Kida (1980) was the first to suggest the separation of the identification of a
going concern problem to the issue of issuing a going concern report. Kida's
results indicate that the auditor may be influenced by the perceived
consequences of issuing or not issuing a qualified audit report. De Angelo
(1981) defined audit quality as the "...probability that a given auditor will both
discover a breach in the client's accounting system and report the breach.
Based on this definition, the going concern decision comprises of two
variables, namely: -
• The discovery of the breach - related to the competence of the auditor, and
• The disclosure of the breach - dependent on the independence of the auditor.
Empirical evidence - Koh (1991), Citron & Teller (1992) indicates that auditors
rarely give qualified audit reports to companies that subsequently file for
bankruptcy.
Given the auditor is assumed competent, independence considerations must
influence their decision as to whether an actual qualification will be made. If
the auditor believes that a firm is going to fail and chooses not to disclose, the
auditor must clearly weigh the risks associated with disclosure/non-disclosure
- i.e. the risk of client bankruptcy and client loss or the risk of litigation and the
loss of reputation, respectively.
The risk of a client going bankrupt as a result of going concern qualification is
known as the "self-fulfilling prophecy". I.e. " the auditor's early warning could
be the proximate cause of bankruptcy" - Elliot & Jacobson (1987). Citron &
Teter (1992) did not find any evidence to support the self- fulfilling prophecy.
Studies in this area are however limited. The results of the study undertaken
by Citron and Taffler (1992) may not constitute conclusive evidence as to the
non-existence of the self-fulfilling prophecy due to the small size of their
sample data.
The number of successful cases brought against audit firms to date is
evidence of the risks associated with litigation. Empirical research- Wilson &
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Grimlund (1990) has shown that audit firms involved in disciplinary actions or
litigation tend to lose market share relative to their competitors.
The above arguments highlight that where impairments to auditor
independence exist, going concern qualifications may not be made. However,
given the risk of litigation and the ensuing loss of reputation, it follows that
auditors must consider that the self-fulfilling prophecy does exist.
It is important to re-state that the audit committee reviews the going concern
status of the company on behalf of the board. The report on going concern
within the financial statement is issued collectively by the board. The extent to
which an incorrect statement on going concern can be directly attributable to
the audit committee is debatable.
It can be inferred, however, that since this role is delegated to them,
regardless of whether the findings of the audit committee are made available
to the shareholders, the statement of going concern within the financial
statements should reflect the true nature of the company where there is an
effective audit committee.
It is therefore considered that certain financial reporting problems primarily due
to inadequate disclosures within the financial statements may be attributable to
an ineffective audit committee.
2.4.3 Composition of Audit Committees
The Cadbury Report noted that "...The committee regards the appointment of
properly constituted audit committees as an important step in raising standards
of corporate governance. Their effectiveness depends on their having a strong
chairman who has the confidence of the board and the external auditors and
on the quality of the non-executive directors". The committee also noted the
importance of good structure in order to ensure that audit committees were
soundly based.
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It is therefore reasonable to consider that audit committee structure and the
quality of the non-executive directors will influence the ability of the audit
committee to be effective.
2.4.3.1 Audit Committee Structure
The terms of reference and organisational structure of the audit committee will
differ from organisation to organisation. However, there are certain elements
that should be present in order for the audit committee to be considered
effective. These include:-
2.4.3.2 Audit Charter/ Terms of Reference
A well-designed audit committee charter detailing the terms of reference is
essential. The charter should be used to guide the audit committee in their
performance in order for them to adequately fulfil the roles required of them by
the main board of directors, shareholders and other third parties. The audit
charter should clearly define the roles and responsibilities and the authority to
investigate of audit committee. A survey conducted by Price Waterhouse
(1993) noted that on average 62% of companies surveyed had an audit
committee charter. Recent surveys e.g. ICAEW (1998) suggest that most large
listed UK companies now have an audit charter. A survey of US audit
committee conducted by KPMG (2000) noted that 70% of companies surveyed
had an audit committee charter.
Recent SEC pronouncements" which require that the annual proxy statement
must state whether the audit committee has adopted a written charter will
result in all US listed companies having charters. There is to date no such
requirement in the UK.
The audit committee roles and responsibilities are laid down in the charter. It is
reasonable to infer that audit committee effectiveness must be affected by the
existence of a charter.
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2.4.3.3 Terms of Office
The Cadbury Report recommended that audit committee members be
appointed for a specified term and that re-appointment should not be
automatic. Price Waterhouse (1993) survey indicated that most companies did
not have a formal rotation policy for committee members. It is important for
those companies to conduct performance evaluations of individual committee
members in order for a balance between experience and complacency to be
struck.
2.4.3.4 Meetings
Price Waterhouse (1993) survey noted that audit committees meet an
average of 3.3 times per year. The survey further noted that such meetings
lasted for an average of two hours. The committee members surveyed
considered the number and length of meetings adequate to fulfil their duties.
The KPMG (2000) survey noted that audit committees meet an average of 4.3
times per year. This survey noted that such meetings also lasted for an
average of two hours. It would appear that whilst the number of meetings held
by audit committees had on average increased 50 over the period, the time
spent during each meeting remained constant. Menon and Williams (1994)
examined the extent of use of audit committees for monitoring by focusing on
the frequency of meetings held by the audit committee and factors associated
with such frequency. Beasley (1996) noted that as the number of additional
directorships held by non-executive directors increases, their ability to fulfil
their monitoring responsibilities decreases as evidenced by his results which
showed a greater likelihood for financial statement fraud where non-executive
directorships had significantly more appointments. Given the above
arguments, it is reasonable to infer that audit committee effectiveness must be
affected by the time devoted to business and by the availability of directors to
attend these meetings.
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2.4.3.5 Agenda
Given the infrequency of meetings and the limited time available, it is important
for a detailed agenda to be prepared for each meeting. This agenda is
necessary to focus the attention of members on the objectives of the meeting
and, over the course of the year, should address all the duties and
responsibilities outlined in the audit charter. This agenda should be circulated
along with any relevant submissions to clarify the subject to the audit
committee members in advance of the meeting.
2.4.3.6 Reporting on the Committee's Activities
Price Waterhouse (1993) survey noted that most committee's -73% provide a
written report of their meetings to the main board of directors. The Treadway
Commission recommended that companies also include a report from the
audit committee in their financial statements. This report would clarify the role
and responsibilities of the audit committee to the shareholders and ensure that
the committee was meeting its responsibilities by focusing their attention on
them. SEC rules require that proxy statements include a representation by the
audit committee that its members have reviewed and discussed the financial
statements with management and the external auditors. There is no
requirement for UK audit committees to report to shareholders within the
financial statements to date.
This section considers the key mechanisms of the corporate governance
framework that relate to the structure of the audit committee. It is important to
consider if these mechanisms improve the effectiveness of the audit
committee. The following research question therefore arises: -
IS THERE A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWENN GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE?
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2.4.3.7 Membership of the Audit Committee
2.4.3.8 Number of Members
The Cadbury Report (1992) recommended that there should be a minimum of
three members. The Hampel Report (1998) considered -that audit committees
composed of less than three non-executive directors might be ineffective.
2.4.3.9 Independence
The Cadbury Report (1992) noted that membership should be confined to non-
executive directors and that the majority of members be independent. I.e. that,
apart from their director's fees and shareholdings, they should be independent
of management and free from any involvement that might significantly interfere
with their ability to judge matters independently.
The Cadbury Report noted that it was for the board to decide if the relevant
directors achieved the criterion for independence. In contrast, The American
Law Institute (1984), in it's "Principles of Corporate Governance- Analysis and
Recommendations" was more specific as it defined 51 any involvement that
might significantly impair independence. Other impairments to independence
in the form of significant relationships with customers and suppliers and
interlocking directorships were examined in the Price Waterhouse (1993)
study. This study noted that 75% of audit committee chairmen considered a
significant affiliation to a customer or supplier as impairment to independence.
They however indicated that ten percent of their current audit committees
would not be considered independent if customer/supplier affiliations were
considered.
Interlocking directorships may also be considered as a possible threat to
director independence. Research data 52 on US companies highlights the
extent of the problem. Whilst interlocking directorships may result in a conflict
of interest, it is also important to remember that the skills and experiences that
are contributed may outweigh the threat.
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However, interlocking directorships present a clear conflict of interest where
directors are also in a position to influence remuneration and nomination by
virtue of them being on each other's boards and committees.
Independence is crucial to the effectiveness of the committee. Furthermore,
the audit committee must also be perceived as independent before they can
be considered to be objective, credible and therefore useful. Given the above,
the following research question arises: -
CAN UK AUDIT COMMITTEES BE CONSIDERED EFFECTIVE IN TERMS OF THEIR
COMPOSITION?
2.4.3.10 Quality of Non-Executive Directors
Regulatory commissions have highlighted the importance of audit committees
and their composition of non-executive independent directors. However
corporate failures involving fraud, poor accounting, inadequate internal
controls, and apparent ineffective monitoring by audit committees — (Mitchell,
1991, Beasley (2000)) highlight that audit committee composition is not the
only factor to influence audit committee effectiveness.
Wolnizer (1995) summarised the functional audit committee recommendations
of corporate governance commissions and committees in the US, UK,
Canada, and Australia. He demonstrated that the audit committee is expected
to perform almost exclusively in the technical areas of financial reporting,
auditing, and internal control.
The Institute of Internal Auditors and Price Waterhouse (1993) study indicated
a need for audit committees to contain sufficient relevant experience to
discharge their responsibilities. Other individuals (e.g. Somer, 1991) and
bodies (e.g. ICAEW, 1993) have stated similar concerns. Kalbers and Fogarty
(1993) identified financial reporting as the functional area that requires prior
experience. A global study by Arthur Andersen (1994) reported the views of
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executive management and the external auditors. They all considered that
audit committee composition was a key factor in determining the effectiveness
of an audit committee.
Each of these studies identified audit committee member experience and an
awareness of technical issues as a prerequisite for committee effectiveness.
The Price Waterhouse (1993) study recommended that at least one member
with a financial, accounting or auditing background as useful in guiding the
committee in the financial areas.
It is therefore reasonable to consider that an audit committee comprised of
non-executive directors, who, as a whole, possess sufficient background
experience, will be effective.
Lee (1997) considered the disclosed audit committee responsibilities of a
sample of US Fortune 500 companies. He noted that the experience
backgrounds of the audit committee members to be inconsistent with the
disclosed audit committee responsibilities.
Regardless of whether those audit committees are actually ineffective, external
parties may perceive them as ineffective if it is considered that the members
have neither the experience nor the technical background with which to make
an informed judgement. It follows that member backgrounds should reflect the
functional responsibilities of the audit committee.
Evidence exists to suggest that the Chief Executive Officer may influence the
composition of the board — Mace, 1971; Vancil, 1989; Hermalin & Weisbach,
1988). Given that audit committee members are chosen from the board, the
preferences of the chief executive officer may affect the composition of the
audit committee. This may result in an audit committee composed of the non-
executive directors who are preferred by the chief executive officer as opposed
to those members who possess the appropriate skills and experience.
The audit committee is composed of non-executive directors and the financial
reporting oversight role is usually delegated to the audit committee. Assuming
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that audit committee members possess the necessary background and the
skills to undertake this role, it follows that they are more likely to be effective in
this role.
It follows that an audit committee may be considered effective if the members
of this committee possess experience in this role. The problem that arises is
what constitutes an adequate amount of experience.
The Blue Ribbon Report (1999) provides guidelines as to when an audit
committee may be considered experienced. SEC (release no. 34-41982)
provides that companies with a stated market capitalisation must have audit
committees consisting of at least three directors who are financially literate°
or who become financially literate within a reasonable time after their
appointment. The audit committees also must have at least one member with
accounting or related financial management expertise.
A survey undertaken by Price Waterhouse (1993) identified the key to audit
committee effectiveness as background experience and training. The report
considered that audit committee effectiveness was only possible where the
members understood their responsibilities and how to meet them. It further
noted that 40% of the chairmen interviewed considered that their audit
committees would benefit from additional briefings on committee
responsibilities and best practice in meeting these responsibilities. A survey of
US companies undertaken by Investor Business relations (March 2000)
highlighted the fact that audit committee members did not consider that they
needed extra training in order to fulfil their functional roles.
Training is considered important to the effectiveness of the audit committee. It
is important for training to ensure that both the functional and executive roles
of the non-executive directors are reviewed. In cases where a mismatch exists
between member backgrounds and functional roles, extra training should be of
benefit.
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2.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter examined the nature of corporate governance systems, theories
that have influenced these systems and considered a model of governance
that embodied all of these concepts.
The governance model highlighted the role of the board" and the factors that
might influence board effectiveness. It was considered that director
age/experience, board size, board structure, and duality of the role of
chairman and chief executive officer as factors intrinsic to the board that might
impinge on the effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. It noted
that: -
• Director age may be an indicator that reflects the experience of non-executive
directors on the audit committee. However, it was noted that experience as opposed to
age might be indicative of the audit committee members' ability to discharge their role.
• The balance of the board i.e. the proportion of executive to non-executive directors
may result in a board in which non-executive directors are ineffective and may
therefore result in an ineffective audit committee.
• The separation of the role and thief executive officer is considered important to the
effectiveness of the overall board and by implication the audit committee.
This factors extrinsic to the organisation that might influence the effectiveness
of the board and therefore the audit committee was also examined. The role of
institutional investors, regulators, and government55 in influencing board
effectiveness were reviewed. In most cases, the recommendations issued by
all extrinsic parties tended to focus on improvements of factors intrinsic to the
board examined in detail in section 2.3.1.
This chapter has considered the factors that might impinge on the ability of the
audit committee to fulfil its oversight role. The roles of the audit committee
were therefore examined. It was considered that the extent to which the audit
PAGE 94
committees discharge their functional roles could be used as a surrogate for
an external indication of audit committee effectiveness.
For the purpose of this thesis, it was decided to focus on the audit committee's
oversight role in respect of the financial statements. Audit committees were
considered ineffective where disclosures within the financial statements did not
reflect the true state of affairs in the company.
The literature specific to audit committee was also considered. The factors
considered influencing the ability of the audit committee to be effective were
the structure of the audit committee, the independence of audit committee
members and the quality of non-executive directors.
The main issues considered to impinge on the effectiveness of the audit
committee in respect of the structure of the audit committee were:
• The existence of an audit committee charter or terms of reference. A well-designed
audit committee charter detailing the terms of reference was essential as this charter
should be used to guide the audit committee in their performance in order for them to
adequately fulfil the roles required of them by the main board of directors,
shareholders and other third parties.
• The number of audit committee meetings in a given period. Research evidence
highlighted that the number of audit committee meetings held was an indication of the
adequacy of the audit committee's oversight role.
• The number of additional directorships held by audit committee members. Research
evidence highlighted that as the number of additional directorships held by non-
executive directors' increases, their ability to fulfil their monitoring responsibility
decreases.
The main factors considered to impinge on the effectiveness of the audit
committee in respect of the membership of the audit committee were:
• The number of members on the audit committee. A minimum of three non-executive
directors was considered necessary for the audit committee to be effective.
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• The independence of audit committee members. All members of the audit committee
were to be independent for the audit committee to be considered independent.
The quality of non-executive directors was considered to impinge on the
effectiveness of the audit committee. Audit committee members were
assessed in terms of:
• The extent to which the audit committee members are financially literate.
• The extent to which the audit committee is considered technically competent.
The overall purpose of this thesis therefore considers if the key factors thought
to impinge on audit committee effectiveness are present in companies in which
the audit committee is considered to have failed in their financial reporting
oversight role. The overall null hypothesis of this thesis is therefore:
COMPANIES WITH FINANCIAL REPORTING PROBLEMS HAVE INEFFECTIVE AUDIT
COMMITTEES.
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1 E.g. Guidelines for Directors (Institute of Directors, 1990), The Roles and Duties of
Directors: A Statement of Best Practice (institutional Shareholders' Committee, 1991)
2 See Cadbury Report (1992) para 4.3 for references to the importance of nomination
committees
3 i.e. recommendations on effective board structure contained in the Combined Code on
Corporate governance (1999)
4 The Maxwell Case is perhaps one of the best examples of the problems that may occur
where a dominant individual may be unaccountable to the shareholders and is in a
position where all actions are unquestioned.
5 Guidelines for Directors (Institute of directors, 1990), The Role & Duties of Directors: A
Statement of Best Practice (Institutional Shareholders' Committee, 1991).
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6 Shown in detail in Figure 70
7 Shown in detail in Figure 71
8 with respect to their oversight role on the audit committee
9 Source: Hendry et al (1992) for statistics 1989-1992
10 Inland Revenue Scheme
11
a non-executive director cannot be included in an approved share option scheme
12 These directors are not considered independent.
13 A smaller listed company is taken to be a company listed outside of the FTSE-350
14 formerly known as CISCO
15 A fraud firm is one in which evidence of financial statement fraud has been publicly
reported
16 No significant differences were found in composition of failed companies as compared
to non-failed companies.
17 A smaller listed company is taken to be a company listed outside of the FTSE-350
18 Pension funds and insurance companies
19 Source: International Markets Group
20 Review of a study by Oxford University's SAID Business School in 'Money, risk and
return: Can the good guys win at work?' (1999), Guardian, 27 March.
21 Background evidence from a number of sources that they gained from in-depth
interviews with senior executives from a sample of leading UK insurance companies in
order to characterise institutional monitoring in the UK.
22	
institut ional US  	 did not consider this to be an important aspect
23
'Good Governance Pays off: Institutions Will Pay a Premium for an Independent
Board', Investor Relations Business, Editorial, 10/7/2000.
24 Investors define good governance as having a majority of outside investors on the
board who have no ties with management, holding regular director evaluations and being
responsive to investor requests for information on governance issues.
25 Re. Stapledon (1996)
26 
until October 1997 known as the Securities and Investments Board (SIB) -
27 Notwi.thstanding amendments to Companies Act 1985.
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28 The history of audit committee development is restricted to the USA, Canada, and the
UK as they represent the countries with the more advanced governance systems within
countries whose governance system is primarily based on the Anglo-Saxon model.
29 Standing Audit Committees Composed of Non-executive directors-
30
'Where were the Directors? Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in
Canada" (also known as the "Dey Report')
31 Internal audit in the Civil Service 1973
32 The KPMG Audit Committee Survey (2000) highlights that the audit committee role in
business risk review is becoming increasingly popular in the large listed companies.
33 In terms of all members being independent and at least one member having a finance
or accounting background.
34 Institute of Internal Auditors (UK) - Professional Briefing Note Three
35 Kusel and Scull (1998) - More than 21% (USA), 31.5% (Canada) have outsourced
some of the internal audit function; 57.6% (USA), 62.2% (Canada) use Big Six firms as
external providers. 60% (USA), 52% (Canada) give financial savings as the main reason
or some outsourcing of the internal audit function; 11.4% (USA), 25.6% (Canada) have
considered outsourcing the whole of the internal audit function;
36 Para 2.2.
37 Cadbury Report Para 5.1
38 United States v Arthur Young 465 US 805(1984)
39 '
Regulating the Auditing Profession' - Consultative document issued by the DTI in 1986
- chaired Lord R. Dearing
40 Cadbury Report pare 5.10
41 Andersen's, formerly known as Arthur Andersen, still undertakes consultancy work
even though consultancy practice — Accenture (formerly known as Andersen Consulting)
exists.
42 SEC Release 33-7919, Released November 2000
43 The external audit provider may not perform more than 40% of Internal audit
assignments
44	 .Discussed in the previous paragraphs with direct reference to going concern
considerations. Firms may look to another firm for the more favourable treatment allowed
by an accounting standard option to be utilised.
45 New Item 306 of Regulations S-K and S-B and Item 7(e)(3) of Schedule 14A
PAGE 107
46 Schedule 4 p.10
47 There is a presumption in both law and accounting standards that the financial
statements are prepared on a going concern basis and that the foreseeable future should
normally extend for a period of a minimum of six months following the date of the audit
report or one year after the balance sheet date whichever period ends on the later date.
48 Developed by nominees of the accountancy profession and the Hundred Group of
Finance Directors
49 Effective from June 2001
50 The main reason given in the KPMG (2000) survey for the increase in meetings was
the increasing duties and responsibilities ascribed to the audit committee
51 
a director who is a member of the family of a current director,
a director who paid to or received from the company commercial payments exceeding
$200,000 in the preceding two years;
a director who owns or has the power to vote an equity interest in a company which paid
to or received from the company commercial payments exceeding $200,000 in the
preceding two years;
a director who is affiliated in a professional capacity with a law firm that was primary legal
adviser with respect to corporate law or securities matters;
a director who is affiliated in a professional capacity with an investment-banking firm
retained in advisory capacity or as underwriter in an issue of the company's securities
52 Kom Ferry International (1999) Annual Study of Boards.
53 Financially literate being defined as having background experience in financial or
banking and or being or been a chief executive officer of a company.
54 Including those roles delegated to board committees
55 
used as a proxy for the general public
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CHAPTER 3:
METHODOLOGY
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The structure and composition of the board is considered to be a factor that
influences the effectiveness of the board. It therefore follows, given that the
audit committee is a subset committee of the board, structure and composition
of the audit committee must also be considered to influence the effectiveness
of the audit committee.
Current recommendations.' on audit committees appear to justify this
assumption as they emphasise the structure and composition of the audit
committee as crucial to the effectiveness of the audit committee.
In principle audit committees should perform an oversight role and thus
provide a focus and a means for a fuller review and analysis of matters relating
to internal controls, auditing [internal and external], and financial reporting.
The main activities of the audit committee were examined in detail in chapter
two. It was considered that the extent to which the audit committees discharge
their functional roles could be used as a measure of audit committee
effectiveness.
The activities of the audit committee in relation to internal control assessment
and internal auditing were considered. Given the contribution that internal audit
can make to the audit committee's ability to assess internal controls, the extent
to which the audit committee interacts with internal audit was also considered
to be a measure of audit committee effectiveness.
Scarborough (1998) and Raghunandan et al (2001) both examined the
relationship between the audit committee and internal audit. They found that
audit committee composition did influence the extent of interaction between
the audit committee and internal audit. Scarborough (1998) focused on the
non-executive directors in terms of their number and their relative
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independence. Raghunandan et al (2001) extended their research to examine
if the composition of the audit committee in terms of independence and
financial literacy influenced the extent to which the audit committee
communicated with internal audit. Whilst limited to the examination of the audit
committee role in internal control assessment, this study provides evidence
that audit committee composition influences the effectiveness of the audit
committee in relation to internal controls. This thesis therefore does not
consider the role of audit committee in respect of internal controls in any great
detail.
The activities of the audit committee in respect of external audit were
considered. Management is principally responsible for selecting the company's
accounting policies and the preparation of the financial statements. The
external auditors are responsible for the auditing of the company's financial
statements and providing an independent opinion on the truth and fairness of
these financial statements.
Given that the external auditors are usually selected or recommended by
management for ratification by shareholders, the relationship between the
external auditors and management may be compromised in certain situations.
The audit committee provides an additional link between management and the
external auditors in so far as the external auditors are able to discuss all
matters in confidence.
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) considered how external auditors and
management perceived the audit committee. They argued that audit
committee effectiveness was conditional on institutional and personal power.
I.e. the power given to the audit committee members and the willingness of the
members to monitor. This study noted that it was only in the area of financial
reporting that member technical expertise was considered as necessary for
audit committee effectiveness.
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This study did not conclude that audit committees were perceived as
ineffective. In fact, it widened the debate as to how audit committee
effectiveness could be evaluated by including institutional and personal power
as conditions for audit committee effectiveness. It was therefore decided not
to focus in this thesis on the relationship between external auditors and the
audit committee as an indicator of audit committee effectiveness.
The activities of the audit committee in terms of financial reporting were
examined. Most of the studies to date have been limited to the study of US
companies and to considering if the existence of an audit committee improved
the quality of financial reporting. Since most UK Listed companies now have
audit committees, these studies are therefore of limited value.
It was therefore decided that the focus of this thesis would be limited to the
financial reporting role of the audit committee and consider the extent to which
the composition and structure of the audit committee was associated with the
ability of the audit committee to fulfil this role effectively.
3.2 AUDIT CONIVIITTEE EFFECTIVENESS
It is reasonable to assume that an audit committee may be considered
effective where it achieves its stated roles. The audit committee is not required
to report to the shareholders within the financial statements on the extent to
which they have achieved their roles. Thus, actual audit committee
effectiveness cannot be externally observed.
It is possible to measure audit committee effectiveness indirectly if it is
considered that the absence of financial reporting problems indicates an audit
committee has been effective in achieving their financial reporting oversight
role.
Financial reporting is the term used to cover all the reports of a financial nature
that are issued to external users by a company. The financial statements are
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the most important areas of financial reporting and thus this thesis focuses on
the financial reporting problems evidenced within the financial statements.
Financial reporting problems within financial statements may range from
inadequate disclosure to corporate failure. It would . be inappropriate to
consider that the audit committee effective or otherwise would be in a position
to prevent corporate failure. That is not the role of the audit committee. The
audit committee should review the financial statements to ensure that they
reflect the true state of affairs of the company. The audit committee is
considered ineffective where the following financial reporting problems arise:
• Non-disclosure within the financial statements of impending corporate failure.
• Financial statement audit report qualification.
• Referral to the Financial Reporting Review Panel.
3.2.1 Non-Disclosure of Potential Insolvency
The external auditor is required to consider if the disclosures given by the
directors are adequate. Auditing Guidelines —SAS 130 2 state that "... where
there is a significant uncertainty about the enterprise's ability to continue in
business, this fact should be stated in the financial statements." This infers
that the external auditor is required to alert shareholders as to the significant
possibility that the company may not continue in business by giving a "going
concern" qualification in the audit report. The failure to qualify the financial
statements of a company that subsequently fails must be considered a failure
in the effectiveness of the external auditors.
It must also be considered in this situation that the audit committee has been
unable to exercise the financial reporting oversight role effectively. Thus a
company that fails without prior warning should be deemed to have had a
financial reporting problem in the year prior to failure.
3.2.2 Audit Report Qualification
The audit report may be qualified for any of the following other reasons:
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• A disclaimer of opinion. This indicates that the auditors are unable to form an opinion
due to a material limitation in the scope of their work.
• An adverse opinion. This indicates that the auditor considers that the financial
statements do not show a true and fair view.
• A qualified opinion arising from a limitation in the scope of their work that does not
result in the inability to form an opinion on the financial statements.
• A qualified opinion arising from disagreement about an accounting treatment
• A qualified opinion arising from the omission of a primary statement required by the
Financial Reporting Standards.
Given that most companies will attempt to avoid qualification, qualification
types 1 and 2 indicate that the external auditors and the audit committee have
succeeded in ensuring that the true state of affairs within the company has
been reflected in the financial statements. Any company with this type of
qualifications is not considered to have a financial reporting problem.
Qualification type 3 indicates that the external auditors have been unable to
form an opinion due to a limitation in the scope of their work. Where this
limitation is as a result of a lack of audit evidence, it is considered that any
company with this qualification has a financial reporting problem.
Qualification types 4 and 5 indicate that management has disagreed with the
external auditors and that the discussions with the audit committee have failed
to resolve these issues. Any company with this type of qualifications can be
considered to have a financial reporting problem.
3.2.3 Report to the FRRP
The Financial Reporting Council established the Financial Reporting Review
Panel in 1989. It is authorised by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
for the purposes of section 245B 3
 of the Companies Act 1985 (introduced by
the Companies Act 1989).
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The Panel is empowered to apply to the court for a declaration that the annual
financial statements of a company do not comply with the accounting
requirements of the Companies Act and for an order requiring the directors to
prepare revised financial statements.
The Panel's main concern is with material departures from accounting
standards, i.e. where the financial statements in question do not give a true
and fair view, but it also considers other departures from the accounting
provisions of the Companies Act 1985. The main areas of concern include: -
• Where a material departure from accounting standards or an accounting requirement
of the Companies Act 1985 has been disclosed in the financial statements or is the
subject of an audit qualification; and
• Where there is no such disclosure or audit qualification but where there nevertheless
appears to be a substantial matter for concern.
The Panel only deals with the financial statements of public and large private
companies. These companies within the Panel's remit are:
• Plc's (except where they are subsidiaries in a small or medium-sized group).
• Subsidiaries in a Group headed by a PLC.
• Large companies that are not PLC's.
• Any company in a "large" 4 group.
The FRRP issues press notices to report on companies who have voluntarily
agreed to revise their financial statements or take other corrective action in
respect of any apparent breaches of the Companies Act 1985. The FRRP has
the power via the courts to compel companies to take corrective action. To
date, all companies subject to FRRP consideration have voluntarily agreed to
remedial action.
A referral to the FRRP that results in an amendment to the financial
statements indicates that the company has a financial reporting problem.
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3.3 DATA SELECTION
In order to consider the extent to which the composition and structure of the
audit committee was associated with the ability of the audit committee to fulfil
the financial reporting oversight role effectively, it was necessary to: -
. Select a group of companies with financial reporting problems;
• Determine the criteria to evaluate the nature of the board (where relevant) and audit
committees of these companies; and
• Select another group of comparable companies with no financial reporting problems
as a control group in order to evaluate the extent to which composition and structure
could be hypothesised as an influence on audit committee effectiveness.
This thesis considers the role and structure of audit committees. Many
companies prior to release of the Cadbury Report (1992) did not have audit
committees. The period 1993 — 1999 was chosen in order to select only
companies with reporting dates after the release of this report.
3.3.1 Company Selection
The criteria to determine that a company was included in the population was
that:
• A financial reporting problem as defined in section 3.2 was in evidence.
• The year in which the problem was evidenced was within the reference date of the
study.
Four main data sources were used to identify companies with financial
reporting problems (FRP Companies). These were:
• Dialogue database.
• Press notices issued by the Financial Reporting Review Panel in the period from
1.1.93 to date.
• Hemmington Scott Quarterly Publications 1993-1997.
• Macmillan's Stock Exchange YearBook 1999.
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• Companies house Statutory Returns.
3.3.1.1 Press Notice Review
Press notices from inception to date are published on the Accounting
Standards Board (ASB) web-site s. This web-site is updated on a quarterly
basis. An update service, by subscription, however communicates by e-mail
any additional press notices released since the last update.
Press notices are issued by the FRRP for a variety of reasons. The press
notices issued were reviewed. The following press notices were excluded:
• Press notices required in amendments to financial statements with year-ends prior to
1.1.93.
• Policy statements.
• Press notices on companies that were no longer in existence as a result of merger,
take-over, or substantial re-organisation.
This review of the web-site resulted in a population of companies that met the
following criteria: -
• Being a separate identifiable entity; and
• Having had a financial reporting problem within the qualifying periods.
3.3.1.2 Dialogue Database Review
The Dialogue database houses the text of all UK Listed Companies financial
statements. An initial search of this database s was undertaken to choose
companies that met the following criteria:
• The reporting date of the financial statements for each company selected fell within the
qualifying period.
• All companies selected were still separate and identifiable entities as at 30th
September 1999.
• All companies selected had financial statements in which the auditors had qualified the
audit report for the reasons stated in section 3.2.2.
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This review of the Dialogue database was incomplete due to problems with
availability of a complete database for the entire reference period. The
Business Information Resource Unit therefore undertook a second database
search at City Business Library using the same criteria. This search yielded a
source of companies that could be defined as: -
• Being a separate identifiable entity; and
• Having had a financial reporting problem within the qualifying periods.
3.3.1.3 Hemmington Scott Quarterly Publications
The last group of companies to be included in the population was those
companies where inadequate disclosure of an insolvency problem had
occurred. It was however necessary to determine the nature of the insolvency
problem and consider which problem would be included in the population. It
was decided to include all companies in creditor liquidation, receivership or
administration.
The first step was to determine all the listed companies that had any of the
above insolvency problems within the reference period. Different data sources
were initially tried. The Companies House Dissolved Database was used. A
search of this database resulted in an initial sample of about 1200 companies.
As there were no advanced search facilities within this database to eliminate
unlisted companies, it was therefore necessary to find another data source.
The Hemmington Scott quarterly publications on companies were found to
include a section that highlighted reasons why listed companies had been
removed from the database. It was noted that companies were removed for a
variety of reasons including liquidation, administration and receivership.
Details for companies removed were found for companies removed between
1993 and 1997.
For companies removed after 1997, the website 7 was used. The companies
highlighted in these searches were then noted. The last available financial
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statements prior to this date were examined to highlight if the financial
statements referred to the possibility of a going concern problem or if the
financial statements had stated that the company was not a going concern.
The companies in which the financial statements provided no warning signals
were considered to have a financial reporting problem and were therefore
added to the population of companies with financial reporting problems
A variety of sources were used to find the financial statements of these
companies. These included:
• Financial statements held at City University Business School Library.
• Financial statements held at City Business Library.
• The Dialogue database CD-ROM's.
• Statutory Financial statements filed at Companies House, London.
It was important to verify that the Hemmington Scott database was a complete
source of companies due to the fact that companies can request to be de-
listed and not provide a reason for this request. The Macmillan Stock
Exchange yearbook was therefore reviewed. This publication also contained a
section that noted the companies that were removed due to liquidation,
receivership, or administration problems. There were no companies listed
there that were not already included in the population. It was therefore
assumed that the Hemmington Scott database was an accurate data source.
3.3.1.4 NFRP Company Selection
To create a control group of companies with no financial reporting problems
(NFRP companies), a search of the Extel database was undertaken using the
following steps. For each FRP company included within the population, the
database was searched for another company that: -
• was within the same industrial sector,
• was listed on the London Stock Exchange;
• had a year end date was co-terminus with that of the FRP company; and
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• The market capitalisation of the NFRP Company was within ± 10% of the market
capitalisation of the FRP Company.
The result of each search was evaluated and the company, closest in size that
met all the other criteria was chosen. The financial statements of this company
were reviewed to ensure that the financial statements did not contain a
qualification of the type detailed in section 3.2.2 that would result in this
company being considered to have a financial reporting problem. It was not
considered necessary to consider any other determinants of a financial
reporting problem given that: -
• All companies reported to the FRRP were included in the FRP population; and
• All companies in liquidation, receivership, and administration were already included in
the population.
13.1.5 NFRP2 Company Selection
The date analysis of the companies included in the FRP population highlighted
that a significant number of companies fell within the earlier years of the
reference period.
It was therefore decided to undertake a time series analysis in order to
highlight if improvements in board and audit committee composition and
structure had taken place over time. It was expected over time, companies
with no financial reporting problem would have improved in the areas relating
to the board and audit committee that might have been considered ineffective.
A second control group of companies with no financial reporting problems
(NFRP2 companies) were therefore created. This group comprised all the
companies included within the first control group. However, the data used to
evaluate these companies was now taken from the latest available financial
statements.
Access to the details of directors and the latest financial statements were
found using the Hemmington Scott Internet website. It was found that some
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companies, which were included in the NFRP1 population, no longer existed in
2000. The main reasons were as a result of:
• Mergers.
• Take-overs.
• Liquidations.
In the case of merger and take-overs an alternative company which met all the
criteria of the NFRP1 population was chosen. This new company was used
only in the NFRP2 population.
Where the NFRP1company had since entered into liquidation, the company
was removed from the NFRP1 population and a new company was used in
both the NFRP1 and NFRP2 population.
The financial statements of these new companies were reviewed to ensure
that the financial statements did not contain a qualification of the type detailed
in section 3.2.2 that would result in this company being considered to have a
financial reporting problem. It was not considered necessary to consider any
other determinants of a financial reporting problem given that:
• All companies reported to the FRRP were included in the FRP population.
• AU companies in liquidation, receivership, and administration during the reference
period were already included in the population.
3.3.2 Test Data Collection
Data to evaluate any hypothesises can be collected from two basic sources
i.e.
• Secondary data i.e. data already available in the public domain.
• Primary data i.e. data generated by the researcher.
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3.3.2.1 Secondary Data
The nature of the data required to evaluate the hypotheses highlighted that
secondary data would be the main data source. The decision to rely on
secondary data sources was taken for the following reasons:
• Data availability. Given that several of the companies to be reviewed were dissolved,
the use of primary data sources was not considered feasible. Furthermore, the
analysis of the key governance mechanisms was primarily based on disclosures within
the financial statements. Given the availability of the financial statements within the
public domain, it was not considered necessary to generate new data for this specific
research study.
• Audit committees should be perceived as effective. The perception of effectiveness is
influenced by the composition of the audit committee. The availability of data within the
public domain to evaluate audit committees is thus required.
• Information on directors and their backgrounds is generally historic data and therefore
secondary data sources are usually available. It is a more time and cost effective
solution to use secondary data sources where available.
3.3.2.2 Primary Data
It was considered important to evaluate the results of the empirical analysis
where the hypothesised result differed from the actual result. Secondary date
sources were of no use in evaluating these differences. It was decided to
generate new information (i.e. primary data source) to explain these
differences.
There are advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of primary
data and the methods in which primary data is usually collected.
Figure 4 highlights the main primary data collection methods and highlights the
advantages and disadvantages inherent in each method.
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QUESTIONNAIRES INTERVIEWS
ADVANTAGES Less expensive to
conduct
Bigger sample sizes
possible
Bias is not a problem
Higher response rate
Explanations can be given to
misunderstood questions
More information may be
gained during the interview
DISADVANTAGES Poor response rate
Only certain types of
person respond to a
questionnaire which may
introduce a certain
amount of bias
Possibility for the introduction
of bias
Response rate may be low
Time consuming
FIGURE 4 DATA COLLECTION METHODS
The information required to evaluate differences was based on the opinions of
non-executive directors in the FRP population and the control group
populations.
Given the nature of the information required, it was decided that
questionnaires were not a viable option. It was decided that interviews would
be conducted to evaluate the results gained using secondary data in the
analysis as the information required was not suitable for a questionnaire due
to:
• The types of people being interviewed. Senior executives were considered more likely
to respond to a request for an interview as opposed to a request to complete a
questionnaire.
• The nature of the topic did not lend itself to the production of questionnaire that could
be easily completed.
Interviewer bias was considered important so that the opinions of the
interviewer were not inadvertently communicated to the interviewee.
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Guidelines for each interview were therefore drawn up and a form, reflecting
these guidelines (see appendix page 250) was completed during the course of
each interview.
3.3.2.3 Hypothesis 1
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (1998) in the UK considers
those Boards where non-executive directors constitute less than one-third of
the overall board to be ineffective. Therefore, hypothesis 1 considers that:
COMPANIES WITH FINANCIAL REPORTING PROBLEMS MORE LIKELY To HAVE
INEFFECTIVE BOARDS.
The financial statements of the companies were the main data source for
details on the numbers of directors in total and the number of non-executive
directors. Figure 5 highlights the specific data collected and the sources of
this data.
DATA DETAILS DATA SOURCES
Total number of Board members Financial statements
Number of executive directors Financial statements
Number of non-executive directors Financial statements
Percentage of non-executive directors to overall board Author
FIGURE 5 BOARD COMPOSITION DETAILS
3.3.2.4 Hypothesis 2
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (1998) in the UK considers
that the separation of the roles to be important to board effectiveness.
Therefore, hypothesis 2 considers.that:
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COMPANIES WITH FINANCIAL REPORTING PROBLEMS MORE LIKELY To HAVE BOARDS
WHERE THE SAME PERSON HELD THE POSITIONS OF CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
The data collected in order to evaluate this hypothesis is shown in Figure 6.
DATA DETAILS DATA SOURCES
Name of Chairman Financial statements
Name of C.E.O. Financial statements
C.E.O. = chairman indicator Author
FIGURE 6 TEST DATA: CEO / CHAIRMAN ROLE DUALITY
3.3.2.5 Hypothesis 3
The audit committee is an important element in corporate governance and
instrumental in ensuring the quality of financial reporting. Academic research
examines the relation between audit committee characteristics and aggressive
reporting and most studies consider that a positive relationship exists between
the existence of an audit committee and the quality of financial reporting.
Accordingly, hypothesis 3 considers that:
COMPANIES WITH FINANCIAL REPORTING PROBLEMS ARE LESS LIKELY To HAVE
AUDIT COMMITTEES.
The financial statements of the companies were reviewed to find out if an audit
committee existed. The financial statements of the companies in most cases
provided all relevant information required and were the main data source. The
data collected in order to evaluate this hypothesis is shown in Figure 7.
DATA DETAILS DATA SOURCES
Audit committee Existence Financial statements, Hemmington Scott
Database / Publications
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FIGURE 7 TEST DATA: AUDIT COMMITTEE EXISTENCE
The financial statements of the companies in most cases provided all relevant
information required and were the main data source. - There were some
companies; notably FRP companies that noted the existence of an audit
committee but did not state which of the directors were on the audit committee.
These companies were removed from the population.
3.3.2.6 Hypothesis 4
The Hampel Report (1998) considered that audit committees composed of
less than 3 non-executive directors might be ineffective. Accordingly,
Hypothesis 4 considers that:
COMPANIES WITH FINANCIAL REPORTING PROBLEMS WERE MORE LIKELY TO HAVE AUDIT
COMMITTEES THAT HAD LESS THAN THREE MEMBERS.
The data collected in order to evaluate this hypothesis is shown in Figure 8.
DATA DETAILS DATA SOURCES
Company size — AIM,
Fledgling etc.
Hemmington Scott Publications / Database
Number of Audit
committee Members
Financial	 statements,	 Hemmington
Publications / Database
Scott
FIGURE 8 TEST DATA: AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP
The financial statements of the companies in most cases provided all relevant
information required and were the main data source.
There were some companies, notably FRP companies, which noted the
existence of an audit committee but did not state which of the directors were
on the audit committee. These companies were removed from the population.
PAGE 125
3.3.2.7 Hypothesis 5
Key mechanisms of the corporate governance framework that relate to the
structure of the audit committee. It is important to consider if these
mechanisms improve the effectiveness of the audit committee. Therefore,
hypothesis 5 considers that:
COMPANIES WITH FINANCIAL REPORTING PROBLEMS WERE MORE LIKELY TO HAVE AUDIT
COMMITTEES WITH POOR GOVERNANCE PROCEDURES.
The data required to evaluate this hypothesis is shown in Figure 9.
DATA DETAILS DATA SOURCES
The existence of an audit committee terms of reference
or charter
Financial statements
The number of meetings held by the audit committee
The existence of an internal audit department
FIGURE 9 TEST DATA: GOVERNANCE PROCEDURES
Non-disclosure of any of the relevant details within the financial statements
was assumed to indicate that these mechanisms did not exist. The financial
statements of the companies selected in most cases provided all relevant
information required and were the main data source.
3.3.2.8 Hypothesis 6
The Combined Code (1998) noted that membership of the audit committee
should be confined to non-executive directors and that all the members should
be independent. I.e. that, apart from their director's fees and shareholdings,
they should be independent of management and free from any involvement
that might significantly interfere with their ability to judge matters
independently. The independence of the non-executive director is considered
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crucial to the effectiveness of the audit committee. Therefore, hypothesis 6
considers that:
COMPANIES WITH FINANCIAL REPORTING PROBLEMS WERE MORE LIKELY TO HAVE AUDIT
COMMITTEES COMPOSED OF NON-INDEPENDENT MEMBERS.
Impairments to independence, for the purpose of this study, are defined as: -
• any non-executive director who has been an executive director of the company ;
• any non-executive director who is related to an executive director, and
• any non-executive director that is a major supplier, customer, or consultant to the
company;
The data required to evaluate this hypothesis is shown in Figure 10.
DATA DETAILS DATA SOURCES
Name of committee member Financial statements
Current status within the company Financial	 statements,	 Hemmington	 Scott
Publications / Database, Companies House
Annual Returns
Previous	 status	 within
company
the Financial	 statements,	 Hemmington	 Scott
Publications / Database, Companies House
Annual Returns
Familial relationship Financial statements
Major supplier to company Financial statements
Consultant to company Financial statements, Directory of Directors.
FIGURE 10 TEST DATA: INDEPENDENCE
The information required to evaluate audit committee independence was taken
primarily from the financial statements. However many of the smaller FRP
companies did not provide adequate information within the financial
statements.
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The Directory of Directors (1999) proved very useful in being able to evaluate
the audit committee members for all criteria except that of being a consultant
to the relevant company. It was therefore assumed that unless evidence could
be found to the contrary, all directors were assumed to be independent.
3.3.2.9 Hypothesis 7
The audit committee is composed of non-executive directors and the financial
reporting oversight role is usually delegated to the audit committee. Assuming
that audit committee members possess the necessary background and the
skills to undertake this role, it follows that they are more likely to be effective in
this role.
It follows that an audit committee may be considered effective if the members
of this committee possess experience in this role. The Blue Ribbon Report
(1999) provides guidelines as to when an audit committee may be considered
experienced. This report considers that audit committees should be composed
of at least three directors who are financially literate 8. Accordingly, hypothesis
7 considers that:
COMPANIES WITH FINANCIAL REPORTING PROBLEMS WERE MORE LIKELY TO HAVE AUDIT
COMMITTEES WITH NON-FINANCIALLY LITERATE MEMBERS.
The data required to evaluate this hypothesis is shown in Figure 11.
DATA DETAILS DATA SOURCES
Director Name Financial statements
Hemmington Scott Publications/ Database
Companies House Return Records
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DATA DETAILS DATA SOURCES
A member of a
recognised professional
body
Membership Handbooks of the Recognised Institutes9
Who's who (1999)
.
Directory of Directors (1999)
Familial relationship Financial statements
Hemmington Scott Publications/ Database
Companies House Return Records
Having banking /
investment management
experience
Financial statements
Hemmington Scott Publications/ Database
Companies House Return Records
Who's who (1999)
Directory of Directors (1999)
Holding / having held the
position of Chief
Executive Officer
Financial statements
Hemmington Scott Publications/ Database
Companies House Return Records
Who's who (1999)
Directory of Directors (1999)
Financial literacy score Author
FIGURE 11 TEST DATA: FINANCIAL LITERACY
The financial statements were reviewed and where possible, details of director
backgrounds were utilised. Where information was not given in the financial
statements, the references shown Figure 11 were utilised.
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Each individual audit committee member was evaluated and a cumulative
score for each committee was gained. The relative financial literacy all the
audit committees selected was then evaluated.
3.3.2.10 Hypothesis 8
The Blue Ribbon Report (1999) provides guidelines as to when an audit
committee may be considered experienced. This report considers that audit
committees be composed of financially literate members and that at least one
member be technically competent. Accordingly, hypothesis 8 considers that:
COMPANIES WITH FINANCIAL REPORTING PROBLEMS WERE MORE LIKELY TO HAVE AUDIT
COMMITTEES WITH NO TECHNICALLY COMPETENT MEMBERS.
Audit committee members was evaluated in terms of their current professional
qualifications. The data required to evaluate this hypothesis is shown in Figure
12.
DATA DETAILS DATA SOURCES
Director name Financial statements,
Membership	 Handbooks	 of	 the
named institutes [ See note 9]
Who's Who (1999).
Directory of Directors (1999).
Companies House Return Records.
aboveDirector qualifications
Audit committee competency score Author
FIGURE 12 TEST DATA: TECHNICAL COMPETENCY
The financial statements were reviewed and where possible, details of the
director's qualifications were utilised. Where information was not given in the
financial statements, the references shown in Figure 12 were utilised.
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The audit committee of each company selected was therefore considered to
be technically competent if at least one member of the audit committee was
professionally qualified.
3.3.2.11 Hypothesis 9
Beasley (1996) noted that as the number of additional directorships held by
non-executive directors' increases, their ability to fulfil their monitoring
responsibilities decreased. His results showed a greater likelihood for financial
statement fraud where non-executive directorships had significantly more
appointments. Given the above arguments, it is reasonable to infer that audit
committee effectiveness must be affected by the time devoted to business and
by the availability of directors to attend these meetings. Therefore, hypothesis
9 considers that:
COMPANIES WITH FINANCIAL REPORTING PROBLEMS WERE MORE LIKELY TO HAVE AUDIT
COMMITTEES WITH DIRECTORS WHO HOLD ADDITIONAL DIRECTORSHIPS.
The data required to evaluate this hypothesis is shown in Figure 13.
DATA DETAILS DATA SOURCES
Additional Directorships Annual Returns
Directory of Directors (1999)
Who's Who (1999)
Financial Statements
Average Directorships per audit committee Author
,
FIGURE 13 TEST DATA: ADDITIONAL DIRECTORSHIPS
The statutory returns held at Companies House was used to check the number
of additional directorships held by directors as Annual Returns require that all
directorships held are reported to Companies House. The average number of
additional directorships held by each committee was therefore calculated.
PAGE 131
3.3.3 Descriptive Data Analysis Methods
It was decided to use Microsoft Excel spreadsheet software to initially collate
the data. For each company, the data in Figure 14 was collated and then
separate spreadsheets see appendices on pages 246 to 239 were created for
each group of data within the population — i.e.
• Sheet One — Data in respect of all companies in the population of companies with
financial reporting problems.
• Sheet two — Data in respect of companies in Control Group 1.
• Sheet two — Data in respect of companies in Control Group 2.
The data on each sheet was then evaluated in order for the description of the
data to be undertaken in chapter 4.
DATA COLLECTED EVALUATION METHOD
No. of Board Members Average no. of board members
Median number of board members
Range in board size
No. of Executive directors Average no. of executive members
Median number of executive members
Range in executive members size
No.	 of	 non-executive
directors
Average no. of non-executive members
Median number of non-executive members
Range in non-executive members size
Percentage of non-executive director compared to total
board size
Name of chairman and of
Chief Executive Officer
Total number of companies where position of Chief
Executive Officer and Chairman is held by the same
person
PAGE 132
DATA COLLECTED EVALUATION METHOD
Existence	 of	 audit
committee
Total number of companies where there is no audit
committee
,
No.	 of	 Audit	 committee
members
No. of members per committee
Average	 number	 of	 members	 per	 control	 group
population
Total number of companies with less than or equal to 2
members
Terms of Reference Total number of audit committees with no formal charter
of terms of reference
Meetings No. of meetings per committee
Average	 number	 of	 meetings	 per	 control	 group
population.
Total number of companies with less than or equal to 2
meetings per year
Internal audit department No. of companies with an internal audit department
Independence Total number of companies where the audit committee is
not considered to be independent
Financial literacy Percentage of financially literate directors per company
Average financial literacy per population.
Number of companies where all directors are financially
literate.
Number of companies where all directors are financially
literate and the audit committee is considered technically
competent.
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DATA COLLECTED EVALUATION METHOD
Technical competence Total number of companies where there is no audit
committee
Additional directorships Average number of additional directorships per audit
committee
Average	 number	 of	 additional	 directorships	 per
population
FIGURE 14 SUMMARY TEST DATA
Charts were constructed using the results to compare changes over time in
respect of certain key governance mechanisms. FRP companies and control
group1 companies were further analysed by year-end date.
This analysis allowed for comparisons over time to be made for both groups of
companies. 6 charts were prepared and Figure 15 reflects the information
analysed in the charts:
CHART
NO.
DATA
SOURCE
DATA ANALYSED
Chart 1
Chart 2
FRP
Control group 1
BOARD COMPOSITION
•	 Average Size Of Board
•	 Average No. of Executive Directors
•	 Average No. Of Non-Exec. Directors
•	 No. of companies where there are less than 3 NED's.
•	 No. of companies where the CEO is the chairman
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CHART
NO.
DATA
SOURCE
DATA ANALYSED
Chart 3
Chart 4
FRP
Control group 1
GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE
•	 No. of companies with a terms of reference
•	 Average number of meetings
•	 No. Of companies with an internal audit dept.
Chart 5
Chart 6
FRP
Control group 1
AUDIT COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
•	 No. of companies with an audit committee
•	 Average no. of audit committee members
•	 No. Of companies with a qualified Ned.
•	 Average no. of financially literate audit committee
members
•	 Average no. of add directorships
•	 No. of companies with an independent audit committee
FIGURE 15 CHART ANALYSIS
The charts were designed such that all control group charts i.e. chart 2,4, and
6 were produced on transparent film. These charts could therefore be
superimposed on the FRP paper charts i.e. charts 1, 3, 5. All trends were
therefore immediately visible. An analysis of all visible trends was undertaken
and reasons for these trends were put forward.
3.3.4 Statistical Data Analysis Methods
The statistical analysis of the results was undertaken using SPSS version 9.0.
IT was therefore necessary to input the data into this program in a format
accessible by SPSS.
The data was first copied across from Excel. Changes to the data descriptions
used in Excel were then made.
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Figure 16 shows the data descriptions and the associated codes in SPSS.
Per Excel Analysis Per SPSS Analysis
,
FRP Companies Control Group 1 Control Group 2
CEO=CHAIR CEOFRP CEOCON1 CEOCON2
BAL IMBFRP IMBCON1 IMBCON2
AUDIT COMM ACFRP ACCON1 ACCON2
NO. OF AC MEM ACMEMFRP ACMEMCON1 ACMEMCON2
TERMS OF REF TREFFRP TRECON1 TRECON2
MEETINGS MEETFRP MEETCON1 MEETCON2
IA DEPT IAFRP IACON1 IACON2
INDEP INDFRP INDCON1 INDCON2
FINL LIT LITFRP LITCON1 LITCON2
QUAL QUALFRP QUALCON1 QUALCON2
ADD DIR AVE.
,
DIRFRP DIRCON1 DIRCON2
FIGURE 16 DATA DESCRIPTIONS RE-CODES
The type of data transferred was then amended as follows:
^ Numeric data was unchanged.
• Alphanumeric data was re-coded to reflect three possible circumstances — see Figure
17.
Per SPSS AnalysisPer Excel Analysis
Yes 2
No 1
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Per Excel Analysis Per SPSS Analysis
N/A ( i.e. missing data where there was no audit
committee)
0
FIGURE 17 DATA RE-CODED
Appropriate statistical tests of significance were undertaken and the results are
detailed in chapter 5. SPSS raw data sheets are contained in appendix page
[282 to 2901.
34 INTERVIEWS
Interviews were carried out in order to investigate the results of the empirical
testing undertaken in section 5. A letter [appendix page 251] was sent to all
the directors within the population. There were 375 directors in total. The first
replies received agreeing to interviews were very disappointing. A second
circularisation was therefore undertaken 5 weeks later. This proved more
successful. Appendix page 252 shows details of the directors interviewed.
Prior to each interview, an interview guideline form (see appendix page 250)
was prepared. This form was completed during the course of the interview to
ensure that the same questions and topics were covered in each interview.
An interview was conducted with at least one director in 20% of the companies
within the population. Results of the interviews are contained in chapter 5
alongside the empirical analysis.
3.4.1 Data Strengths and Weaknesses
Several limitations in the data were evidenced during the study. These
included:
• A focus on limited listed companies only.
• Company selection.
• Audit committee data.
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• Audit committee members.
• The use of secondary data sources.
3.4.1.1 Limited Company Focus
The focus on listed companies resulted in the fact those large private limited
companies whom, by choice, have not converted to PLC status were ignored
by the study. Whilst this may have resulted in some significantly large
companies with financial reporting problems being excluded from the
population, this problem is not considered to have invalidated the results of the
study.
3.4.1.2 Company Selection
The populations of companies with financial reporting problems were drawn
from three distinct sources, namely:
• The FRRP primarily focuses on large PLC's — i.e. the TOP 350 UK companies.
• The Dialogue Database does not distinguish companies in terms of size. The criterion
for inclusion in this database is PLC status.
• The Hemmington Scott publications and database that includes all companies that
have been placed in liquidation, administration, and or receivership.
The selection of companies from these three sources therefore results in a
population which may be considered representative, in terms of size, of the
overall population of UK listed companies. The amalgamation of the
companies identified from these three sources limits this study but is not
considered to invalidate this study.
The identification of companies with no financial reporting problems is however
biased due to the assumption that the absence of an audit report qualification
indicates the lack of a financial reporting problem.
The literature review highlights the reasons for which audit reports may not be
qualified in situations where a qualification was justified. The FRRP is however
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there to prevent this situation from occurring. The problem however lies with
the manner in which cases are brought to the attention of the FRRP. The
financial statements of all listed companies are not routinely examined. The
FRRP relies on any inconsistencies to be brought to their attention. The lack of
a pro-active approach limits the extent to which the FRRP .may be considered
effective.
There is currently no other alternative source of information on the company
that would guarantee that a company selected would have no financial
reporting problems.
3.4.1.3 Audit Committee Member Data
Certain weaknesses were evidenced in the collection of data on audit
committee members. The criteria for independence to some extent relied on
the disclosure of family and other significant director relationships. There is no
requirement to disclose family relationships and unless an obvious pattern is
evidenced, this evidence is unobtainable. This clearly limits the extent to which
this criteria may be evaluated.
Director loans and other significant relationships are required to be disclosed
by the Companies Act 1985 and FRS 8 respectively. However, FRS 8 was
only introduced in 1995 and is effective only for companies with accounting
periods commencing after 23 rd
 December 1995. Many companies included in
the qualifying period may not have been required to make the relevant
disclosures. This clearly limits the extent to which this criteria may be
evaluated in some companies.
3.4.1.4 Member Backgrounds
The categorisation of the backgrounds in terms of the technical competency
and financial literacy of audit committee members introduced a certain amount
of bias as audit committee members were classified into categories based on
published biographical information and prior employment history.
PAGE 139
Problems therefore arose where no biographical information was available on
the director. It was therefore only possible to assume certain competencies
based on the directorships disclosed in the statutory returns by the director.
3.4.1.5 Secondary Data
The use of secondary data sources only is a potential weakness. The decision
to rely on secondary data sources was taken for the following reasons:
• Data availability. Given that a number of the companies to be reviewed were
dissolved, the use of primary data sources was not considered feasible.
• Audit committees should be perceived as effective. The perception of effectiveness is
influenced by the composition of the audit committee. The availability of data within the
public domain to evaluate audit committees is thus required.
However, in order to ensure that the results gained using secondary data were
valid, a sample of audit committee members were interviewed to ensure that
their opinions validated the results obtained.
3.5 DATA EVALUATION METHODS
The data on all the selected companies was collated and a description of the
data observed on audit committee composition and member backgrounds was
undertaken. The data observations are shown in chapter four.
An empirical investigation was then undertaken to highlight the variations in
the data observed. The methodology and results of the empirical investigation
are shown in chapter five.
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i E.g. Cadbury Report (1992)
2 SAS 130— The Going Concern Basis In Financial Statements. IssUed November 19994
By The APB
3 the power to apply to the court for an order for the revision of defective company financial
statements
4	 ,	 „ .By ' large is meant companies or groups that are not small or medium-sized as defined
by the Companies Act
s VVWVV.ASB/FRG.ORG.UK
6 CD-ROM Based held at CUBS Library
7 VVWW. HEMSCOTT. CO. UK
8 Financially literate being defined as having background experience in financial or
banking and or being or been a thief executive officer of a company.
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Membership of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland.
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nCHAPTER 4:
DESCRIPTIVE
ANALYSIS
4 DESCRIPTIVE DATA RESULTS
4.1 ItirRoDuc-noN
In principle audit committees should play an oversight role and thus provide a
focus and a means for a fuller review and analysis of matters relating to
internal controls, auditing [internal and external], and financial reporting.
It is reasonable to assume that an audit committee may be considered
effective where it achieves its stated roles. However, given the nature of these
roles, actual audit committee effectiveness cannot be externally observed.
It is possible to measure audit committee effectiveness indirectly if it is
considered that the absence of financial reporting problems indicates an
effective audit committee.
Thus by comparing the composition and structure of audit committees in
companies with no financial reporting problems ("CNFRP") with audit
committees in companies that appears to have a financial reporting problem
(CFRP), characteristics common to CFRP's should be highlighted. The
following are descriptions of the data observed for the above mentioned
companies.
4.2 FINANCIAL REPORTING PROBLEMS
The criteria, defined in chapter 3, resulted in an overall population of 49
companies with financial reporting problems (CFRP). This population was
analysed in order to compare and contrast the companies by reason for
inclusion, size, and sector in the population.
Figure 18 shows the analysis of companies in relation to the reason for
inclusion in the population. This showed that a majority of the companies
(67%) were considered to have had insolvency problems.
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CFRP COMPANY ANALYSIS
Panel A :Criteria Analysis
No. cyo
Referred to FRRP 1 15 31%
Liquidation 10 22%
Administration/receivership 23 45%
Disagreement 1 2%
49 100%
PANEL B :SIZE CHARACTERISTICS
No. cYci
AIM 12 24
Fledgling 30 62
Small Cap 4 8
MID 250 1 2
FTSE 100 2 4
49 100
FIGURE 18 CFRP ANALYSIS BY CRITERIA AND SIZE
Figure 18 also shows the analysis of CFRP's using FTSE classification as a
proxy for size. This table highlighted that 76% of all the companies in the
population were either AIM or FTSE Fledgling companies.
It was also noted that all companies considered to have had insolvency
problems were either AIM or FTSE Fledgling Companies.
Figure 19 shows the analysis of CFRP's using the FTSE Industrial
Classification.
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No. %
Engineering 6 12%
Retailers 5 10%
Leisure 5 10%
Media 4 8%
Distributors 3 6%
Extractive Industries 3 6%
Support services 3 6%
Building materials 2 4%
Computer services 2 4%
Construction 2 4%
Electrical equipment 2 4%
Household Products 2 4%
Paper & Packaging 2 4%
Property 1 2%
Aerospace 1 2%
Beverages 1 2%
Diversified Industrials 1 2%
Health 1 2%
Insurance 1 2%
Telecommunications 1 2%
Transport 1 2%
Total 49 100%
FIGURE 19 CFRP ANALYSIS BY SECTOR
Figure 19 highlights that the engineering, leisure, and general retailing sectors
constitute about 33% of the overall population. It was also found that 88% of
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the companies in these sectors had been included as a result of insolvency
problems.
4.2.1 Board Composition in CFRP's
The number of directors on average in the CFRP's was 6.10. The average
number of executive directors in these companies was 3.48 and the average
number of non-executives was 2.61.
Mean Median Range
Number of directors 6.10 6 3-14
Number of executive directors 3.48 3 1-7
Number of non-executive directors 2.61 2 0-8
FIGURE 20 CFRP BOARD ANALYSIS
Figure 20 highlighted that on average most of the boards in the companies
observed were still dominated by executive management. This finding appears
to be consistent with existing literature on the composition of UK Boards.
There were 9 companies in which there were more non-executive directors
than executive directors, The dominance of the board by non-executive
directors is more prevalent in US boardroom situations and is usually coupled
with Chief Executive and Chairman Role duality. Of the companies highlighted,
only 2 companies were observed as having CEO Chair Role Duality.
4.2.1.1 The Number of Non-Executive Directors
The Hampel Report (1998) 1
 considers that non-executive directors should
constitute not less than one-third of the overall board. 39 out of the 49
companies (80%) were observed to have boards in which the non-executive
directors constituted at least one-third of the overall board. Figure 21 however
highlighted that the number of non-executives directors in most companies fell
short of the three considered being necessary in order for non-executives to
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form an effective audit committee. 63% of the companies observed had less
than three non-executive directors.
No %
Number of boards with less than 3 non- Executive Directors 29 59
Of Which AIM Companies 10
Fledgling Companies 18
MID 250 Company 1
FIGURE 21 CFRP BOARD COMPOSITION
Figure 21 also compared the size of the companies to the number of
companies that did not have an adequate number of non-executive directors.
10 out of the 29 companies were known to be AIM companies. This appeared
to highlight that most2 AIM companies in this study (91%) did not comply. AIM
companies are not required to comply with the Listing Rules and thus, this
result is to be expected.
The Cisco Report (2000) updated their guidance for small quoted companies.
They noted that the requirement to have at least three non-executive directors
might be excessive in some companies. They therefore recommended that
two non-executives directors were sufficient in smaller companies. The Cisco
Report (2000) is only a set of guidelines and does not supersede Stock
Exchange Listing Requirements.
However, if the assumption that companies with less than three directors were
in fact relying on the recommendations of the Cisco Report (2000), 7 out of the
49 companies had less than 2 non-executive directors.
4.2.1.2 Separation of Chair and CEO Role
The data observed showed that the role of chief executive and chairman is
shared by the same individual in only 9(18%) of the cases examined. Given
the period over which the data is observed i.e. post 1995, post Cadbury, this
result is to be expected and supports the literature which considers that role
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duality of the chairman and CEO to be a more common attribute of US Board
structure.
4.2.2 Audit Committee Analysis
Audit committees are considered to be one of the primary means of improving
corporate governance. Whilst it would be incorrect to directly attribute
corporate failure to audit committee effectiveness, it is necessary to consider
the structure and composition of the audit committee and analyse if ineffective
structure and composition is more prevalent in companies with financial
reporting problems.
It is important to firstly consider if companies with financial reporting problems
are therefore less likely to have audit committees. Of the cases observed, 11
companies (22%) did not have audit committees. However, given that 50% of
these companies were AIM companies that do not have to comply with the
Governance requirements of the Listing rules, there were in fact only six
companies that should have had audit committees.
It was noted however that the companies in which non-executive directors
dominated the boards were more likely (87%) to have audit committees as
opposed to the overall population (78%).
It is also important to consider the structure and composition of the audit
committee to highlight the attributes common to companies with financial
reporting problems.
4.2.2.1 Number of Audit Committee Members
The Hampel Report (1998) considered that audit committees composed of
less than 3 non-executive directors might be ineffective. The Cisco Report
(2000) however considers that 2 non-executive directors are sufficient in a
small company. Whilst the Cisco Report (2000) is only a set of guidelines, the
results emphasise that a significant number of small companies do not have at
least three non-executive directors and that there may be a case for alternate
rules for smaller companies.
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The average number of audit committee members was 2.85 [ranging from 2 to
6 members]. The low average membership of the audit committee results due
to the fact that a significant number of companies did not have 3 non-executive
directors. Figure 22 shows an analysis of the membership by type of company.
No. %
Total population 49 100
Less: CO's with no audit committee (11) (22)
38 88
Less than 3 members 17 45
3 or more members 21 55
38 100
AIM CO's with at least 2 members 4
Other CO's with less than 3 members 13
FIGURE 22 CFRP AUDIT COMMITTEE COMPOSITION ANALYSIS COMPANY
It was noted that in six of the cases observed the audit committee was
composed of two non-executive directors and either the CEO or the Executive
Chairman. Clearly, this poses a problem with the independent nature of the
audit committee and this is examined further in section 4.2.2.3.
4.2.2.2 Governance Disclosures
The disclosure requirements examined in the financial statements of all
companies observed were: -
• indication of an audit committee charter or terms of reference;
• indication of the number of meetings held by the audit committee;
• references to communication with an internal audit department;
• the scope of disclosure on internal controls within the financial statements; and
• The scope of the external auditors report on corporate governance.
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Figure 22 highlights that only 38 of the 49 companies observed had audit
committees. Analysis of the financial statements in respect of these companies
revealed that:
• 23% i.e. 9 out of the 38 companies with audit committees had or made reference to
,.
the existence of a formal charter or terms of reference for the audit committee.
• 46% of these companies examined stated the number of audit committee meetings
held. Of the companies that stated the number of meetings held the average number
of meetings held was 2. A significant number of the companies - 54% did not state the
number of meetings or made no reference to the number of meetings held within the
financial statements.
• The extent of interaction between the audit committee and internal audit was
examined. It was noted however that only 7 of the 38 companies had internal audit
departments. This result was expected, as it is not mandatory to have an internal audit
department. The analysis of these seven companies highlighted that they were the
companies with the largest market capitalisation of all cases observed.
• The scope of the external auditors' report on governance was considered as a
measure of the interaction between the audit committee and the external auditors. In
all cases examined, where relevant, the report given by the external auditors was
adequate.
4.Z2.3 Member Independence
The criteria used to evaluate the independence of the non-executive directors
were as follows:-
• any non-executive director who has been an executive director of the company ;
• any non-executive director who is related to an executive director, and
• any non-executive director that is a major supplier, customer, or consultant to the
company.
Even though both the Cadbury and the Hampel Report required that all
members of the audit committee be non-executive and a majority be
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independent, the audit committee of any of the companies examined was not
considered independent if any member did not meet the above criteria.
Whilst this criteria was not in strict compliance with the provisions of the UK
code (Section A.2.3), it was considered that the presence of a director not
considered independent could compromise the overall effectiveness of the
audit committee.
Figure 23 analyses the independence of the audit committees in the
companies observed. It reveals that 14 audit committees were considered not
independent. The companies were further examined to highlight any common
attributes. The criteria for independence were examined. It was noted that the
most common reasons for failing the independence test were: -
• the presence of a former executive director ;
• a non-executive director also acting as a consultant to the company;
The size of the companies with non-independent audit committees was
examined. As expected, most of the companies were small companies with
one notable exception. We noted that a majority of companies with non-
independent audit committees (73%) had been considered to have insolvency
problems. The relationship between audit committee independence and board
structure was examined. It was found that non-executive dominated boards
were more likely not to be independent.
INDEPENDENCE ANALYSIS
PANEL A: OVERALL ANALYSIS
No. %
No. of Companies with audit committees 38 100
Independent committees 24 69
Not Independent 14 31
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INDEPENDENCE ANALYSIS
PANEL B: OVERALL ANALYSIS
Id. Not Ind.
No. of Companies with audit committees 24 14
Of which:
Executive dominated boards 19 11
Non-executive dominated boards 5 3
PANEL C: ANALYSIS BY CRITERIA
No. %
Executive director 2 16
Former executive director 6 38
Related to executive director 1 8
Consultant 5 38
14 100
PANEL D: ANALYSIS BY SIZE
No. %
Aim Companies 3 23
Fledgling 10 69
Mid 250 0 0
FTSE 100 1 8
14 100
PANEL E ANALYSIS BY INCLUSION IN POPULATION
No. %
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INDEPENDENCE ANALYSIS
Referred to the FRRP 3 23
Insolvent 11 77
14 100
FIGURE 23 CFRP AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE ANALYSIS
4.2.2.4 Competencies
The Blue Ribbon Report recommended that companies should have "..Audit
committee comprised of a minimum of three directors, each of whom is
financially literate and.. that at least one member have accounting expertise".
The technical competencies of the directors in the 38 companies with audit
committees were analysed. An audit committee was considered to be
technically competent where at least one member was a member of a
professional accounting body. It was noted that (55%) of audit committees
were technically competent.
The financial literacy of the directors was examined. The Blue Ribbon Report
recommended that members were considered to be financially literate if: -
• A member of a recognised professional body;
• Having banking or investment management experience; and
• Holding or having held the position of Chief Executive Officer.
The financial literacy of each audit committee member was assessed using the
above criteria. The total score for each committee was found and averaged
over the number of audit committee members. The audit committee was given
a score based on the percentage of financially literate members.
There were only 9 companies that were considered to be completely
financially literate. The average score for financially literacy was (0.61). There
were only 6 committees that were considered both technically competent and
financially literate.
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4.2.2.5 Additional Directorships
The number of additional directorships held by the audit committee members
was assessed. Figure 24 shows that the average number of directorships per
audit committee was 1.40.
Average Add. Directorships
Average 1.40
Median 1.27
Range 0 — 5.17
FIGURE 24 CFRP's ADDITIONAL DIRECTORSHIPS
This average was distorted by the high number of additional directorships held
by one of the FTSE100 companies and the fact that this company also had a
higher than average number of non-executive directors. After allowing for this
distortion, the average number of additional directorships per audit committee
was 1.27.
4.3 COMPARISON WITH CONTROL COMPANIES
The control companies were selected in accordance with the criteria defined in
chapter 3. As a result of these selection criteria, 49 control companies were
selected.
Given that corporate governance standards have only been introduced in the
last five years, improvements in governance disclosures are to be expected.
Information on the control companies was therefore drawn from:
• The financial statements in the same year in which the comparable FRP company
experienced a problem (Year-end date matched companies) Control Group 1.
• The last available set of financial statements (during the year ended 1999) Control
Group 2.
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This resulted in two control group populations that would therefore allow
analysis to reflect if the control group of companies did have better
governance standards and disclosures over time.
Figure 25 shows the analysis of CFRP's using FTSE classification as a proxy
for size. This table highlighted that 78% of the both groups of control
companies in the population were either AIM or FTSE Fledgling companies as
compared to 88% in the FRP Company population.
FRP Companies Control Group 1
No. % No. %
AIM 12 24 10 22
FLEDGLING 30 62 28 56
SMALL CAP 4 8 9 18
MID 250 1 2 - -
FTSE100 2 4 2 4
Total 49 100 49 100
FIGURE 25 CONTROL COMPANY SIZE ANALYSIS
4.3.1 Board Composition Analysis — Control Group 1
The number of directors on average in control group 1 was 5.90. The average
number of executive directors in these companies was 3.47 and the average
number of non-executives was 2.41.
FRP Companies Control Group 1
Mean Median Range Mean Median Range
Number of directors 6.10 6 3-14 5.90 5 3-12
No.	 of	 executive
directors
3.48 3 1-7 3.47 3 1-6
No.	 of	 non-executive
directors
2.61 2 0-8 2.41 2 0-7
FIGURE 26 CONTROL COMPANY BOARD COMPOSITION
This highlighted that on average most of the boards in the companies
observed in both populations were still dominated by executive management.
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There were 11 (9 FRP) companies in which there were more non-executive
directors than executive directors. None of the control companies (2 FRP)
highlighted were observed as having CEO Chair Role Duality.
4.3.1.1 The number of non-executive directors
The Hampel Report (1998) 3 considers that non-executive directors should
constitute not less than one-third of the overall board. 34 out of the 49
companies (69%) were observed to have boards in which the non-executive
directors constituted at least one-third of the overall board.
Figure 27 highlighted that the number of non-executives directors in the control
companies also fell short of the three considered being necessary in order for
non-executives to form an effective audit committee. Control companies were
more likely to have less than three non-executive directors.
FRP
Companies
Control Group 1
[DATE MATCHED]
No. °/0 No. %
Number of boards with less than 3 NED's 29 59 30 61
Of which:
AIM Companies 10 5
FLEDGLING Companies 18 22
MID 250/SMALL CAP Companies 1 3
FIGURE 27 CONTROL COMPANY BOARD ANALYSIS
Figure 27 compared the size of the companies with the number of companies
that did not have an adequate number of non-executive directors. 5 out of the
30 control companies were known to be AIM companies. Once again, this
appeared to highlight that most AIM companies did not comply. However a
smaller percentage of AIM companies (52%) as opposed to 91% in the FRP
population did not comply.
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However, if the assumption that companies with less than three directors were
in fact relying on the recommendations of the Cisco Report (2000), 11 out of
the 49 companies (7 out of 49 in the FRP population) had less than 2 non-
executive directors. Given that data for the control companies was taken from
financial statements in the relevant years, this result was not expected.
4.3.1.2 Separation of Chair and CEO Role
The data observed showed that the role of chief executive and chairman is
shared by the same individual in 25% (18%-FRP Companies) of the cases
examined. This was a higher percentage than that seen in the FRP population.
Given data for the control companies was taken from financial statements in
the relevant years, this result was not expected.
4.3.2 Audit Committee Analysis — Control Group 1
The structure and composition of the audit committees in control group 1
companies was analysed in order to compare their characteristics to those in
companies with financial reporting problems.
Of the 49 control group 1 companies observed, cases observed, 9 companies
(18%) did not have audit committees, 5 of these 9 companies were AIM
companies that do not have to comply with the Governance requirements of
the Listing rules. There were .therefore only 4 companies that did not meet the
requirement for an audit committee. It was noted that companies with financial
reporting problems were less likely to have audit committees.
Figure 28 summarises the relationship between the structure of the board and
the existence of the audit committees in both populations. It was noted that:
• Control Group 1 audit committees were marginally less likely to be dominated by non-
executive directors.
• Companies with financial reporting problems were marginally less likely to be
dominated by executive management.
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FRP COMPANIES Control Group 1
Executive Dominated Board
Non-Executive dominated Board
13% 25%
87% 75%
FIGURE 28 AUDIT COMMITTEE - BOARD STRUCTURE COMPARISON
4.3.2.1 Number of Audit Committee Members
The Hampel Report considered that audit committees composed of less than 3
non-executive directors might be ineffective. The Cisco Report (2000) however
considers that 2 non-executive directors are sufficient in a small company.
Figure 29 analyses the composition of the audit committees in the control
group 1 companies and highlights that the average number of audit committee
members was 2.93.
FRP COMPANIES CONTROL GROUP 1
Average 2.85 2.93
Median 3 3
Range 2-6 1-6
FIGURE 29 CONTROL COMPANY AUDIT COMMITTEE COMPOSITION ANALYSIS
The low average membership of the audit committee results due to the fact
that a significant number of companies (16 out of 40) had audit committees
composed of only 2 non-executive directors.
There did not on average appear to be notable differences in audit committee
composition in both populations. Figure 30 shows an analysis of the
membership by type of company.
FRP Companies Control Group 1
No. % No. ok
Total population 49 100 49 100
Less: CO's with no audit committee (11) (22) (9) (23)
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FRP Companies
1
Control Group 1
No. % No. ok
38 78 40 77
Of which:
FRP Companies Control Group 1
No. % No. %
Less than 3 members 17 45 16 40
3 or more members 21 55 24 60
38 100 40 100
AIM CO's with at least 2 members 4 4
12Other CO's with less than 3 members 13
FIGURE 3 0 CONTROL COMPANY AUDIT COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
4.3.2.2 Governance Disclosures
The disclosure requirements examined in the financial statements of all
companies observed were: -
• indication of an audit committee charter or terms of reference;
• indication of the number of meetings held by the audit committee;
• references to communication with an internal audit department;
• the scope of disclosure on internal controls within the financial statements; and
• the scope of the external auditors report on corporate governance.
The analysis of the financial statements of the 40 companies showed that:
• 45% i.e. 18 out of the 40 companies with audit committees had or made reference to
the existence of a formal charter or terms of reference for the audit committee.
• 52% of these companies examined stated the number of audit committee meetings
held. Of the companies that stated the number of meetings held, the average number
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of meetings held was 2.1. A significant number of the companies - 48% did not state
the number of meetings or made no reference to the number of meetings held within
the financial statements.
• The extent of interaction between the audit committee and internal audit was
examined. It was noted however, that only 7 of the 40 companies had internal audit
departments. This result was expected, as it is not mandatory to have an internal audit
department. The analysis of these seven companies highlighted that they were the
companies with the lamest market capitalisation of all cases observed.
• The scope of the external auditors' report on governance was considered as a
measure of the interaction between the audit committee and the external auditors. In
all cases examined, where relevant, the report given by the external auditors was
adequate.
Figure 31 compares the governance disclosure levels in the two populations
and highlights that the governance disclosures in control group 1 companies
appeared to be better than those in the FRP Company population.
FRP Companies Control Group 1
NO. % NO. %
Terms of Reference 9 23 18 45
No. of meetings 18 46 21 52
Internal audit department 7 18 7 18
FIGURE 31 GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURES
4.3.2.3 Member Independence
The criteria used to evaluate the independence of the non-executive directors
were as follows:-
• any non-executive director who has been an executive director of the company ;
• any non-executive director who is related to an executive director, and
• any non-executive director that is a major supplier, customer, or consultant to the
company.
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Even though both the Cadbury and the Hampel Report required that all
members of the audit committee be non-executive and a majority be
independent, the audit committee of any of the companies was not considered
independent if any member did not meet the above criteria.
Whilst this criteria was not in strict compliance with the provisions of the UK
code (Section A.2.3), it was considered that the presence of a director not
considered independent could compromise the overall effectiveness of the
audit committee.
Figure 32 analyses the independence of the audit committees in the
companies observed. It reveals that 21 audit committees were considered not
independent. The companies were further examined to highlight any common
attributes. The criteria for independence were examined. It was noted that the
most common reasons for failing the independence test were: -
• the presence of a former executive director, and
• a non-executive director also acting as a consultant to the company.
The size of the companies with non-independent audit committees was
examined. As expected, most of the companies were small companies with
one notable exception.
It was also noted that there seemed to be little difference in the likelihood of
audit committee independence when related to board structure.
FRP
Companies
Control Group 1
PANEL A: OVERALL ANALYSIS
No. %
No. of Companies with audit committees 38 100 40 100
Independent committees 24 69 21 53
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FRP
Companies
Control Group 1
Not Independent 14 31 19 47
PANEL B: OVERALL ANALYSIS
Ind. Not Ind. Ind. Not Ind.
No. of Companies with audit committees 24 14 21 19
Of which:
Executive dominated boards 19 11 14 16
Non-executive dominated boards 5 3 7 3
PANEL C: ANALYSIS BY CRITERIA
No. % No. %
Executive director 2 16 3 16
Former executive director 6 38 10 52
Related to executive director 1 8 2 11
Consultant 5 38 4 21
14 100 19 100
FIGURE 32 CONTROL COMPANY AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE ANALYSIS
4.3.2.4 Competencies
The Blue Ribbon Report recommended that companies have "..Audit
committee comprised of a minimum of three directors, each of whom is
financially literate and.. that at least one member have accounting expertise".
The technical competencies of the directors in the 40 companies with audit
committees were analysed. An audit committee was considered to be
technically competent where at least one member was a member of a
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professional accounting body. It was noted that (82%) of audit committees
were technically competent.
The financial literacy of the directors was examined. Members were
considered to be financially literate if: -
• A member of a recognised professional body;
• Having banking or investment management experience; and
• Holding or having held the position of Chief Executive Officer.
The financial literacy of each audit committee member was assessed using the
above criteria. The total score for each committee was found and averaged
over the number of audit committee members. The audit committee was given
a score based on the percentage of financially literate members. There were
17 companies that were considered to be completely financially literate. The
average score was 0.74. Figure 33 summarises the differences in the
competencies of audit committee members in both populations. Control
companies appeared to be both more technically sound and financially literate.
FRP Companies Control Group 1
Technical competency 55% 82%
Average financial literacy 0.61 0.74
Technically competent &	 completely
financially literate [no.]
6 12
_
FIGURE 33 COMPETENCIES COMPARISON
4.3.2.5 Additional Directorships
The number of additional directorships held by the audit committee members
was assessed. It was found the average number of directorships per audit
committee was 1.5.
Figure 34 highlights that control companies seemed to have on average more
additional directorships than FRP companies.
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FRP COMPANIES CONTROL GROUP 1
No. No.
Average 1.4 1.5
Median 1.27 1.47
Range 0-5.17 0-6
FIGURE 34 CFRP's ADDITIONAL DIRECTORSHIPS
4.4 COMPARISON INFTH CONTROL GROUP 2 COMPANIES
The control companies used in section 4.3.1 utilised but with the relevant
information being extracted from current financial statements in order to see if
the had been improvements in the quality of governance procedures over time.
4.4.1 Board Composition Analysis Control Group 2
The number of directors on average in the Companies with no financial
reporting problems was 6.16. The average number of executive directors in
these companies was 3.47 and the average number of non-executives was
2.69.
FRP Companies Control Group 2
Mean Median Range Mean Median Range
Number of directors 6.10 6 3-14 6.16 3 3-13
No. of executive directors 3.48 3 1-7 3.47 3 1-7
No. of non-executive directors 2.61 2 0-8 2.69 2 0-8
FIGURE 35 CONTROL COMPANY BOARD COMPOSITION
This highlighted that on average most of the boards in the companies
observed in both populations were still dominated by executive management.
There were 13 (9 FRP) companies in which there were more non-executive
directors than executive directors. None of the control companies (2 FRP)
highlighted were observed as having CEO Chair Role Duality.
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4.4.1.1 The Number of Non-Executive Directors
The Hannpel Report (1998)4 considers that non-executive directors should
constitute not less than one-third of the overall board. 38 out of the 49
companies (78%) were observed to have boards in which, the non-executive
directors constituted at least one-third of the overall board. Figure 36
highlighted that the number of non-executives directors in the control
companies also fell short of the three considered being necessary in order for
non-executives to form an effective audit committee.
• FRP Companies Control Companies
No. % No. %
Number of boards with <3 NED's 29 58 28 57
Of which:
AIM Companies 10 6
FLEDGLING Companies 18 19
MID 250/SMALL CAP Companies 1 3
FIGURE 36 CONTROL COMPANY BOARD ANALYSIS
Figure 36 compared company size to the number of companies that did not
have an adequate number of non-executive directors. Six out of the 28 control
companies with less than three non-executive directors were known to be AIM
companies. Once again, this appeared to highlight that most AIM companies
did not comply. However a smaller percentage of AIM companies 5 (60%) as
opposed to 91% in the FRP population did not comply.
However, if the assumption that companies with less than three directors were
in fact relying on the recommendations of the Cisco Report (2000), 7 out of the
49 companies (7 out of 49- FRP Companies) had less than 2 non-executive
directors.
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4.4.1.2 Separation of Chair and CEO Role
The data observed showed that the role of chief executive and chairman is
shared by the same individual in 25% (18%-FRP Companies) of the cases
examined. This was a higher percentage than that seen in the FRP population.
Given data for the control companies were predominantly taken from financial
statements with years-ended 1998 or later, this result was not expected.
4.4.2 Audit Committee Analysis - Control Group 2
The structure and composition of the audit committees in the control
companies was analysed in order to compare their characteristics to those in
companies with financial reporting problems.
Of the 49 control companies observed, cases observed, 7 companies (14%)
did not have audit committees, 5 of these 7 companies were AIM companies
that do not have to comply with the Governance requirements of the Listing
rules. There were therefore only 2 companies that did not meet the
requirement for an audit committee.
It was noted that companies with financial reporting problems were less likely
to have audit committees. Figure 37 summarises the relationship between the
structure of the board and the existence of the audit committees in both
populations.
FRP Companies Control Group 2
Executive Dominated Board 13% 19%
Non-Executive	 dominated
Board
87% 81%
FIGURE 37 AUDIT COMMITTEE - BOARD STRUCTURE COMPARISON
It was noted that:
• Control Company audit committees were marginally less likely to be dominated by
non-executive directors.
• Companies with financial reporting problems were marginally less likely to be
dominated by executive management.
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4.4.2.1 Number of Audit Committee Members
The Hampel Report considered that audit committees composed of less than 3
non-executive directors might be ineffective. The Cisco Report (2000) however
considers that 2 non-executive directors are sufficient in a small company.
Figure 38 analyses the composition of the audit committees in the control
companies and highlights that the average number of audit committee
members was 2.51.
FRP Companies Control Group 2
Average Members 2.85 2.51
Median Members 3 3
Range Members 2-6 1-7
FIGURE 38 CONTROL COMPANY AUDIT COMMITTEE COMPOSITION ANALYSIS
The low average membership of the audit committee results due to the fact
that a significant number of companies (18 out of 42) had audit committees
composed of only 2 non-executive directors.
There did not on average appear to be notable differences in audit committee
composition in both populations. Figure 39 shows an analysis of the
membership by type of company.
FRP
COMPANIES
CONTROL
GROUP 2
No. % No %
Total population 49 100 49 100
Less: CO's with no audit committee (11) (22) (7) (14)
38 78 42 86
Of which:
Less than 3 members 17 45 18 43
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FRP
COMPANIES
CONTROL
GROUP 2
3 or more members 21 55 24 57
38 100 42 100
AIM CO's with at least 2 members 4
13
4
14Other CO's with less than 3 members
FIGURE 39 CONTROL COMPANY AUDIT COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
4.4.2.2 Governance Disclosures
The disclosure requirements examined in the financial statements of all
companies observed were: -
• indication of an audit committee charter or terms of reference;
• indication of the number of meetings held by the audit committee;
• references to communication with an internal audit department;
• the scope of disclosure on internal controls within the financial statements; and
• the scope of the external auditors report on corporate governance.
Analysis of the financial statements of the 42 companies revealed that:
• 45% i.e. 19 out of the 42 companies with audit committees had or made reference to
the existence of a formal charter or terms of reference for the audit committee.
• 52% of these companies examined stated the number of audit committee meetings
held. Of the companies that stated the number of meetings held, the average number
of meetings held was 2. A significant number of the companies - 48% did not state the
number of meetings or made no reference to the number of meetings held within the
financial statements.
• The extent of interaction between the audit committee and internal audit was
examined. It was noted however that only 8 of the 42 companies had internal audit
departments. This result was expected, as it is not mandatory to have an internal audit
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department. The analysis of these eight companies highlighted that they were the
companies with the largest market capitalisation of all cases observed.
Figure 40 compares the governance disclosure levels in the two populations
and highlights that the governance disclosures in the control companies
appeared to be better than those in the FRP Company population.
FRP Companies Control Group 2
No. % No. %
Terms of Reference 9 23 19 45
No. of meetings 18 46 22 52
Internal audit department 7 18 8 19
FIGURE 40 GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURES
44.2.3 Member Independence
The criteria used to evaluate the independence of the non-executive directors
were as follows:-
• any non-executive director who has been an executive director of the company;
• any non-executive director who is related to an executive director, and
• any non-executive director that is a major supplier, customer, or consultant to the
company.
Even though both the Cadbury and the Hampel Report required that all
members of the audit committee be non-executive and a majority be
independent, the audit committee of any of the companies was not considered
independent if any member did not meet the above criteria.
Whilst this criteria was not in strict compliance with the provisions of the UK
code (Section A.2.3), it was considered that the presence of a director not
considered independent could compromise the overall effectiveness of the
audit committee.
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Figure 41 analyses the independence of the audit committees in the
companies observed. It reveals that 18 audit committees were considered not
independent. The companies were further examined to highlight any common
attributes. The criteria for independence were examined. It was noted that the
most common reasons for failing the independence test were: -
• the presence of a former executive director, and
• a non-executive director also acting as a consultant to the company.
The size of the companies with non-independent audit committees was
examined. As expected, most of the companies were small companies with
one notable exception.
It was also noted that there seemed to be little difference in the likelihood of
audit committee independence when related to board structure.
FRP
Companies
Control
Group 2
,-
PANEL A: OVERALL ANALYSIS
No. % No. %
No. of Companies with audit committees 38 100 42 100
Independent committees 24 69 24 57
Not Independent 14 31 18 43
PANEL 13: OVERALL ANALYSIS
Ind. Not
Ind.
Ind. Not
Ind.
No. of Companies with audit committees 24 14 24 18
Of which:
Executive dominated boards 19 11 17 14
Non-executive dominated boards 5 3 7 4
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FRP
Companies
Control
Group 2
PANEL A: OVERALL ANALYSIS
No. %	 ^ No. %
PANEL C: ANALYSIS BY CRITERIA
No. % No. %
Executive director 2 16 6 33
Former executive director 6 38 6 33
Related to executive director 1 8 2 11
Consultant 5 38 4 23
14 100 18 100
FIGURE 41 CONTROL COMPANY AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE ANALYSIS
4.4.2.4 Competencies
The Blue Ribbon Report recommended that companies have "..Audit
committee comprised of a minimum of three directors, each of whom is
financially literate and.. that at least one member have accounting expertise".
The technical competencies of the directors in the 42 companies with audit
committees were analysed. An audit committee was considered to be
technically competent where at least one member was a member of a
professional accounting body. It was noted that (88%) of audit committees
were technically competent.
The financial literacy of the directors was examined. Members were
considered to be financially literate if: -
• A member of a recognised professional body;
• Having banking or investment management experience; and
• Holding or having held the position of Chief Executive Officer.
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The financial literacy of each audit committee member was assessed using the
above criteria. The total score for each committee was found and averaged
over the number of audit committee members. The audit committee was given
a score based on the percentage of financially literate members. There were
21 companies that were considered to be completely financially literate. The
average score was 0.77. Figure 42 summarises the differences in the
competencies of audit committee members in both populations. Control
companies appeared to be more technically sound but less financially literate.
_
FRP Companies Control Group 2
Technical competency 55% 88%
Average financial literacy 0.61 0.77
Technically	 competent
financially literate
& completely 6 18
FIGURE 42 COMPETENCIES COMPARISON
4.4.25 Additional Directorships
The number of additional directorships held by the audit committee members
was assessed. It was found the average number of directorships per audit
committee was 1.78.
FRP COMPANIES CONTROL GROUP 2
No. No.
Average 1.4 1.78
Median 1.27 1.5
Range 0-5.17 0-4
FIGURE 43 CFRP's ADDITIONAL DIRECTORSHIPS
Figure 43 highlights that control companies seemed to have on average more
additional directorships than FRP companies.
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4.5 TREND ANALYSIS
The data of both the FRP population and NFRP Date matched population was
further analysed to highlight if there were any trends in the data streams. The
number of companies analysed by date is shown in Figure 44,.
Year No. of Companies
1995 9
1996 11
1997 17
1998 5
1999 7
Total 49
FIGURE 44 ANALYSIS OF COMPANIES BY DATE
4.5.1 Analysis of Board Composition
Analysis of the FRP population over time (see Figure 45 and Figure 46)
highlighted that on average board sizes had fallen over the period.
Furthermore, boards were tending to have a more equal balance between
executive and non-executive directors.
The NFRP boards also appeared to falling in size but the average size of the
boards in these companies were larger. There was however a difference in the
balance of the board. There tended, with the exception of year 1998, o have
more executives than non-executive directors.
The number of FRP boards with three non-executive directors or more was
fairly constant. There were, over the period however, more NFRP boards that
did not have at least three non-executive directors.
The number of boards where the CEO was also the chair was fairly constant
with the exception of the year 1998 in which a significant number of boards
had CEO/Chairman role duality.
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The NFRP Date matched boards appeared to have fewer instances of
CEO/Chairman role duality over time.
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4.5.2 Analysis of governance disclosures
Analysis of the FRP population (see Figure 47 and Figure 48) over time
highlighted that on average governance disclosures had improved over the 5-
year period. Figure 47 highlighted the following:
• The number of companies disclosing the number of audit committee meetings held
was rising in period (1995-1997) but appeared to decline sharply.
• The number of companies stating an appropriate internal control policy in the financial
statements showed marked improvements over the period.
• The number of companies with internal control departments remained fairly constant
over the period.
There appeared to be a small improvement in the number of companies that
stated they had a terms of reference /charter for the audit committee.
However, the overall number of companies making this disclosure was still
low.
Figure 48 (below) highlights that the governance disclosures in the date
matched control companies appeared on average to be much better than
those in the FRP population.
All companies made an appropriate statement on internal controls. The
number of companies disclosing the number of audit committee meetings held
was rising in period. However, the overall number of companies making this
disclosure was also still low.
The number of companies disclosing the existence of terms of
reference/charter for the audit committee rose over the period but does not
appear to be significantly better than the FRP Company experience.
The number of companies with internal control functions also remained
constant over the period.
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4.5.3 Analysis of Audit Committees
Analysis of the populations (see Figure 49 and Figure 50) over time
highlighted the following trends in the FRP and the Date matched NFRP
Population:
• Audit committee membership in both populations appeared to still be below the
prescribed number.
• There were less additional directorships on average in the FRP population. The
number of additional directorships held appeared to be declining over the five year in
the NFRP population.
• Both populations highlighted that over the five-year period the number of companies
with audit committees was rising.
• The financial literacy of the audit committee members in the control groups was
consistently higher than that in the FRP population.
• The number of companies in each year with a technically competent member was on
average on the increase and more so within the NFRP population.
There were on average more independent FRP companies in each period. On
average the number of independent companies in both populations was fairly
constant over the period.
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4.6 SUMMARY
Previous sections have considered the main differences in the populations.
The results in most cases justify the hypothesised expectation that companies
with financial reporting problems would have ineffective governance
mechanisms considered to render the audit committee ineffective. Figure 51
summarises the main differences between the population groups.
The shaded areas of the table represent the variables for which an unexpected
result was exhibited. Whilst these differences were unexpected, they were
marginal.
FRP
COMPANIES
CONTROL
GROUP 1
CONTROL
GROUP 2
Board structure (Dominated
by)
Executive
Directors
Executive
Directors
Executive
Directors
NED <= 1/3 board go% 70% 78%
Less than 3 members 58% 59% 57%
CEO = Chair 18% 25% 25%
Audit Committee =Yes 78% 82% 86%
Audit committee < 3 45% 60% 43%
Terms of reference 23% 55% 45%
Number of meetings 46% 52% 52%
Internal audit department 18% 18% 19%
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FRP
COMPANIES
CONTROL
GROUP 1
CONTROL
GROUP 2
Independent audit committee 69%
, / 	 I
53% 57%
Technically competent 55% 83% 88%
Financially literate 0.61 0.74 0.77
Additional directorships 1.4 1.5 1.78
FIGURE 51 SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES
Figure 51 highlights that with the exception of the results for C.E.0.= Chair
Role duality, audit committee independence, and additional directorships,
control companies appeared to have better results regardless of the year end
date used.
PAGE 184
4.7 REFERENCES
Cadbury Committee (1992) Report Of The Committee On The Financial Aspects Of
Corporate Governance. (London - Gee)
Guidance for Smaller Quoted Companies — CISCO (2000)
Hampel, R. (1998). Committee On Corporate Governance. Final Report
The Blue Ribbon Report (1999) Improving the effectiveness of corporate audit
committees
PAGE 185
ENDNOTES
1 Code provision A.3.1
2 Given that there were only 13 AIM companies in the population
3 Code provision A.3.1
4 Code provision A.3.1
5 I.e. The number of AIM companies with less than three directors compared to the
overall number of AIM companies in the respective populations
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CHAPTER 5:
EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS
5 EMPIRICAL DATA RESULTS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The research design of this study involves the use of both parametric and non-
parametric statistical analysis due to the nature of the data collected. The
estimation is based on a choice based sample in which 50% of the firms have
experienced financial reporting problems and 50% have not experienced
financial reporting problems.
This method was chosen in order to highlight if companies that had
experienced financial reporting problem were different in terms of board
composition and audit committee structure to companies of a similar size and
nature.
The sample was taken from a period from 1995 to 1999. Clearly, governance
disclosure requirements had been considerably amended during this period.
Additional data was therefore collected on the original control group
companies but from the latest available financial statements to see if
disclosures had improved or declined over time.
5.2 ASSUMPTIONS
5.2.1 Data Assumptions
Siegel (1996) considers that parametric significance tests rest upon the
assumptions that the data has certain characteristics. The assumptions for
using parametric tests are:
• Observations are drawn from a population with a normal distribution. It is important to
stress that this assumption requires that the overall population being considered
normal and not necessarily the sample extracted from it.
• There is homogeneity of variance between the data a sample sets. However this
assumption is not considered important given that the groups are of an equal size.
Foster (1998) states that parametric tests are still valid where the variance of one
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group is double that of the other. Where parametric testing has been used, there have
been no significant differences in the variances of the appropriate data sets.
• The data is measured on an interval or ratio scale. All data in this study to be tested
using parametric tests have been measured on a ratio scale.
Non-parametric tests have been used to examine the data sets that do not
meet these assumptions.
5.2.2 Variables
Eleven variables for each group of data were identified. These are shown in
detail Figure 52.
Variable
Name
Data Measurement
1 IMB Ratio The percentage of non-executive directors to total
board in each company.
2 CEO Ordinal A dummy variable given a value of 0 if C.E.O. = Chair
otherwise 1.
3 AC Ordinal A dummy variable given a value of 1 if there is an
audit committee otherwise 0.
4 TREE Ordinal A dummy variable given a value of 1 if the existence
of an audit committee charter or terms of reference is
disclosed or otherwise 0
5 IA Ordinal A dummy variable given a value of 1 if there is an
internal audit department or otherwise 0.
6 MEET Ratio The number of disclosed audit committee meetings.
7 ACMEM Ratio The number of audit committee members
8 QUAL Ordinal A dummy variable given a value of 1 if there is a
technically	 qualified	 audit	 committee	 member	 or
otherwise 0.
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Variable
Name
Data Measurement
9 FLIT Ratio The percentages of financially literate audit committee
members for each company.
10 DIR Ratio Average number of additional directorships held by
audit committee members.
11 IND Ordinal A dummy variable given a value of 1 if the audit
committee is considered independent or otherwise 0.
FIGURE 52 VARIABLE ANALYSIS
The hypotheses were all formulated so as to achieve one main goal i.e. to see
if board, and audit committee structure and composition differed between the
problem cases and the control group. On that basis, statistical tests of
difference were employed. In the cases of rank data Paired Sample T-Tests
(parametric test) were used. Where ordinal data had been collected, the
Wilcoxon Test (non-parametric test) was used.
5.2.3 Significance levels
If it is considered that there is a real difference between the groups when in
fact there is not with an alpha level of 5%, it is likely to make a type 1 error.
Testing at an alpha level of 1% reduces the likelihood of a type 1 error but
however increases the chances of a type II error which states that we consider
there to be a difference when no difference exists. Appendices pages 264 and
277 respectively summarise the results of the statistical testing using an alpha
level of 1%.
5.2.4 Directional Testing
We have considered that the control group should perform better that the
problem cases and thus it is relevant to use directional significance testing.
The data is tested using SPSS version 9. This software assumes a two-sided
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(i.e. a non-directional test). Where this is not the case, it is appropriate to
divide the results by two in order to find the true significance of the test.
5.3 RESULTS
Statistical tests of significance were used to analyse the differences between:
• The FRP companies and the date matched companies (control group 1). These tests
were conducted to highlight if there were any significant differences in corporate
governance disclosures when comparing the above stated groups.
• The FRP companies and the 1999-year end date-matched companies (control group
2). Given that governance disclosure requirements had improved during the period
under examination, it was relevant to see if there were any statistically significant
differences between these groups.
5.3.1 Empirical results Control Group 1
5.3.1.1 Hypothesis 1- Control Group 1
Hypothesis 1 considered companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have ineffective boards. Boards were considered ineffective
where non-executives directors constituted less than one-third of the overall
board.
FRP Companies Control Group 1
No. of companies 49 49
NED > one-third of board 39/49 34/49
FIGURE 53 BOARD COMPOSITION
Figure 53 highlighted that non-executive directors were more likely to
constitute more than one-third of the overall board in FRP companies than in
control group I. Whilst this pattern of results was not in the expected
direction, the difference was not statistically significant (p =0.74) see
appendices page 253.
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5.3.1.2 Hypothesis 2- Control Group 1
Hypothesis 2 considered companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have boards where the same person held the positions of
chairman and chief executive officer.
More control group companies (see Figure 54) were seen to have CEO role
duality as compared to the FRP companies. This result whilst not significant
(p=0.47) see appendices page 254 was not in the predicted direction.
FRP Companies Control Group 1
No. companies 49 49
CEO = Chair 8 12
CEO # Chair 41 37
FIGURE 54 ROLE DUALITY
5.3.1.3 Hypothesis 3- Control Group 1
Hypothesis 3 considered companies with financial reporting problems are less
likely to have audit committees. It is possible to measure audit committee
effectiveness indirectly if it is considered that the absence of financial reporting
problems indicates an effective audit committee. The analysis of the FRP
group of companies and control group 1 was expected to highlight that
companies with no financial reporting problems were more likely to have audit
committee. Figure 55 highlights this positive trend which while expected was
not considered statistically significant (p= 0.62) see appendices page 258.
FRP Companies Control Group 1
No. of companies 49 49
No. co.'s with audit committees 38 40
% co.'s with audit committees 78% 	 82%
FIGURE 55 AUDIT COMMITTEE
The Hampel Report (1998) considered that audit committees composed of
less than three non-executive directors might be ineffective.
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5.3.1.4 Hypothesis 4- Control Group 1
Hypothesis 4 stated that companies with financial reporting problems are more
likely to have audit committees with an inadequate number of non-executive
directors.
Figure 56 highlights that the control group had more companies in which there
were greater than or equal to three non-executive director members.
Furthermore, the control groups had fewer companies in which there were less
than three members.
This result see appendices page 259 was expected but the differences whilst
positive were not significant (p= 0.31) statistically.
FRP Companies Control Group 1
No. of companies 49 49
No. with audit committees 38 40
<3 members 45% 40%
>3 members 55% 60%
FIGURE 56 AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBER COMPOSITION
Cadbury Report (1992) and the Hampel Report (1998) both required that all
members of the audit committee be non-executive and independent to be
effective. The audit committee of any of the companies was not considered
independent if any member did not meet the criteria.
5.3.1.5 Hypothesis 5- Control Group 1
Hypothesis 5 stated that companies with financial reporting problems are more
likely to have audit committees with poor governance procedures. The
governance disclosures chosen were these considered more likely to influence
the ability of the audit committee to be effective.
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The financial statements of the FRP companies and control group 1 were
therefore examined for: -
• the existence of an audit committee charter or terms of reference;
• the number of meetings held annually by the audit committee; and
• the existence of an internal audit department.
In all cases the control group appeared to have better governance procedures
than the FRP companies with the exception of the existence of an internal
audit department.
The differences between the FRP companies and the control companies (see
Figure 57) were in the expected direction but were not considered statistically
significant.
FRP Companies Control Group 1 P Page Ref.:
Terms of reference 23% 45% 1.00 255
Meetings 46% 52% 0.39 256
Internal audit 18% 18% 1.00 257
FIGURE 57 GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURES
5.3.1.6 Hypothesis 6- Control Group 1
Hypothesis 6 therefore considered companies with financial reporting
problems are more likely to have audit committees that are not considered
independent. Figure 58 highlighted that this was not case. This result see
appendices page 262 was not expected but was not significantly (p= 0.48)
significant.
I FRP Companies Control Group 1
No. companies 49 49
No. with audit committees 38 40
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FRP Companies Control Group 1
Independent committees 26 21
% independent 69% 53%
FIGURE 58 AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE
The Blue Ribbon Report (1999) recommended that companies have "..Audit
committee comprised of a minimum of three directors, each of whom is
financially literate and.. that at least one member have accounting expertise".
The competencies of the directors in the companies with audit committees
were analysed.
5.3.1.7 Hypothesis 7- Control Group 1
Hypothesis 7 stated that companies with financial reporting problems are more
likely to have audit committees with fewer financially literate members. The
analysis of data reflected the predicted result pattern as Figure 59 shows that
control group1 had a higher proportion of financially literate directors. This
result see appendices page 261(p = 0.03) was statistically significant.
5.3.1.8 Hypothesis 8- Control Group 1
Hypothesis 8 stated that companies with financial reporting problems are more
likely to have audit committees with no technically competent members.
The analysis of data reflected the predicted result pattern as Figure 59 shows
that control group 1 had a higher proportion of technically competent
members. This result, in the predicted direction, was statistically (p=0.03)
significant —see appendices page 260.
FRP Companies Control Group 1
No. companies 49 49
No. with audit committees 38 40
% of Tech. Competent members 55% 82%
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FRP Companies Control Group 1
Average financial literacy 0.61 0.74
FIGURE 59 COMPETENCIES
5.3.1.9 Hypothesis 9- Control Group 1
Hypothesis 9 stated that companies with financial reporting problems are more
likely to have audit committees members who hold additional directorships.
Figure 60 highlights that on average the non-executive directors in control
group 1 held more additional directorships as compared to the FRP group of
companies.
This result was not in the predicted direction and as unexpected. However the
difference - see appendices page 263 -was not considered to be statistically
significant (p= 0.20).
FRP Companies Control Group 1
No. companies 49 49
No. with audit committees 38 40
Average Additional directorships 1.4 1.5
FIGURE 60 ADDITIONAL DIRECTORSHIPS
5.3.2 Empirical Results Control Group 2
5.3.2.1 Hypothesis 1- Control Group 2
Hypothesis 1 considered companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have ineffective boards. Boards were considered ineffective
where non-executives directors constituted less than one-third of the overall
board. Figure 61 highlighted that non-executive directors were more likely to
constitute more than one-third of the overall board in FRP companies than in
control group 2. Whilst this pattern of results was not in the expected
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direction, the difference —see appendices page 266 was not statistically
significant (p = 0.52).
FRP Companies Control Group 2
• No. of Companies 49 49	
.
NED > one-third of board 39/49 38/49
FIGURE 61 BOARD COMPOSITION
5.3.2.2 Hypothesis 2- Control Group 2
Hypothesis 2 considered companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have boards where the same person held the positions of
chairman and chief executive officer.
More Control group 2 companies (see Figure 62 were seen to have CEO role
duality as compared to the FRP companies. This result- see appendices page
267 -whilst not significant (p= 0.59) was not in the predicted direction.
FRP Companies Control Group 2
No. companies 49 49
CEO = Chair 8 12
CEO # Chair 41 37
,
FIGURE 62 ROLE DUALITY
5.3.2.3 Hypothesis 3- Control Group 2
Hypothesis 3 considered companies with financial reporting problems are less
likely to have audit committees. It is possible to measure audit committee
effectiveness indirectly if it is considered that the absence of financial reporting
problems indicates an effective audit committee.
The analysis of the FRP group of companies and control group 2 was
expected to highlight that companies with no financial reporting problems were
more likely to have audit committee. Figure 63 highlights this positive trend
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which while expected was not considered statistically significant (p= 0.29) —
see appendices page 271.
FRP Companies Control Group 2
No. of companies 49 49
No. co.'s with audit committees 38 42
% co.'s with audit committees 78% 86%
FIGURE 63 AUDIT COMMITTEE
The Hampel Report (1998) considered that audit committees composed of
less than three non-executive directors might be ineffective.
5.3.2.4 Hypothesis 4- Control Group 2
Hypothesis 4 stated that companies with financial reporting problems are more
likely to have audit committees with an inadequate number of non-executive
directors. Figure 64 highlights that control group 2 had more companies in
which there were greater than or equal to three non-executive director
members. Furthermore, control group 2 had fewer companies in which there
were less than three members. This result (see appendices page 272) was
expected but the differences whilst positive were not significant (p=0.47)
statistically.
FRP Companies Control Group 2
No. with audit committees 38 42
<3 members 45% 43%
>3 members 55% 57%
FIGURE 64 AUDIT COMMITTEE MEMBER COMPOSITION
The Cadbury Report (1992) and the Hampel Report (1998) both required that
all members of the audit committee be non-executive and independent to be
effective. The audit committee of any of the companies was not considered
independent if any member did not meet the criteria.
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5.3.2.5 Hypothesis 5- Control Group 2
Hypothesis 5 stated that companies with financial reporting problems are more
likely to have audit committees with poor governance procedures.
The governance disclosures chosen were these considered more likely to
influence the ability of the audit committee to be effective. The financial
statements of the FRP companies and control group 2 were therefore
examined for: -
• the existence of an audit committee charter or terms of reference;
• the number of meetings held annually by the audit committee; and
• the existence of an internal audit department.
In all cases control group 2 appeared to have better governance procedures
than the FRP companies. The differences between the FRP companies and
the control companies (see Figure 65) were in the expected direction but were
not considered statistically significant.
FRP Companies Control Group 2 P Page Ref.
Terms of reference 23% 45% 0.052 268
Meetings 46% 52% 0.288 269
Internal audit 18% 19% 0.74 270
FIGURE 65 GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURES
5.3.2.6 Hypothesis 6- Control Group 2
Hypothesis 6 therefore considered companies with financial reporting
problems are more likely to have audit committees that are not considered
independent. Figure 66 highlighted that this was not case. This result (see
appendices page 273) was not expected but was not statistically (p=1.00)
significant.
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FRP Companies Control Group 2
No. companies 49 49
No. with audit committees 38 42
Independent committees 26 24
% independent 69% 57%
FIGURE 66 AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE
The Blue Ribbon Report (1999) recommended that companies have "..Audit
committee comprised of a minimum of three directors, each of whom is
financially literate and.. that at least one member have accounting expertise".
The competencies of the directors in the companies with audit committees
were analysed.
5.3.2.7 Hypothesis 7- Control Group 2
Hypothesis 7 stated that companies with financial reporting problems are more
likely to have audit committees with fewer financially literate members. The
analysis of data reflected the predicted result pattern as Figure 67 shows that
control group 2 have a higher proportion of financially literate directors. This
result (p=0.03) was statistically significant — see appendices page 274.
5.3.2.8 Hypothesis 8- Control Group 2
Hypothesis 8 stated that companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have audit committees with no technically competent members.
The analysis of data reflected the predicted pattern as Figure 67 shows that
control group 2 have a higher proportion of technically competent members.
This result (see appendices page 275) was statistically (p=0.01) significant.
FRP Companies Control Group 2
No. companies 49 49
No. with audit committees 38 42
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FRP Companies Control Group 2
% of Tech. competent members 55% 88%
Average financial literacy 0.61 0.77
FIGURE 67 COMPETENCIES
5.3.2.9 Hypothesis 9- Control Group 2
The number of additional directorships held by the non-executive directors was
considered to influence the amount of time available to them to devote to their
duties on the audit committee and thus therefore impinge on the effectiveness
of the audit committee. Hypothesis 9 stated that companies with financial
reporting problems are more likely to have audit committees members who
hold additional directorships.
Figure 60 highlights that on average the non-executive directors in control
group companies held more additional directorships as compared to the FRP
group of companies.
This result was not in the predicted direction and as unexpected. However the
difference was not considered to be statistically (see appendices page 276)
different (p=0.29).
FRP Companies Control Group 2
No. companies 49 49
No. with audit committees 38 42
Average Additional directorships 1.4 1.78
FIGURE 68 ADDITIONAL DIRECTORSHIPS
5.3.3 Summary
The descriptive analysis of the data showed some data trends that highlighted
the predicted differences between companies with financial reporting problems
and the control groups. The statistical analysis however disputes this fact
(except in the case of hypotheses 7 and 8) as there were no statistically
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significant differences found. I.e. the differences found originated through
chance as opposed to there being a real difference between the problem
company data and the control group data. Figure 69 highlights the hypotheses
tested and shows whether they were accepted (due to statistically significant
differences being found in the predicted direction) or rejected.
HYPOTHESIS DESCRIPTION DECISION
CONTROL
GROUP 1
CONTROL
GROUP 2
Companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have ineffective boards. I.e. where
NED's are deemed to be ineffective in that they
constitute less than 1/3 of the total board.
REJECT REJECT
Companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have ineffective boards I.e. where
there is CEO Chair role duality
REJECT REJECT
Companies with financial reporting problems are
less likely to have audit committees.
REJECT REJECT
Companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have audit committees with less than
three NED's.
REJECT REJECT
Companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have audit committees with poor
governance procedures.
REJECT REJECT
Companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have audit committees that are not
considered independent.
REJECT REJECT
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HYPOTHESIS DESCRIPTION DECISION
CONTROL
GROUP 1
CONTROL
GROUP 2
7 Companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have audit committees with fewer
financially literate members
ACCEPT ACCEPT
8 Companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have audit committees with	 no
technically competent members.
ACCEPT ACCEPT
9 Companies with financial reporting problems are
more likely to have audit committees members who
hold additional directorships.
REJECT REJECT
FIGURE 69 HYPOTHESIS SUMMARY
Figure 69 highlighted that a majority of the hypotheses were rejected.
Additional tests.' were therefore conducted to examine if there was a likelihood
of there being significant differences using a confidence level of 99% (Alpha
=1%).
Figure 87 (appendices page 265) highlighted that there were no statistically
significant differences (except in the case of hypotheses 7 and 8) found
between FRP data and control group 1 data using an alpha level of 1%. Figure
99 -see appendices page 278 (except in the case of hypotheses 7 and 8)
highlighted that there were no statistical differences found between FRP data
and control group 2 data using an alpha level of 1%.
5.3.4 Interviews
The rejection of a majority of the hypotheses had serious implications for the
validity of this study. It was important to establish if these unexpected results
were a reflection of the true state of corporate governance affairs in UK
companies.
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The characteristics of firms' subject to an adverse ruling by the FRRP were
considered by Peasnell et at (2000). the governance characteristics examined
within their study of these firms (i.e. board size, CEO role Duality, audit
committee existence) as compared to a control sample were largely
indistinguishable. This to some extent validates the results in this thesis.
It was therefore decided to conduct interviews to see if directors' opinions
concurred with the results of the study. It was considered that if directors'
opinions concurred with the results of the study, the results could therefore be
considered as evidence that audit committee effectiveness in terms of the
financial reporting monitoring role was not influenced by the current
governance recommendations designed to ensure their effectiveness.
5.3.4.1 Hypothesis 1
The directors were asked if they agreed with hypothesis 1 which stated that:
Companies with financial reporting problems are more likely to have ineffective
boards. I.e. where non-executive directors are deemed to be ineffective in that
they constitute less than 1/3 of the total board.
Most directors noted that the number of non-executive directors on the board
was important but considered that 2 non-executive directors were sufficient. A
board imbalance that resulted because there were only 2 non-executive
directors was not considered important.
It was interesting to note that most of the directors who felt that only 2 non-
executive directors were sufficient and that board imbalance was not an issue
in these circumstances were directors in board that had these characteristics.
A certain amount of bias was therefore evident.
In order to further explain this result, additional analysis of the companies was
undertaken. It was found that most of the companies where non-executive
directors constituted less than 1/3 of the overall board could be classified
"small" companies in line with the CISCO Report (2000).
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There appeared to be a relationship between the size of the company and the
number of non-executive directors on the board. This study did however not
control for company size as current governance recommendations do not
distinguish listed companies based on the size.
Most directors noted that the size of the board and the percentage of non-
executive directors therein were not the most important factors. They all
considered that the personal reputation and experience of the members were
more important factors determining the board effectiveness.
No statistically significant differences were found in the balance of the board
between the FRP population and the control groups. Directors' opinions
emphasise that board balance was not a crucial factor.
If company size is considered to influence the number of non-executive
directors and board balance, it follows that significant differences between
FRP and control groups where these companies are of a similar size should
not exist.
The companies examined within this study were predominantly "small
companies" and thus may explain why no statistically significant differences
were found in the composition of the board between the FRP population and
the control groups.
5.3.4.2 Hypothesis 2
The directors were asked if they concurred with the following hypothesis:
Companies with financial reporting problems are more likely to have ineffective
boards I.e. where the same person holds the role of the chairman and chief
executive officer.
The directors were asked to comment on whether they agreed with this
hypothesis. Whilst most considered that the separation of the roles did prevent
dominance and protect accountability, they all noted that:
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• There was no real basis for the premise as many successful companies had
combined the roles in the past.
• The separation of the roles did not preclude the dominance of the chief executive
officer or chairman. A significant number of respondents considered that the role of the
chairman to be a figurehead position and thus the combination or separation of the
roles did not change the dominant position of the chief executive officer. In many
cases, these directors felt the combination of the roles to be cost-effective.
It was interesting to note that the directors who felt that role separation was
unimportant were all from small companies and a certain amount of bias might
therefore exist. Once gain, directors were of the opinion that the incidence of
role separation was influenced by the size of the company. It can be assumed
that, given the predominance of smaller companies within the population, no
statistical differences should exist.
Role separation is considered important for all companies regardless of size.
Current governance recommendations stress this fact. The CISCO Report
(2000) also highlights the importance of this separation of these roles for small
companies.
This study therefore highlights that in respect of audit committee effectiveness,
the separation of the role of the chairman and chief executive officer is not
important.
Hypothesis 1 and 2 have considered certain board governance mechanisms
and examined to see if they are associated with the incidence of financial
reporting problems (used as a proxy to measure audit committee
ineffectiveness). No positive associations are found. The opinions of the
directors go some way to explaining this result.
5.3.4.3 Hypothesis 3
The directors were asked to comment on whether they agreed with hypothesis
3, which stated that:
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Companies with financial reporting problems are less likely to have audit
committees.
The results of this study showed no statistically significant differences between
audit committee existence between the population groups. This result was not
in the predicted direction.
Most directors considered that the audit committee was necessary. They all
however qualified this opinion by stating that only an effective audit committee
could prove useful. They all agreed that the quality most required by any audit
committee to be effective was member experience.
The size of the companies included in the population was once again a factor.
A significant number of AIM companies were included within the populations
and that these companies do not have to comply with corporate governance
listing requirements. This may have contributed to why the result was not
statistically significant.
This result does however confirm the recent empirical studies on US
companies. Beasley (2000) noted the importance of audit committee structure
and composition as opposed to the mere existence of an audit committee.
5.3.4.4 Hypothesis 4
Companies with financial reporting problems are more likely to have audit
committees with less than three non-executive directors.
The directors were asked to comment on whether they agreed with this
hypothesis. Most directors noted that the number of non-executive directors on
the audit committee was important but considered that 2 non-executive
directors were sufficient. It was interesting to note that most of the directors
who felt that only 2 non-executive directors were sufficient were directors in
boards that had these characteristics. A certain amount of bias was therefore
evident.
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Most respondents felt that the personal reputation and experience of the
members were more important factors determining audit committee
effectiveness.
It follows that if overall board size and board balance is influenced by company
size, the number of non-executive directors on the audit committee must be
also be directly affected. Directors' opinions on company size explains why no
statistically significant differences were found in the composition of the audit
committee in terms of size between the FRP population and the control
groups.
5.3.4.5 Hypothesis 5
Companies with financial reporting problems are more likely to have audit
committees with poor governance procedures.
All respondents considered that an unstructured audit committee (in respect of
a charter or terms of reference) was undisciplined and therefore in most cases
ineffective. Some directors however considered that the size and nature of the
company determined the extent to which disclosures were made within the
financial statements.
Furthermore, it was noted that a significant number of AIM companies were
included within the populations and that these companies do not have to
comply with corporate governance listing requirements. The result of the
study, which found no statistically significant differences in the governance
procedures of audit committees of FRP companies as compared to the control
groups, was understandable.
With regards to other specific governance procedures considered in this study,
the following opinions were noted:
• Two meetings per year were considered to be a sufficient number of meetings. The
descriptive analysis highlighted that this was the average number of meetings held
regardless of population. The size and nature of most companies in either of the
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groups resulted in the audit committees activities in respect of the financial reporting
monitoring role being confined to the review of the financial statements prior to overall
board approval. This was evidenced during the financial statement review of all the
companies in population during the data analysis stage of this study. This
concentration of audit committee activities around the external audit process does not
..
require a great number of meetings explains why most companies only held 2 audit
committee meetings annually. This therefore explained why there were no statistically
significant differences between the populations.
• The internal audit department whilst useful was not necessary. Furthermore, most
directors felt that the size of their respective companies precluded the need for an
internal audit department. This therefore explained why there were no statistically
significant between the populations.
5.3.4.6 Hypothesis 6
Companies with financial reporting problems are more likely to have audit
committees that are not considered independent.
The study found that whilst no statistically significant differences in audit
committee independence of the FRP companies and control groups were
found, the descriptive analysis highlighted that that more FRP companies audit
committees were considered independence as compared to the control
groups.
This result was unexpected. The directors interviewed were asked their
opinion on the importance of audit committee independence. All directors
considered the independence of non-executive directors to be important. They
however commented on the criteria used to determine independence.
They noted that the nomination process could compromise the independence
of the non-executive director. I.e. where non-executive directors who met the
criteria used in the study but had other connections to the executive directors.
They all noted that this was possible but agreed that it would be impossible to
lay down prescriptive guidelines on independence that covered all potential
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scenarios. It was for that reason that they mostly all concluded that the
competency of the non-executive director was important.
It was clear that the result of the study was contrary to the opinions of directors
interviewed. Other reasons therefore needed to be found to explain this
variation. Empirical studies (e.g. Dechow, 1996; Beasley, 2000) have all found
independence to be a factor strongly associated with audit committee
effectiveness. There was therefore no reason to assume that the hypothesised
prediction was incorrect.
The analysis of audit committee independence was based on the assumption
that all directors were considered to be independent unless information
disputing this assumption was available. The review of the financial statements
during the data analysis stage of this thesis revealed that the quality of
corporate governance disclosures in the financial statements of FRP
companies was poor.
It must therefore be considered that directors in FRP companies assumed
independent were not. The lack of statistically significant differences may to
some extent be attributable to poor financial statement disclosures.
5.3.4.7 Hypothesis 7
Companies with financial reporting problems are more likely to have audit
committees with fewer financially literate members.
The study found statistically significant differences in the financial literacy of
audit committee members in the control groups as compared to FRP
companies.
All directors considered the financial literacy of non-executive directors to be
important. The result shown in the statistical analysis was considered justified.
5.3.4.8 Hypothesis 8
Companies with financial reporting problems are more likely to have audit
committees with no technically competent members.
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The study found statistically significant differences in the technical competency
of audit committee members in the control groups as compared to FRP
companies.
All directors considered the technical competence of non-executive directors to
be important. The result shown in the statistical analysis was considered
justified.
5.3.4.9 Hypothesis 9
Companies with financial reporting problems are more likely to have audit
committees members who hold additional directorships.
Most directors agreed that the number of non-executive directorships held
compromised the abilities of non-executive directors. They however
considered that the number of directorship held was dependent on the
personal circumstances of the director.
Some directors considered 3 additional directorships to be the maximum
amount of directorships to be held and this was reflected in the analysis of
directorships in sections 4.3.2.5 and 4.4.2.5.
Given that there is no guidance or legislation on this issue, the result
highlighting the lack of significant significance is understandable.
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CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSIONS
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
6.1 CONCLUSION
There has been considerable emphasis placed on corporate governance
structures as an aid to improving long term performance of the organisation.
Most of the recent developments in UK corporate governance have focused on
board structure and composition and board committees.
The role played by independent non-executive directors on the board
continues to be a prominent feature of corporate governance. In recent years,
increasing attention has been paid to audit committees by both regulatory
authorities and academics. SEC, the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting (1987) and the Kirk Panel (1994) state that the audit
committee is an important element in corporate governance and instrumental
in ensuring the quality of financial reporting.
Academic research examines the relation between audit committee
characteristics and aggressive reporting (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991;
Dechow et al. 1996), the incidence of fraud (Beasley 1996; McMullen 1996)
and other firm characteristics. Most studies consider that a positive
relationship exists between the existence of an audit committee and the quality
of financial reporting.
The activities of the audit committee in terms of financial reporting were
examined. Most of the studies to date have been limited to the study of US
companies and to considering if the existence of an audit committee improved
the quality of financial reporting. Since most UK Listed companies now have
audit committees, these studies are therefore of limited value.
It was therefore decided that the focus of this thesis would be limited to the
financial reporting role of the audit committee and consider the extent to which
the composition and structure of the audit committee (i.e. the governance
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structure) was associated with the ability of the audit committee to fulfil this
role effectively.
It is reasonable to assume that an audit committee may be considered
effective where it achieves its stated roles. The audit committee is not required
to report to the shareholders within the financial statements on the extent to
which they have achieved their roles. Thus, actual audit committee
effectiveness cannot be externally observed.
It is possible to measure audit committee effectiveness indirectly if it is
considered that the absence of financial reporting problems indicates an audit
committee has been effective in achieving their financial reporting oversight
role.
It is important to note that the absence of a financial reporting problem may not
always be indicative of an effective audit committee. This thesis however
highlights that the presence of financial reporting problems is associated with
audit committee ineffectiveness.
•Financial reporting is the term used to cover all the reports of a finanical nature
that are issued to external users by a company. The financial statements are
the most important areas of financial reporting and thus this thesis focuses on
the financial reporting problems evidenced within the financial statements.
Financial reporting problems within financial statements may range from
inadequate disclosure to corporate failure. It would be inappropriate to
consider that the audit committee effective or otherwise would be in a position
to prevent corporate failure. That is not the role of the audit committee. The
audit committee should review the financial statements to ensure that they
reflect the true state of affairs of the company. The audit committee is
considered ineffective where the non-disclosure of financial reporting problems
was evidenced.
The main objective of this study is to consider if governance structures are
positively associated with financial reporting and disclosure. It was therefore
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hypothesised that companies with financial reporting problems would be more
likely to have poor governance structures. I.e. Ineffective audit committees
should have ineffective governance structures.
The study collated data on 49 companies that were considered to have
financial reporting problems. A control group of similar companies with no
financial reporting problems was also collated. The governance structures of
these boards were analysed using the variables defined in chapter 4.
This study found positive associations between audit committee effectiveness
and the financial literacy and technical competence of non-executive directors.
These were found to be the only areas where there were significant statistical
differences found when comparing the FRP population and the control group
populations. No other statistically significant differences were evidenced. This
was clearly not as predicted.
Peasnell et al (2000) considered the characteristics of firms subject to an
adverse ruling by the FRRP. They noted that the governance characteristics of
these firms (i.e. board size, CEO role Duality, audit committee existence) as
compared to a control sample were largely indistinguishable. This to some
extent validates the results in this thesis.
Based on these results and the opinions of directors in interviews, certain
conclusions may be drawn from this result:
The emphasis on audit committee structure may be inappropriate. The results
of this study highlight the need for focus on the quality of members on the
committee.
There were significant statistical differences found between the competencies
of the non-executive directors. The current UK recommendations do not
contain clear guidelines on the competencies of non-executive directors. There
is a need to consider if the guidelines on non-executive competencies detailed
in the Blue Ribbon Report (1999) should be included in UK recommendations.
PAGE 215
It may be argued that the size of the sample precludes this conclusion. It is still
contended that the sizes of these samples form an adequate basis to conclude
that the focus on composition and structure of the board in the smaller listed
companies may be inappropriate. It is perhaps necessary to consider if
governance requirements should be tailored to the needs of smaller
companies. The CISCO Report (2000) considers that governance
requirements in the Stock Exchange Listing Rules should be tailored towards
the needs of the smaller listed companies. The opinions of directors
interviewed concur with this need.
The people who are responsible for governance in the company determine the
quality of governance. Regardless of the need to focus on quality, the absence
of basic structures must still be rectified so that audit committees and boards
operate within a disciplined framework. This study highlights the need for
improvements in the governance framework of smaller companies.
6.2 OPPORTUNMES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Corporate governance, in terms of both accountability and enterprise, involves
complex interrelated mechanisms. As yet research (particularly in the UK) into
the extent of the relationships between the various governance mechanisms is
extremely limited. Further research is required into the interdependence these
mechanisms.
Both the Hampel Report and the Cadbury Report stressed the need to apply
recommendations regarding board structure, etc., flexibly. It is however
unclear whether merely complying with the recommendations will improve
accountability.
Research evidence gained from the study of US companies suggests that
there is a relationship between governance mechanisms and accountability. It
is not clear that these findings may be appropriate in the UK context as there
are a number of significant differences between the two countries with respect
to:-
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• the balance of non-executive to executive directors in board structures; and
• the separation of the role of chairman and chief executive officer.
Given these differences, it is possible that US research findings are not directly
appropriate to UK companies. There are a number of key research questions
which research could usefully investigate:
The relationship between audit committee governance structures and
firm performance.
There is some evidence from the US that audit committee formation is
positively associated with improvements to quality of the firms accounting
earnings. Further research may include an investigation as to whether the
audit committee is perceived to add value to the business in the long-term and
whether the quality of audit committee members would affect this perception.
The relationship between audit committee effectiveness and external
auditing.
One of the key functions of the audit committee is to act as an interface
between the external auditors and the board of directors. Furthermore, the
external auditors can provide an objective report on internal financial controls
to the audit committee. Research evidence from the USA indicates that audit
committees are perceived as effective by external auditors in the area of
financial reporting where they are considered to have technical experience.
Research may therefore consider an attitudinal survey of external auditor
perceptions of the audit committee effectiveness, the adequacy of member
qualifications and the extent to which any negative perceptions may be filled
by training.
The relationship between audit committee effectiveness and internal
audit.
One of the key functions of the audit committee is to act as an interface
between the internal auditors and the board of directors. Research evidence
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from the USA and Canada indicates that the composition of the audit
committee influences the extent of interaction between the audit committee
and internal audit. Further research may therefore investigate whether this
relationship exists in UK companies.
Future research may also consider:
. An attitudinal survey of directors' perceptions of audit committee effectiveness and the
extent to which they consider that the governance mechanisms used in this thesis are
effective.
• A replication of this thesis using a different proxy for audit committee effectiveness.
This would result in a different population of companies to be analysed using the same
governance mechanisms employed in this thesis. This study would therefore further
investigate the results evidenced in this thesis.
• This thesis considered the adequacy of governance structures in the financial year in
which the problem was evidenced. Given that the problem might have existed in prior
years, it was necessary to consider if governance mechanisms of the audit committee
in the year the problem was evidenced were the same in the year the problem actually
occurred. A longitudinal study of governance mechanisms in companies with financial
reporting problems would highlight if this time lapse exists.
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SAMPLE LETTER
«FirstName» «LastName»
«Company»
«Addressl»
«Address2»
«City»
«Postcode»
Dear Sir
Research Study on Corporate Governance
I am a doctoral student at City University Business School and am currently
researching in the area of corporate governance with specific reference to the
effectiveness of audit committees in UK.
As part of my research, I will be conducting interviews with non-executive directors in
order to:
• Discuss their individual experiences of audit committees.
• Discuss their opinions on the effectiveness and usefulness of corporate governance to the
business.
I would be grateful if you would consider being interviewed and I can assure you that
all opinions expressed will remain confidential. The interview would last for no longer
than forty minutes.
Please indicate a convenient time and date on the card enclosed and I will contact
you or your secretary to arrange a location convenient to you for the interview to take
place. I enclose a stamped address envelope for your convenience.
In the event that a meeting is not possible, I would be able to conduct the interview by
telephone. If this option is preferred, please complete the enclosed card stating your
preference and time most convenient to you.
Yours faithfully
Ms. D. 0. Dafinone
FIGURE 74 INTERVIEW LETTER
PAGE 251
INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS
Name Company Name FRP NFRP
1 A Skailes Bulgin PLC v
2 A Winter Bulgin PLC v
3 Albert Cheesebrough Abbeycrest PLC v
4 Alex Watson Locker PLC v
5 Fred Shedden Burn Stewart Distillers PLC v
6 G Maddrell Glenmorangie PLC v
7 J M Southworth Locker PLC v
8 J R Featherstone Abbeycrest PLC v
9 J Smith Bullough PLC v
10 J T Sutcliffe Abbeycrest PLC v
11 K M Benson Abbeycrest PLC v
12 L Rogers AIM PLC v
13 M C Stoddart Bullough PLC v
14 M N Lever Abbeycrest PLC v
15 Richard Olver Reuters PLC v
16 Rupert Mark Pearson PLC v
17 Shaun Bowden Eurocopy PLC v
18 Sir John Craven Reuters PLC v
19 Sir John Pickard Bullough PLC v
20 Sir Noel Davies Ricardo PLC v
21 T Black Peter Black Holdings v
22 Vernon Sankey Photo me International PLC v
FIGURE 75 RESPONDENTS
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